^ 


C^SAR. 

From  a  Colossal  Bust  in  the  Museum  at  Naple* 


CESAR'S   ARMY: 


A  STUDY  OF  THE 


MILITARY  ART  OF  THE  ROMANS  IN  THE  LAST 
DAYS   OF   THE   REPUBLIC. 


BY  ^ 


U05 
^^3 


HARRY    PRATT  JUDSON. 


GINN  AND  COMPANY 

BOSTON     •     NEW  YORK     •     CHICAGO     •     LONDON 
ATLANTA     •     DALLAS     •     COLUMBUS     •     SAN  FRANCISCO 


eOSTON  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 
CHESTNUT  win     MAQC 


cOt  V 


I 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1888,  by 

HARRY   PRATT  JUDSON, 

in  the  Office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  WashingtoUc 

521.3 


GINN  AND  COMPANY  •  PRO- 
PRIETORS •  BOSTON  •  U.S.A. 


PREFACE. 


This  little  book  is  an  attempt  to  reconstruct  Caesar's  Army  so 
as  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  its  composition  and  evolutions.  It  is 
hoped  that  students  of  Caesar's  writings  and  students  of  military 
science  alike  may  find  interest  in  such  a  study. 

The  Commentaries  of  Caesar  are  the  story  of  his  wars.  They 
are  military  history.  It  is  true  that  they  were  intended  largely 
for  civilian  readers  at  Rome.  Still,  they  imply  throughout  a 
certain  amount  of  military  knowledge  that  all  Roman  citizens 
were  supposed  to  have.  The  modern  student  can  hardly  be 
said  to  read  understandingly,  unless  the  text  conveys  to  his 
mind  the  same  idea  that  it  conveyed  to  the  intelligent  Roman 
reader  to  whom  Caesar  addressed  it.  Hence  it  seems  clear  that 
we  should  at  least  seek  to  gain  those  notions  of  the  military 
art  with  which  the  Roman  reader  was  familiar,  and  in  the  light 
of  which  Caesar  described  his  campaigns. 

Many  of  these  facts  are  entirely  lost.  Many  others  we  can 
reach  at  best  only  approximately.  Our  inferences,  based  some- 
times on  meagre  data,  may  often  be  erroneous.  And  yet  is  it 
not  better  to  have  even  such  an  inadequate  idea  than  no  idea 
at  all? 

It  is  needless  to  say  that  in  these  pages  the  work  of  modern 
scholars  has  been  laid  heavily  under  contribution.  Especially 
the  exhaustive  and  ingenious  treatise  of  Riistow  has  been  followed 
m  many  particulars.  It  has  been  the  aim  of  the  author  to  reach 
the  truth,  and  to  present  it  as  clearly  as  he  could,  giving  credit 


IV  ~  PREFACE. 

where  the  investigations  of  others  have  been  of  use,  and  never 
hesitating  to  set  forth  different  conclusions  where  the  circum- 
stances seem  to  warrant. 

War  is  barbarism.  But  the  story  of  man  has  no  epoch  in 
which  war  has  not  existed.  The  history  of  war  is  the  history  of 
the  development  of  the  human  mind.  The  military  science  of 
each  age  is  almost  the  exact  reflex  of  the  civilization  of  that  age. 
And  no  study  of  the  achievements  of  man  can  be  complete  unless 
we  understand  the  method  of  the  hostile  coUision  of  nations. 

The  history  of  military  science  is  yet  to  be  written.  Thus  far, 
only  some  fragments  exist.  This  work  is  intended  as  an  ess2iy 
at  grouping  and  illustrating  some  such  fragments. 

The  University  of  Minnesota, 
Minneapolis,  February,  1888. 


CONTENTS. 


I. 

PAGE 

THE  ORGANIZATION .  i 

^    I.   The  Infantry  of  the  Legion 2 

{    2.  The  Standards 13 

3.  The  Music 15 

0  4.  The  Baggage  Train 16 

,    5.  The  Auxiliary  Infantry  ...........  18 

^    6.  The  Cavalry .  19 

7.  The  Artillery 20 

8.  The  Staff  and  Staff  Troops 26 

II. 

THE   LEGIONARY 30 

/I.   Enlistment ' 30 

•  2.   Clothing 32 

3.    Armor ^2 

4-   Arms 33 

5.  Baggage 36 

6.  Work 36 

7-   Pay 37 

--8.   Discipline 38 

III. 

TACTICS   OF  THE   LEGION .*....  40 

*     A.   Order  of  Battle 41 

1.  The  Cohort 41 

2.  The  Legion 43 

B.   Order  of  March 46 

1.  The  Cohort 47 

2.  The  Legion 49 


VI  CONTENTS. 

IV. 

PAGE 

TACTICS  OF  THE  CAVALRY 53 


V. 

TACTICS  OF  THE  ARMY 55 

.>    A.  The  Battle 55 

1.  Offensive •     •     •  55 

2.  Defensive 57 

3.  Manner  of  Attack 59 

^   B.  The  March  .    .    .    .    « 62 

1.  The  Advance 64 

2.  The  Retreat 67 

/                          3.   The  Flank  March 68 

4.  Crossing  Streams 70 

C.  The  Camp 70 

,    I.  The  Summer  Camp 71 

1.  The  Site .  71 

2.  The  Fortification 72 

(a)  The  Ground  Plan 72 

(3)  The  Elevation 73 

1.  The  Ditch •     •    •  73 

2.  The  Wall 76 

3.  The  Interior 78 

4.  Arrangement  of  the  Cohorts     ...  81 

5.  Arrangement  of  Cavalry 82 

6.  Time  needed  for  Fortifying       ...  82 
\                                  7.  Camp  Duties 84 

II.  The  Winter  Camp 86 

D.  The  Siege 87 

V    I.  Blockade     . 87 

2.  Assault 89 

3.  Regular  Siege 90 

(a)  Construction  of  the  Agger 93 

*    (Jf)  Siege  Apparatus 96 


VI. 

THE  SHIPS   AND   SEA-FIGHTS    .....     0    ....  102 


CONTENTS.  VU 

VII. 

PAGE 

THE  ENEMY >     ...  104 

A.  Defence  of  Fortified  Towns 104 

B.  The  Gallic  Array  and  Arms 106 

C.  The  British  Chariots 108 

MAPS  AND  PLANS  ILLUSTRATING  THE  GALLIC  WAR .  109 
INDEX  TO   LATIN   MILITARY  TERMS 125 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS. 


Caesar Frontispiece 

Fig.     I.    Aquila 13 

"       2.    Signum 13 

"       3.     Vexillum 13 

"       4.   Aquilifer 14 

"       5.    Buccina 15 

"       6.    Tuba 15 

"       7.    Cornu 15 

"       8.    Infantry  soldiers 18 

''       9.   Cavalryman 19 

^*     10.    Cataptdta 21 

"     II.    Ballista o     .  22 

"     12.    Scorpio 24 

£,egionary 30 

Fig.  13.    Scutum 33 

"     14.    Gladius »     .  33 

"     15.    Pilum 34 

"     16.    Pilu77i    o ,     . 34 

"     17.    Maniple 42 

"     18.    Cohort  in  Line  of  Battle 41 

"     19.    Legion  in  Triple  Line 44 

"     20.   Cohort  in  Column  of  Maniples .     .  41 

"     21.   Cohort  in  Column  of  Centuries 41 

"     22.   Cohort  in  Column  of  Centuries 41 

"     23.   Legion  marching  in  Lines 44 

"     24.    Legion  marching  by  Wings 44 

"  25.   Legion  marching  in  Square    ..........  <p 

"     26.    Bridge  over  the  Rhine 69 

"     27.   The  Summer  Camp 72 

«     28.   Wall  and  Ditch   .     , 74 

"  29.   Fossa  Punica  ...     ....     ....     o     ..     .  75 


LIST    OF    ILLUSTRATIONS.  X 

PAGE 

Fig.  30.    Fossa  directis  lateribus 7^ 

"     31.    Fortifying  the  Camp ^t^ 

"     32.    Oppiignatio 88 

"     ^jT).    Horizontal  Section  of  Agger 90 

"     34.    Vertical  Section  of  Agger  and  Hostile  Wall       .     .     .     .92 

"     35.    General  View  of  Siege  Operations 94 

"     36.   Musculus 97 

"     37.   Musculus 97 

"     1%.     Vinea 98 

"     39.    Pluteus 98 

"     40,    Pluteus •  ,     .     .  99 

"     41.    Pluteus 99 

"     42.    Caesar's  Circumvallation  at  Alesia    .     .     .     „     .     .     .     ,  100 

"     43.    Liliuni  . .  loi 

"     44.    Section  of  Galley io> 

"     45.    Horizontal  Section  of  Gallic  Wall  ........  10^ 

"     46.    Vertical  Section  of  Gallic  Wall 105 

"     47.   The  British  Attack  with  Chariots     ,     .     .     .     ,     .     .     .  lo? 

Plan        I.  Fortifications  on  the  Rhone     ....^.....iir 

"         11.  Battle  with  Helvetians 112 

"        III.  Battle  with  Ariovistus 1 13 

"        IV.  Battle  on  the  Aisne 114 

"    '    V.  Battle  on  the  Sambre lie 

"        VI.  Siege  of  Aduatuca ^.     ......  116 

"      VII.  Campaign  against  the  Veneti 117 

"    VIII.  Siege  of  Avaricum 118 

"        IX.  Siege  of  Gergovia 119 

"         X.  March  of  Labienus  against  Lutetia 120 

"        XL  Defeat  of  Vercingetorix .     . .  121 

"      XII.  Siege  of  Alesia 122 

"    XIII.  Campaign  against  the  Bellovaci  ....,,..  123 

"     XIV.  Siege  of  Uxellodunum ••<,,..  124 

Campaign  Maps :  — 

I.  Gaul  in  the  time  of  Csesar. 
II.  Campaign  of  B.C.  58. 

III.  Campaign  of  B.C.  57. 

IV.  Campaigns  of  B.C.  55  and  54. 

V.  Britain  in  Campaigns  of  B.C.  55  and  54. 
VI.  Campaign  of  B.C.  52. 


ABBREVIATIONS. 


A.  =  Caesar  de  Bella  Africano> 
App.  =  Appian. 
B.  G.  =  Caesar  de  Bella  Gallico. 

C.  =  Caesar  de  Bella  Civili. 
Dio.  =  Dion  Cassius. 

G.  =  Goler,  Caesars  Gallischer  Krieg,  Tubingen,  1880. 
Gen.  =  Albericus  Gentilis,  De  Armis  Roraanis. 
Gro.  =  Grotefend,  Zur  Romischen  Legions  geschichte. 
H.  =  Caesar  de  Bella  Hispanico. 
Jal  =  Jal,  La  Flotte  de  C^sar. 
Jung  =  Jung,  Leben  und  Sitten  der  Romer  in  der  Kaiserzeit. 
K.  =  Krohl,  De  Legionibus  Reipublicae  Romanae. 
Lange  =  Lange,  Mutationum  Historia. 

L.  =  Lindenschmidt,  Die  Alterthiimer  unser  heidnischer  Vorzeit. 
M.  =  Marquardt-Mommsen,  Handbuch  der  Rom.  Alterthiimer,  Bd.  5, 1884- 
N.  =  Nissen,  Das  Templum. 
N.  =  Histoire  de  Jules  Cesar,  par  Napoldon  III. 
Notes  =  Notes  to  Allen  and  Greenough's  New  Caesar. 
P.  =  Polybius. 
Plut.  Cses.  =  Plutarch's  Caesar. 
Plut.  Pomp.  =  Plutarch's  Pompey. 

R.  =  Riistow,  Heerwesen  und  Kriegfiihrung  Casars. 
R.  K.  =  Riistow  and  Kochly,  Geschichte  des  Griechischen  Kriegwesens. 
Ro.  =  Robertson,  History  of  Charles  V. 
Sch.  A.  =  Schambach,  Die  Artillerie  bei  Casar. 
Sch.  R.  =  Schambach,  Die  Reiterei  bei  Casar. 
Schef.  =  Scheffer,  De  Militia  Navali  Veterum,  1654. 
Suet.  =  Suetonius. 
T.  G.  =  Tacitus,  De  Germania. 

U.  =  Upton's  United  States  Army  Infantry  Tactics,  1883. 
V.  =  Vegetius. 


CESAR'S   ARMY. 


»o>©<oc 

I.    THE   ORGANIZATION. 

1.   THE   INFANTRY    OF   THE   LEGION. 

§  I.  The  chief  strength  of  the  Roman  army  was  the 
legionary  infantry.-^''  The  cavalry  was  merely  auxiliary  to  this 
in  field  operations  and  was  comparatively  weak  in  number. 
The  engines  (corresponding  to  our  artillery)  were  used  in 
siege  operations,  but  very  little  in  the  field.  The  heavy 
infantry  furnished  by  the  allies  {auxilia),  though  generally 
organized  and  trained  after  the  Roman  model,  were  rather 

used  to  make  a  show   of  force    than  for  much  important 

•         •      -k  ..1  E.G.  Ill,  25 

service  m  battle. 

The  European  armies  of  the  middle  ages  were  composed  almost  „  t  «  tt 
wholly  of  cavalry;  the  individual  horseman  being  encased  in  heavy  p.  go,  81. 
armor  and  equipped  with  sword,  spear  and  battle-axe.  In  modern 
armies  the  infantry  is  again  the  main  arm  of  the  service.  Unlike  the 
Roman  legions,  however,  our  infantry  is  greatly  strengthened  by  a 
powerful  field  artillery.  No  army  of  mere  cavalry  can  be  very  effective 
unless  in  partial  and  temporary  operations. 

§  2.  The  tactical  unit  of  the  Roman  infantry  was  the 
legion  {legio) .  Csesar  had  under  his  command  at  different 
times  a  varying  number  of  legions. 

A  tactical  unit  may  be  defined  as  a  body  of  troops  under  a  single 
command,  by  a  combination  of  several  of  which  a  higher  unit  is  formed. 
Thus  in  the  army  of  the  United  States,  the  tactical  unit  of  the  army  U-  §§  365, 
is  the  corps ;  each  corps  should  contain  three  divisions  ;  each  division,  55it7i8, 748. 
three  brigades;   each  brigade,  four  regiments  (or  battalions);    each 


2  CiESARS   ARMY. 

regiment,  ten  companies.  The  company  is  the  lowest  unit  of  organiza^ 
tion  in  the  United  States  army. 

The  organization  of  European  armies  is  in  the  main  similar  to  that 
of  our  own  country;  the  main  difference  being  in  the  size  and  sub- 
division of  the  regiment. 

Each  tactical  unit  has  a  commanding  officer,  who  receives  orders 
from  the  commander  of  the  next  higher  unit.  Thus,  the  captain  of  a 
company  reports  for  orders  to  the  colonel  of  his  regiment;  the  colonel, 
to  his  brigade  commander  (usually  a  brigadier-general),  etc.,  etc.  Each 
commanding  officer  regulates  the  formation  and  movements  of  his  com- 
mand by  a  combination  of  the  proximate  units  of  which  it  is  composed; 
his  orders  being  given  to  the  commanders  of  those  units. 

§  3.  The  Roman  legions  were  designated  by  numbers, 
probably  given  according  to  priority  in  formation.  The 
corps  of  a  modern  army  are  distinguished  in  like  manner. 

Caesar  had  under  his  command  in  Gaul,  at  different  times,  the  legions 
numbered  I,  III,  VII,  VIII,  IX,  X,  XI,  XII,  XIII,  XIV,  XV. 

B  G  I  7^  When  he  came  to  Geneva,  in  the  spring  of  the  year  58  B.C.,  he 

found  only  one  legion  stationed  in  the  farther  province.     This  was  the 

B.G.  1,  40  .  ^Qi^  (Legio  X),  afterwards  so  distinguished  for  fidelity  and  courage. 
As  soon  as  the  Helvetians  set  out  through  the  territory  of  the  Sequani, 
Caesar  hastened  to  Hither  Gaul,  enrolled  two  new  legions  (XI  and 
p  3  XII),*  and  called  from  their  winter  quarters  the  three  (VII,  VIII,  and 
IX)  that  were  stationed  in  that  province.  It  was  these  six  legions, 
together  with  auxiliaries  (both  horse  and  foot),  that  composed  the  army 
with  which  the  Helvetians  were  conquered  and  Ariovistus  was  driven 
across  the  Rhine. 

In  the  campaigns  of  the  years  57,  56  and  55  Caesar  had  eight  legions; 
the  six  used  in  the  previous  year,  58,  and  two  of  new  levies  (Legioneis 
XIII  and  XIV). 

E.G.  V,  243.        In  the  year  54,  probably  in  the  spring,  C^sar  enlisted  a  new  legion 

G.  169.  (XV).     The  14th  was  divided.     Five  of  its  ten  cohorts  were  scattered, 

*  We  learn  the  numbers  from  B.  G.  II,  23.  XI  and  XII  are  the  highest 
of  those  numbers,  and  hence  doubtless  belonged  to  the  two  new  legions. 
In  the  after  narrative  Caesar  in  no  case  mentions  a  legion  with  a  number 
higher  than  XII  without  having  previously  referred  to  a  legion  or  legions 
newly  raised.  So  we  have  little  difficulty  in  tracing  the  numbers  of  his 
legions.  The  numbers  are  specifically  given  by  Hirtius  in  his  commentary 
(commonly  called  Bk.  VIII). 


E.G.  II,  i\ 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  3 

the  men  being  used  to  fill  up  the  depleted  ranks  of  the  other  legions. 
Thus  Caesar  had  in  that  year  eight  and  a  half  legions  under  arms.  Of 
these,  fifteen  cohorts  (all  of  Legion  XV  and  five  cohorts  of  Legion 
XI.V)  were  destroyed  with  Sabinus. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  53  B.C.,  Pompey  loaned  Caesar  E.G. 
two  legions  (I  and  III).     One  new  one  was  raised,  which  received  the  ^^'  ^>  'i'^"- 
same  number  (XIV)  as  the  one  Caesar  had  divided,  and  of  which  five  ^tg°^' 
cohorts  were  lost  with  Sabinus.     These  ten  legions  were  used  in  the 
operations  of  the  year  52. 

In  the  commentary  written  by  Hirtius  Pansa  (de  Bello  Gallico,  Bk.  ^  o 

VIII)    the  legions  are   repeatedly  mentioned  by  number;    although,  n,  24,  54. 

unfortunately,  with  considerable  confusion  where  the  Mss.  agree,  and  ^-G.  VIII, 

.  .  .  .  ^  2, 24, 54. 

moreover  with  considerable  variation  in  the  Mss.     If  we  should  follow  ^  p  y^^y 

the  text  of  Pansa,  we  should  find  the  12th  legion  in  three  different  places  2,  24. 

at  the  same  time :  then,  too,  he  mentions  a  6th  legion,  which  we  no-  B.G.VIII,  4. 

where  else  find  in  Caesar's  army.     However,  by  using  some  care  we  can  g.  pp.  333, 

trace  the  different  legions  from  place  to  place  pretty  accurately.     It  is  334. 336,  338, 

clear  enough  that  in  his  last  campaign  in  Gaul,  Caesar  had  eleven  legions,  ^'^°'  ^j^'  ^P" 

.  .  .  3S4»  3^3'  3^9; 

although  Pansa  makes  no  mention  of  the  levy  of  the  additional  legion.  373,  374. 

Very  possibly  it  was  numbered  XV,  as  Gciler  conjectures,  to  take  the 

place  of  that  Legio  XV  that  had  been  destroyed  with  Sabinus  in  54  B.C. 

For  a  careful  study  of  the  history  of  Caesar's  legions,  see  the  dissc- 

tation  of  J.  G.  Krohl,  De  Legionibus  Reipublicae  Romanae. 

§  4.  The  officers  in  command  of  a  legion  were  originally 
the  military  tribunes  {tribuni  milituni),  six  in  number.  These 
were  appointed  partly  by  the  Comitia  at  Rome,  partly  by  the 
consul,  or,  frequently,  by  the  proconsul  himself;  but  always 
from  the  knights  or  nobles.  The  old  requirement  of  mili- 
tary experience  had  become  obsolete  in  Caesar's  time,  so  e.g.  i,  39 
that  the  tribunes  were  mostly  selected  mainly  from  political 
considerations.  It  can  readily  be  seen  that  this  did  not  add 
to  their  efficiency.  The  six  assigned  to  each  legion  were 
divided  into  three  pairs,  and  each  pair  took  the  command 
for  two  months.  During  this  period  the  two  alternated  on 
duty  day  by  day.  This  custom  seems  an  odd  survival  of  the 
peculiar  Roman  jealousy  of  a  single  command,  as  in  the  case 
of  the  consuls.  Their  duties  were,  a  general  superintendence 
of  the  legion,  the  nomination  and  assignment  to  duty  of  the 


4  Cesar's  army. 

centurions,  and  to  preside  at  courts-martial.     They  were 

B.G.  Ill,  f.  often  detached  to  obtain  supplies,  such  tribunes  being  very 

probably  from  the  four  not  on  duty  with  the  legion.     They 

B.G.  1, 41.    formed  the  natural  channel  for  petitions  or  other  communi- 

B.G.  IV,      cation   from  the  soldiers  to  the  general.      They  were  also 

summoned  to  councils   of  war  by  the  commander  of  the 

army.     The    tribunes,  like    the  staff  of  a  modern  infantry 

regiment,  were  mounted. 

This  constant  change  in  command  and  variety  of  duties, 

together  with  the  merely  political  source  from  which  most 

of  the  tribunes  came,  made  them  hardly  reliable  to  lead 

soldiers  in  battle,  and  Caesar  accordingly  soon  devised  a 

B.G.  better  plan.     Without  displacing  the  tribunes,  he  stationed 

T     C2 '    II    20 ' 

V,  ji'  254,  '  a  legatus  (§  30)  with  each  legion  — in  the  first  place  merely 
472,  also       ag  a  witness  for  the  general  of  the  way  in  which  each  officer 

notes,  p.  64; 

M.  V.  457.  and  soldier  performed  his  duty,  afterwards  as  the  actual 
commander  of  the  legion  in  battle.  This  important  reform 
of  Caesar  remained  under  the  empire  ;  the  legate  so  assigned 
being  distinguished  as  legatus  legionis  (§  29). 

R,  12.  Rustow  considers  the  duties  of  the  tribunes  to  have  been  mainly  ad- 

ministrative and  judicial;    i.e.,  as  having  to  do  with  an  oversight  of  the 
rations   and   equipments  of  the  troops,  and  vi^ith  the   cognizance   of 
v'  ^2-  VII '   military  oifences.    This  is  true  as  far  as  it  goes.    Still,  we  meet  repeated 
47,  52, 62.      instances  in   which   the  tribunes  undoubtedly  commanded   in    actual 
B.G.  VI,  39.   battle.      Their  command  of  detachments  composed  of  one  or  more  co- 
horts, is  not  infrequent.     The  many  duties  of  the  tribunes  are  divided 
among  a  number  of  officers  in  a  modern  army.     The  quartermaster 
(whether  of  brigade,  regiment,  or  company)  sees  to  arms,  equipments, 
and  clothing.     The  commissary  provides   food.       Courts-martial   are 
composed  of  details  from  the  various  officers.     Thus  the  whole  admin- 
istration of  the  army  is  systematized  and  made  more  effective. 

§  5.  The  normal  or  full  strength  of  a  legion  in  Caesar's 
time  we  have  no  adequate  means  of  learning.  This  is  to  be 
regretted,  as  a  knowledge  of  the  fact  in  question  would  help  us 
to  comprehend  the  Roman  tactics.     However,  the  effective 


THE   ORGANIZATION.  5 

Strength  in  the  field  we  can  estimate  with  tolerable  accu- 
racy. From  the  experience  of  modern  armies  we  know  that 
the  number  of  effectives  ready  for  duty  in  the  field  always 
falls  considerably  below  the  number  on  the  rolls  j  and  again, 
that  even  the  number  on  the  rolls  rarely  approximates  very 
closely  to  the  full  strength  of  any  organization  as  prescribed 
by  the  tactics.  And  we  may  be  very  sure  that  in  like  manner 
the  effective  strength  of  any  legion  must  have  varied  con- 
stantly with  the  exigencies  of  the  campaign  —  always,  how- 
ever, or  nearly  always,  being  less  than  that  of  a  full  legion 
just  recruited. 

In  his  account  of  the  battle  of  Pharsalia,  Caesar  speaks 
especially  of  the  great  depletion  some  of  his  legions  had  suf- 
fered.    In  that  battle  his  legions  had  an  average  strength  of  c.  iii,  88, 
2750  men.     Those  of  Pompey  averaged  a  little  over  4000. 
Riistow  estimates  the  average  effective  force  of  the  legions  r.  p.  3. 
throughout  Caesar's  campaigns  at  from  3000  to  3600  men. 
Goler  puts  the  normal  strength  at  about  4800,  besides  300  g.  p.  213. 
antesignani  (§  36).   These  estimates  cannot  be  far  from  the 
truth. 


Caesar  in  one  place  speaks  of  a  detachment  of  two  legions  of  infantry  b.g.  V,  49 
and  a  few  cavalry  as  hardly  7000  strong.  That  would  make  about  3500 
to  the  legion. 

In  the  return  from  Britain  in  B.C.  55,  two  transports  came  to  land  b.q.  yv  36 
below  the  main  port,  and  the  soldiers  debarked  and  marched  overland.  37- 
From  these  two  ships  300  soldiers  landed.     Assuming  the  two  trans- 
ports to  have  been  of  about  the  same  size,  that  would  average  150  men  to 
a  ship.     Now  Csesar  had  80  transports  and  an  unknown  number  of  ^-G-  IV, 
galleys.     He  lost  12  vessels  in  the  storm.     It  seems  likely  that  those  12       '  ^^  * 
were  transports,  as  they  lay  at  anchor,  and  hence  would  be  more  exposed 
to  the  storm  than  the  galleys,  which  were  hauled  up  on  the  beach. 
Then   at  that  rate  the   68  transports  remaining  carried  10,200  men.  g  q^  notes. 
Allowing   for   staff  officers    and  servants,  the   two  legions  must  have  P*  'SS- 
averaged  somewhat  less  than  5000  men.     At  the  outbreak  of  the  civil 
war,  Caesar  had  with  him  at  Aii minium  only  the  XIII  Legion  (C.  I,  7). 
But  Plutarch  (^Cces.  32)  says  that  Csesar  had  at  that  time  5000  men. 


6  CiESAR  S    ARMY. 

So  we  may  fairly  assume  that  that  number  was  in  round  numbers  tht 
strength  of  a  lesion  when  its  ranks  were  full. 


Gellius, 
i6,  4,  6. 


C.  I,  64; 
111,91. 


§  6.  The  legion  was  divided  into  ten  cohorts  {cohortes)  ; 
each  cohort  into  three  maniples  {nianipuli)  ;  each  maniple 
into  two  centuries  {centuriae,  ordines). 

The  tactical  unit  of  the  legion  was  the  cohort;  of  the 
cohort,  the  maniple. 

The  half  of  the  maniple  Caesar  usually  calls  oi^do.  The  term  centuria 
occurs  only  twice  in  the  Commentaries;  and  it  is  at  least  doubtful  in 
each  case  whether  reference  is  made  to  the  divisions  of  the  maniple  at 
all.  We  should  notice  that  the  word  ordo  is  also  used  in  other  senses 
than  the  above.  It  often  means  a  rank,  or  line,  of  soldiers;  often  a 
relation  of  rank  among  officers,  as  p7'i?noriim  ordimini  centurioties , 
sometimes  it  refers  to  the  officers  themselves;  and  frequently  it  denotes* 
a  mere  position  in  the  array. 

The  maniple,  as  the  tactical  unit  of  the  cohort,  consisted  from  day 
to  day  of  the  same  men,  so  far  as  these  were  present.  Each  time  the 
maniple  was  formed,  it  was  divided,  presumably  according  to  the  heigh>. 
of  the  soldiers,  into  two  equal  parts.  These  were  the  ordines.  Thus  i*" 
will  be  seen  that  these  did  not  necessarily  consist  from  day  to  day  of 
the  same  men;  as,  of  course,  if  any  should  be  absent,. the  division  would 
not  be  made  at  the  same  point  in  the  line  on  successive  days.  The  ordo 
corresponded  exactly  to  the  platoon  of  an  American  company.  Th>. 
maniple  corresponded  to  our  company. 

§  7.  With  Goler's  estimate  of  4800  men  to  the  legion, 
each  cohort  would  contain  480  men  \  and  each  maniple,  1 60 
men.  Rlistow's  computations  are  based  on  an  average 
strength  in  the  field  of  3600  in  the  legion.  That  would 
give  360  to  the  cohort,  and  120  to  the  maniple. 

§  8.  Each  maniple  was  under  the  command  of  two  cen- 
turions (^cefituriones) ,  one  (the  senior  in  rank)  in  charge  of 
the  first  ordo  ;  the  other  (the  junior),  in  charge  of  the  second 
ordo.  Each  centurion  probably  had  a  subcenturion  {optio) 
to  assist  him.  The  optio  was  chosen  from  the  ranks  by  the 
PauiusDiac.  ceuturiou.      The    centurion,  like    the   line    officers   of  our 


Varro; 

Festus ; 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  7 

infantry,  was  on  foot.  As  a  badge  of  his  office,  he  carried  a 
short  staff  {viHs),  or  baton;  this  was  in  token  of  his  power 
of  inflicting  punishment. 

§  9.    Of  the  six  centurions  in  a  cohort,  the  senior  centu-  m.  v, 
rion  of  the  first  maniple  was  called  pilus  prior ;  the  junior,  368-374" 
pilus  posterior.     The  senior  of  the  second  maniple  was  prin- 
ceps  prior,  and  the  junior  ^2i^  princeps  posterior.   The  senior 
of  the  third  maniple  was  hastatus  prior,  and  the  junior,  has- 
tatus  posterior. 

Thus  the  terms  piius,  princeps,  hastatus  referred  to  the  first,  second, 
and  third  maniple  respectively.  This  is  plainly  a  survival  of  the  old 
organization,  in  which  the  soldiers  of  the  first  line  were  called /z'/awe 
(^pili),  those  of  the  stcoud.  principes,  and  those  of  the  third  hastati  (or 
triarii').  Such  distinction  was  entirely  lost  as  applied  to  the  soldiers, 
m  the  new  organization  of  the  legion  by  cohorts.  The  only  traces  of 
it  we  find  in  the  three  maniples  whose  union  formed  a  cohort,  and  in 
>he  titles  of  the  centurions  of  those  maniples. 

We  readily  learn  the  ordo  the  centurion  commanded  by  the  epithet 
■prior  for  the  first  dind.  poste^-ior  for  the  second. 

The  cohort  to  which  a  centurion  belonged  was  indicated 
by  its  number  in  the  legion ;  e.g.,  the  lowest  centurion  in  a 
legion  was  decii7ius  hastatus  posterior;  tertius  hastatus  prior 
would  refer  to  the  centurion  in  command  of  the  first  ordo  of 
the  third  maniple  of  the  third  cohort ;  and  the  senior  cen- 
turion of  the  whole  legion  was  primus  pilus  prior,  or  simply 
p7'imipilus. 

§  10.    The  senior  centurion  of  a  maniple  must  have  com-  m.  v, 
manded  the  maniple.    Each  cohort  was  under  the  command  37i-72« 
of  its  pilus  prior ;  and  the  primipilus,  at  least  in  time  of 
battle,  practically  directed  the  legion. 

Such  an  arrangement  would  hardly  be  feasible  in  a  modern  army. 
Only  the  solidity  and  uniformity  o^  the  Roman  array  made  it  possible 
for  them. 


8  ;.  Caesar's  army. 

R.  p.  II.  §  ii«  The  position  and  duties  of  a  centurion  corresponded 

very  nearly  with  those  of  non-commissioned  officers  in  a 
modern  army.  They  were  chosen  from  the  ranks,  as  are  our 
sergeants  and  corporals,  and  were  very  rarely  promoted  to 
the  grade  of  tribune.  However,  their  responsibihties  (not 
their  rank)  were  in  some  respects  (§  lo)  like  those  of  our 
commissioned  officers.  The  centurions  were  usually  nomi- 
nated by  the  tribunes.  They  received  their  appointment, 
however,  from  the  commanding  general. 

§  12.  The  relative  rank  of  the  ceLturions  in  a  cohort  is 
not  difficult  to  learn,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  it  was  as 
explained  in  the  sections  just  preceding.  The  order  of  their 
rank  throughout  the  legion,  however,  —  or,  in  other  words, 
the  rank  of  the  centurions  of  any  one  cohort  relatively  to 
those  of  any  other,  —  is  quite  a  different  matter.  We  have 
no  clear  and  positive  information  on  the  subject,  and  the 
various  theories  formed  are  based  on  isolated  references,  and 
on  inferences  from  the  general  spirit  of  the  Roman  organiza- 
tion and  from  the  probable  course  that  human  nature,  as  we 
know  it,  would  take  under  conditions  like  those  in  which  the 
Romans  were. 

The  main  facts  with  which  any  theory  must  accord,  are 
the  following :  — 

1 .  The  centurions  were  plainly  divided  into  classes  accord- 
ing to  rank.  There  is  constant  reference  to  those  of  the  first 
class  {primorum  ordinuin).    Caesar  in  one  place  speaks  of  a 

C.  Ill  S3,  centurion  who  for  especial  gallantry  was  promoted  from  the 
eighth  class  {^ab  octavis  ordinibits)  to  the  position  oi priiJiipi- 
lus,  senior  centurion  of  the  first  cohort  (§9). 

2.  We  may  infer  from  this  last  reference  {ab  octavis 
ordinibus)  that  there  were  at  least  eight  classes.  Of  course 
there  may  have  been  more. 

3.  From  an  expression  of  Tacitus  (Hist.  HI,  22  :  occisi 
sex  primorum  ordimi7n  centuriones)  we  infer  that  at  that 


B.G.  I,  41^ 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  9 

time  there  were  at  least  six  centurions  of  the  first  class.  As 
the  time  to  which  he  refers  was  that  of  the  emperor  Galba, 
not  much  more  than  a  century  after  Juhus  Caesar,  it  seems 
likely  that  no  material  change  had  been  made  meanwhile. 

4.  A  passage  in  Vegetius  (II,  21)  gives  us  some  idea  of 
the  order  of  promotion.     We  quote  :  — 

Nam  quasi  in  orbejn  quemdam  per  diversas  scholas  milites 
pronioventur,  ita  ut  ex  prima  cohorte  ad  gradum  quetnpiam 
promotus  vadat  ad  decimam  cohortem  ;  et  rui'sus  ab  ea,  cres- 
centibus  stipendiis,  cum  majore  gradu  per  alias  reatrrit  ad 
primam. 

5.  The  centurions  of  the  first  class  {pri7?tomm  ordinum)  e.g.  v,  282 
held  so  high  rank  that  they  were  regularly  invited  to  the  ^^'  ^*'* 
council  of  war,  in  company  with  the  tribuni  militum  and 

legati. 

On  these  and  a  few  minor  facts,  ingenious  military  antiquarians  have 
constructed  very  elaborate  and  very  diverse  theories.  The  most  promi- 
nent of  these  theories,  with  a  few  considerations  both  for  and  against 
them,  are  as  follows :  — 

RUstow  conjectures  that  the  centurions  of  each  cohort  form  one  r  „„_  g_ji 
class.  There  would  then  be  ten  classes  in  the  legion,  with  six  in  each 
class.  The  regular  order  of  promotion  would  be,  through  all  the  six 
grades  of  the  tenth  cohort,  then  from  the  sixth  through  to  the  first 
place  in  the  ninth  cohort;  and  in  like  manner  until  every  grade 
had  been  passed  to  that  of  primipilus.  According  to  this  view,  the 
centuriones  primorum  ordinum  were  those  of  the  first  cohort,  six  in 
number. 

It  will  be  seen  that  this  scheme  accords  with  2  and  3  above.  The 
passage  in  Vegetius  (4  above),  RUstow  gives  this  interpretation :  As 
vacancies  occurred  in  the  ranks  of  any  cohort,  they  were  filled  by  de- 
tailing men  from  the  next  lower  cohort.  Thus  recruits  would  always 
fall  to  the  tenth  cohort,  and  the  first  would  contain  the  very  flower  of 
the  legion.  Hence,  under  ordinary  circumstances,  when  it  became 
necessary  to  appoint  a  centurion,  selection  would  be  made  from  the 
privates  of  the  first  cohort  (presumably  from  its  first  maniple),  and  he 
would  be  assigned  as  a  centurion  (Jiastatus  posterior)  of  the  tenth  co- 
hort {decimus).  Then  he  would  pass  successively  through  the  grades 
of  that  cohort,  then  through  the  grades  of  the  ninth,  and  so  on,  until  he 


322-28. 


lO  CiESAR  S    ARMY, 

became  first  centurion  of  the  first  cohort.    Thus  the  circle  {orbeni)  ox 
service  would  be  complete.* 
G.  pp.  Goler  devises  a  different  scheme.     In  the  first  place,  to  the  60  cen- 

turions of  the  legion  he  adds  60  subcenturions  {pptiones),  making  a 
total  of  120.  The  subcenturions  he  calls  simply  centurions,  just  as  in 
our  army  a  lieutenant-colonel  is  commonly  called  merely  "  colonel,"  or 
a  brigadier-general  is  usually  addressed  as  "  general."  Then  he  makes 
12  classes  of  rank,  each  class  comprising  10  centuriones  ;  i.e.,  one  from 
each  cohort.  The  first  class  {centuriones  prii?iorum  ordinuni)  would 
include  the  \o  pili  prior es,  or,  in  other  words,  the  commanders  of  the 
10  cohorts.  The  second  class  would  be  the  \o  pili  posterior es ;  and  so 
on  through  the  6  classes  of  real  centurions,  the  sixth  being  the  10  has- 
tati  posteriores.  The  seventh  class  he  considers  to  have  been  the  10 
subcenturions  of  the  pili  prior  es  ;  and  in  like  o  der  to  the  twelfth  class;, 
the  10  subcenturions  of  the  hastati  posteriores. 

It  will  at  once  appear  that  this  theory  also  accords  with  the  essential 
points,  3  and  4,  above.     Goler  would  explain  Vegetius  in  this  way :  — 

When  a  private  soldier  was  promoted,  he  became  subcenturion  to  the 
decimus  hastatus  posterior.  As  he  rose  in  rank,  he  passed  from  cohort 
to  cohort,  but  always  as  subcenturion  to  the  hastatus  posterior,  until  he 
reached  that  position  in  the  first  cohort.  His  next  step  in  promotion 
would  lead  him  from  the  twelfth  to  the  eleventh  class,  and  he  would 
return  to  the  tenth  cohort  as  subcenturion  of  the  deci?nus  hastattis  prior. 
Thus  again  and  again  he  would  complete  the  circle  {orbefu'),  going 
through  the  cohorts  6  times  in  the  6  classes  of  subcenturions,  and  6 
times  in  the  6  classes  of  centurions,  until  at  last  he  would  reach  the  rank 
oi primipilus.     Here  his  promotion  usually  ended. 

RUstow  argues  that  the  cohorts,  as  well  as  the  centurions,  were  care- 
fully distinguished  in  rank;  that  it  is  well  known  that  the  earlier  Roman 
custom  of  beginning  the  battle  with  less  experienced  troops,  and  reserv- 
ing the  veterans  for  an  emergency,  had  by  the  time  of  Caesar  been  quite 
reversed;  so  that  the  first  line  of  the  legion  (the  first  four  cohorts) 
must  have  included  the  choice  soldiers;  and  hence  that  the  centurions 
would  in  all  probability  have  been  graded  in  like  manner. 

Marquardt  objects  to  the  scheme  of  RUstow,  that  thereby  promotion 
would  make  the  commander  of  a  cohort  merely  a  subordinate  in  the 
next  higher  cohort,  an  arrangement  quite  impossible  to  the  military 
mind.     Moreover,  as  Goler  says,  the  most  experienced  and  skilled  offi- 

*This  is  an  amplification  of  the  interpretation  of  Vegetius  by  Riistow; 
but  merely  carries  out  the  suggestions  of  the  latter. 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  II 

cers  would  be  grouped  in  the  first  cohort,  and  the  least  experienced 
and  skilled  would  be  gathered  in  the  tenth  —  an  arrangement  obviously 
unpractical. 

Rustow  remarks,  however,  and  the  remark  is  not  without  weight, 
that  there  was  not,  after  all,  a  very  great  difference  between  the  different 
cohorts  of  a  legion  in  point  of  soldiefship;  nor  again  a  very  wide  dis- 
tinction in  the  same  regard  between  the  centurions  and  the  privates. 
The  Roman  organization  was  marked  by  a  peculiar  solidarity,  very 
much  unlike  our  own ;  and  while,  of  course,  the  officers  had  great 
influence  on  the  fortunes  of  the  battle,  yet  that  influence  must  have  B.G.  II,  202 
been  very  considerably  less  than  in  a  modern  army. 

But  the  strongest  point  in  favor  of  some  such  plan  as  that  of  Goler 
is  the  fact  that  the  primi  ordines  are  sometimes  mentioned  in  such  a 
way  as  to  imply  that  they  held  immediate  relations  with  all  the  cohorts 
in  the  legion.  Thus,  after  the  council  of  war  that  preceded  the  opera-  -p  p,  x 
tions  against  Ariovistus,  the  legions  that  had  been  panic-stricken 
arranged  zvith  the  tribunes  and  centurions  of  the  first  class  to  make  their 
apologies  to  Caesar.  This  would  imply  that  the  primi  ordines,  like  the 
tribunes,  were  immediately  accessible  by  all  the  soldiers.  It  would  be 
difficult  to  imagine  the  troops  of  the  other  nine  cohorts  coming  for  such 
a  service  to  the  officers  of  the  first.  Certainly  it  would  seem  more  natu- 
ral for  the  men  of  each  cohort  to  go  to  their  own  commander.  Passages 
of  similar  import  are  quoted  by  Marquardt  from  Livy,  Hyginus,  Tacitus  P'  37i« 
(II,  89),  Frontinus,  and  others.  The  scheme  of  Marquardt,  it  may 
be  noted,  is  the  same  as  Goler's,  without  the  subcenturions.  This 
would  make  but  six  classes,  and  cannot  be  reconciled  with  point  2 
above. 

The  principal  objection  to  the  system  proposed  by  Goler  is  the  fact 
that  subcenturions  seem  not  to  have  been  in  the  grades  of  promotion, 
but  were  more  probably  chosen  from  the  ranks,  each  by  his  own  cen- 
turion (§  8).  If  we  take  away  these,  we  are  at  once  reduced  to  the  six 
classes  of  Marquardt,  and  meet  the  same  difficulty. 

One  striking  difference  between  the  Roman  organization 
and  that  of  modern  armies  is  in  the  matter  of  the  number 
of  officers.  The  Romans  had  far  fewer  than  we.  In  neither 
cohort  nor  maniple  do  we  find  any  trace  of  officers  corre- 
sponding to  the  commissioned  officers  in  one  of  our  compa- 
nies, or  even  to  our  relatively  numerous  corporals.  The 
centurions  seemed  to  have  all  the  functions  that  we  should 


12  CiESAR  S    ARMY. 

assign  to  sergeants.  They  must,  besides  that,  have  exer- 
cised at  least  a  portion  of  the  duties  of  general  supervision 
and  command  that  belong  to  a  captain  and  lieutenants  of 
our  infantry.  Each  prio7'  centurion  must  have  had  some 
such  general  authority  over  his  maniple ;  and  each  pilus 
prior,  besides  the  direction  of  his  maniple,  must  have  had 
some  charge  of  the  cohort.  For  the  command  of  the  legion, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Roman  methods  provided. 

The  objection  of  Marquardt  to  Rustow's  scheme  of  rank 
apphes  with  equal  force  both  to  Marquardt's  ov,ai  plan  and  to 
Goler's,  as  well  as  to  Rustow's.  According  to  the  scheme  of 
either  of  the  two  former,  a  centurion  who  had  commanded 
maniples,  e.g.,  primus  hastatus  prior,  on  promotion  would 
become  second  in  command  of  a  maniple,  e.g.,  decimus  prin- 
ceps  posterior.  This  would  be  quite  as  little  according  to 
modern  military  ideas  as  to  promote  the  commander  of  a 
cohort  to  a  subordinate  place  in  another  cohort.  Then  to 
make  the  two  theories  named  quite  consistent,  we  should 
make  the  first  three  classes  contain  the  priores,  in  the  order 
oi  pili,  principes,  and  hastati ;  and  the  second  three  classes 
should  comprise  the  posteriores,  in  the  same  order. 

This,  however,  would  provide  for  but  six  classes,  and  we 
see  that  there  must  have  been  not  less  than  eight  (2,  above). 
If  we  adopt  the  view  of  Goler,  and  add  six  classes  of  sub- 
centurions  to  the  six  of  centurions,  we  at  once  run  counter 
to  a  strong  probability  that  subcenturions  (^optiones)  were 
not  in  the  regular  line  of  promotion,  but  were  chosen  each 
by  his  own  centurion.  At  least,  this  seems  to  have  been  the 
Livy;  fact  both  before  and  after  the  time  of  Caesar;  and  hence 

FeTus-         ^^^^  likely  was  not  different  at  that  time.     A  fair  verdict  on 
Pauius         each  of  the  ingenious  theories  thus  far  propounded  would 
perhaps  be,  "  not  proven." 


THE    ORGANIZATION. 


13 


2.     THE    STANDARDS. 


§   13.    Each  legion  had  as  its  standard  an  eagle  {aquila,  cm, 64. 
Fig.  i),  usually  of  bronze  or  silver,  on  a  wooden  staff.     This 

was  entrusted  to  the  care  of  the 
first  cohort,  and  usually  to  its 
senior  centurion  {primipilus) , 
Hence  this  officer  was  sometimes 
called  aquilifer;  though  the  same 
term  was  applied  to  the  men  he 
selected   to   carry   the   standard 

(Fig.  4)- 

Each  cohort,  also,  had  a  stand-  b.g.  ii,  25 
ard  of  its  own  {signum,  Fig.  2). 
The    bearer   of  this   was   called 
signifer.     Sometimes   the  legion 
for  brevity  was  called  aqi/ila,  and  h.  30. 
in  like  manner  the  cohort  was  denoted  by  signum.   The  signum  h.  18. 
was  usually  an  animal — a  sheep,  for  instance  —  on  a  staff. 
Of  course  it  would  differ  for  different  cohorts,  so  that  the  men 
in  the  confusion  of  battle  might  know  their  proper  place.        b.g.iv,26i 
The  cavalry  and  light      g^ 
troops  (§§  17,  18)    car- 
ried a  vexillum  (Fig.  3). 
This  was  a  little  banner, 
white  or  red,  attached  to 
a  short  horizontal  piece 
of  wood  or  metal   sur- 
mounting the  staff. 
There     was     another 


Fig.  1. 


Fig.  3. 


Fig.  3. 


banner  called  vexillum,  the  standard  of  the  general.     This  b.g.  ii,  20I 
was  white,  with  an  inscription  in  red  letters  giving  the  name  c.  iii,  89. 
of  the  general,  his  army,  etc.     It  was  placed  near  the  gen-  dIo  Cassiua 
eral's  tent  in  the  camp,  and  when  displayed  was  the  sign  for  ^'^*  '^°- 
march  or  battle.  - 


14 


C^SAR  S    ARMY, 


Fig.  4.    A.quilifer» 


G.  pp. 

239-40. 

E.G.  II,  252 

M.  p.  439. 


E.G.  VI, 

40^,  also 


In  the  period  when  the  maniple  was  the  tactical  unit  of  the  legion, 
each  maniple  had  its  sigmim.  Goler  thinks  this  to  have  been  the  case 
even  in  Csesar's  army.  But  a  consideration  of  the  account  of  the  battle 
with  the  Nervii  would  lead  to  a  different  conclusion.  Caesar  relates 
that  of  the  fourth  cohort  all  the  centurions  had  fallen,  the  standard 
bearer  had  been  slain  and  the  standard  lost.  This  certainly  seems  to 
imply  that  the  cohort  had  only  one  standard  and  one  standard-bearer. 

Again,  in  speaking  of  the  flight  of  the  servants  on  one  occasion  when 
a  foraging  party  was  suddenly  attacked,  Caesar  says  se  in  signa  manipu- 


notes,  p.  163.  losque  coniciunt.     We  interpret,  the  servants  threw  themselves  among 


THE    ORGANIZATION. 


IS 


the  cohorts  and  maniples.  That  is,  they  rushed  for  safety  into  the 
intervals  between  the  cohorts  (in  signa),  and  also  even  into  the  smaller 
intervals  between  the  maniples  (in  ??ianipulos) .  Here  signa  seems  to 
refer  to  the  cohorts. 

3.     THE    MUSIC. 

§  14.  The  musical  instruments  used  in  the  Roman  army 
were  the  bugle  {buccina,  Fig.  5),  the  trumpet  {tuba^  Fig.  6), 
the  cavalry  trumpet  {lituus,  Fig.  7),  and  the  horn  (cornu). 
This  last  was  made  of  the  horn  of  a  buffalo,  and  provided 
with  a  silver  mouthpiece.  The  others  were  probably  of 
brass. 


Fig.  5. 


Fig.  6/ 


Fig.  7. 


Caesar  mentions  as  musicians  only  buccinatores  and  tubi- 
cines.  The  former  seem  to  have  used  the  cornu  as  well  as 
the  buccina. 

The  Romans  knew  very  well  a  fact  familiar  to  modem 
tactics,  that,  to  carry  a  command  amid  the  tumult  of  battle 
or.  down  a  long  line  of  march,  the  penetrating  notes  of  a 
brazen  horn  are  much  more  effective  than  the  sound  of  the 
human  voice.  And  accordingly  the  signals  for  the  various 
evolutions  of  march  and  battle  were  given  by  horn  and 
trumpet,  first  by  the  horn,  at  command  of  the  general,  then 
taken  up  by  the  trumpets.  The  bugle  seems  to  have  sounded 
the  divisions  of  the  day — reveille,  noon,  and  night-fall. 


B.G.  II,2oi 
VII,  47'. 
C.  II,  35- 


1 6  CiESAR's    ARMY. 

We  know  that  there  were  more  trumpets  than  horns. 
Quite  hkely  each  maniple  had  its  trumpeter,  and  each  cohort 
its  buccinator, 

4.     THE   BAGGAGE   TRAIN. 

c  I  8i.  §  15-    The  heavy  baggage   of  the  legion   {impedimenta) 

E.G.  V,  i2.    -y^g^g  carried  by  pack-animals  {Jumenta,  jumenta  sarcinaria) , 
either  horses  or  mules.      Wagons  or  carts,  while  occasionally 
used  by  the  army,  were  generally  found  only  with  the  sutlers 
A.  75.  {77iercatores)  who  followed  the  legions.     The  personal  bag- 

gage {sarcinae)  was  carried  by  the  soldiers  (§§  45-48). 

R.pp.  16-19.  §  16.  Riistow  has  made  elaborate  calculations  of  the  quan- 
tity of  baggage  a  legion  must  have  had.  We  follow  his 
estimates  in  the  main,  making  such  adaptations  as  may  be 
warranted  by  deviation  from  his  figures  for  the  size  of  the 
legion. 

We  may  reckon  the  load  of  one  pack-animal  at  200  lbs. 
The  first  thing  would  be  the  tents  {tentoria,  tabernacula). 
These  as  described  by  Hyginus  were  on  a  square  base,  10 
feet  on  a  side,  with  a  wedge  roof.     Ten  men  could  use  such 

Hy.  I.  a  tent.  Hyginus  estimates  8  men  in  a  tent.  Yet  he  allows 
one  to  every  10  men,  as  one-fifth  of  each  contubernium 
should  always  be  on  guard  duty ;  and  hence  of  the  10 
belonging  to  any  one  tent,  only  8  would  ever  occupy  it  at 
the  same  time.  It  seems  safe  to  consider  that  the  contuber- 
nium, a  group  of  soldiers  messing  together  in  a  tent,  was  10 
in  number  also  in  Caesar's  army.  Then,  each  centurion  had 
one  tent.  So  a  maniple  would  need  14  tents  for  the  centu- 
rions and  a  strength  of  120  men.  Allowing  two  for  the  ser- 
vants, the  entire  number  would  be  16.  That  would  make 
48  for  a  cohort,  and  480  for  a  legion.  To  this  number 
must  be  added  those  needed  by  the  six  tribunes  and  their 
servants,  or  perhaps  1 2  more.  If  tents  are  allowed  also  for 
subcenturions,  perhaps  we  should  estimate  60  or  30  more, 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  Ij 

according  as  two  subcenturions  or  one  should  be  allowed  to 
one  tent. 

The  tents  were  of  leather  {pelks) .  The  weight  of  one,  e.g.  hi, 
including  two  upright  poles,  one  ridge-pole,  and  a  supply  'f^'- 
of  pegs,  must  have  been  at  least  40  lbs.  One  horse,  then, 
could  carry  five  such  tents.  It  seems  more  likely,  however, 
that  we  should  estimate  one  pack-animal  to  each  tent ;  i.e., 
one  to  each  centurion  and  one  to  each  contubernium.  In 
this  way  would  be  carried  provisions  for  a  week,  with  hand- 
mills  (§  47),  blankets,,  etc. 

For  pitching  camp  there  must  have  been  needed  a  full 

supply  of  stakes,  tools,  etc.     As  these  were  for  general  use, 

they  could  not  have  been  divided  among  the  pack-animals 

of  the  cohorts.     So  we  may  add  one  animal  tq  each  cohort 

for  this  service.     Thus  the  cohorts  would  have  at  least  49 

beasts.    To  each  beast  should  be  allowed  one  servant  icald),  b.g.  11,242; 

VI,  363. 
who  could  attend  to  a  centurion  or  conticbernium,  and  on 

the  march  would  lead  the  animal  conveying  the  baggage 

under  his  charge. 

The  higher  officers  had,  besides  at  least  two  riding-horses  e.g.  vii, 
each,  a  still  greater  number  of  pack-animals.     We  shall  not   ^  * 
be  far  astray  if  we  assign  to  each  tribune  three  pack-animals 
and  five  servants.     Thus  the  number  of  the  pack-horses  or 
mules  in  the  baggage  train  of  a  legion  reaches  at  least  520. 

If  we  consider  the  normal  strength  of  one  of  Caesar's  g.  p.  213. 
legions  to  have  4800  men,  the  maniple  would  have  had  160. 
This  excess  of  40  men  over  the  estimate  above  would  have 
required  four  tents  and  other  appurtenances,  and  four  pack- 
animals  to  carry  them.  That  would  add  120  animals  and 
the  same  number  of  servants  to  the  baggage  train,  giving  a 
total  of  640  beasts  of  burden.  However,  even  if  this  is  the 
nearly  correct  number  for  a  normal  legion,  we  must  remem- 
ber that  a  legion  very  rarely  had  its  normal  force.  Riistow's 
estimate  of  520  animals  cannot  be  far  out  of  the  way  as  the 
baggage  train  of  one  of  Caesar's  legions  in  the  field. 


i8 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


B.G.  II,  7I 

loi. 


5.    THE   AUXILIARY   INFANTRY. 

§  17.  The  auxiliaries  {auxiliares)  were  raised  from  sub- 
ject or  allied  states  by  enlistment,  by  conscription,  and  by 
treaty.     Of  course  in  no  case  were  they  Roman  citizens. 

Among  the  auxiliaries  obtained  by  voluntary  enlistment 
were  the  light-armed  troops  {milifes  levis  armaturae,  Fig.  8), 


n  b  c  d  e 

Fig.  8. 

a.  Siinger,  —  b.  Light-armed  soldier.  —  c.  Legionary  on  the  march.  — 

d.  Legionary  ready  for  battle.  — e.  Light-armed  soldier. 

used  for  skirmishing  or  rapid  movements  for  which  the  heavily 
loaded  legionaries  were  hardly  adapted  (§  46).  Then  there 
were  the  slingers  {funditores,  Fig.  8),  casters  of  stones  and 
leaden  balls,  those  from  the  Balearic  Islands  being  especially 
skilful ;  and  the  archers  {sagif/arii),  often  from  Crete  or 
Numidia. 

Of  the  organization  of  the  auxiliaries  conscripted  or  sup- 
plied by  the  allies,  little  is  known  definitely.  We  may  infer 
that  it  would  depend  much  upon  the  nation  ;  but  in  case  of 
long  service  the  Roman  general  doubtless  gave  some  atten« 


THE    ORGANIZATION,  I9 

tion  to  their  improvement.  They  were  for  the  most  part 
used  to  make  a  show  of  strength,  thus  impressing  the  enemy 
with  fear,  or  to  aid  in  constructing  fortifications,  or  similar  e.g.  1, 51 
work.  Caesar  never  placed  much  dependence  on  them  for 
actual  battle.  As  they  were  usually  posted  on  the  wings  of 
the  army,  they  v/ere  often  called  alarii. 

The  light-armed  auxiliaries  (Fig.  8)  wore  a  short  jerkin, 
or  jacket,  of  leather,  without  the  corselet ;  and  they  carried 
a  light,  round  shield  [parma)  instead  of  the  heavy  scutum. 
The  archers  had  neither  corselet,  helmet,  nor  shield,  as 
their  bow  and  quiver  would  prevent  their  carrying  them. 
Their  arms  were  protected  by  very  thick  sleeves. 

6.    THE    CAVALRY. 

§  18.    Originally  in  the  Roman  army  a  body  of  cavalry,- 
about  300  strong,  of  Roman  citizens,  was  attached  to  each 


Fig.  9. 


legion.  This  custom  had  been  discontinued  by  Csesar's 
time,  although  afterwards  it  was  revived  under  the  empire. 
Csesar's  cavalry  consisted  entirely  of  auxiliary  troops,  raised 
in  like  manner  and  from  the  same  sources  as  the  auxiliary 
infantry ;  and  these  were  massed  in  a  single  body.  During 
the  Gallic  war  the  cavalry  attached  to  the  Roman  army  y,  5 


E.G.  I,  13; 


20  CiESAR  S    ARMY. 

averaged  about  4000  in  number.     When  the  legions  were 

in  winter  quarters,  the  cavalry  contingents  were  scattered  to 

E.G.  V,  463;  i^qIj-  homes.     There  were,  however,  a  few  enlisted  men  m 

VII,  13I;  v, 

262;'  VII,    '  this    arm  of   the    service   who    remained  constantly   under 

55**  the  standards.     They  were  Gauls,  Germans,  and  Spaniards. 

(Fig.  9-)        ^ 

The  organization  of  the  auxiliary  cavalry  contingents  was 

after  the  manner  of  their  nation ;  modified  more   or  less, 

doubtless,  by  Roman  customs.     Contingents  of  from  200  to 

B.G.  IV,      ^QQ  j^gj^  were  commanded  by  praefecti  equitum.     A  larger 

E.G.  1, 525.   body  was  always  under  a  Roman  commander. 

Of  course  the  enlisted  cavalry  was  organized  entirely  in 

the  Roman  way.    A  tactical  unit  was  the  ala,  or  regiment,  300 

to  400  strong,  commanded  by  2^  praefectus  equitum.    The  ala 

B.'a  vij's*.  was  divided  into  turmae,  squadrons,  of  perhaps  ^iZ  "^^"^  each, 

A.  29.  including  the   commander,  the  decurio.      The  turma  was 

G.  p.  229.  °  ' 

divided  into  three  decuriae  of  1 1  men  each. 


7.     THE    ARTILLERY. 

§  19.  For  battles  in  the  open  field  the  Romans  of  Cae- 
sar's day  seldom  used  anything  corresponding  to  modern 
artillery.  In  defending  and  attacking  fortified  places,  how- 
ever, engines  of  various  kinds  were  employed  for  hurling 
R.  pp.  16-19.  missiles,  and,  in  case  of  attacking,  for  battering  down  walls. 
As  such  engines  could  not  easily  be  improvised,  and  must 
always  be  at  hand  in  a  campaign  involving  siege  operations, 
it  seems  quite  likely  that  a  siege  train  would  usually  be  car- 
ried with  the  army.  That  would  involve  a  body  of  men 
who  should  see  to  its  transportation  and  who  should  under- 
stand setting  it  up,  using,  and  repairing  it.  Possibly  a  de- 
tachment of  the/^<^r/  (§36)  was  entrusted  with  this  work. 

§  20.    Of  the  exact  construction  of  the  Roman  artillery 
of  this  period  we  have  no  precise  accounts.     We  can  only 


THE   ORGANIZATION. 


21 


infer  what  it  was  from  the  names  applied,  from  its  use,  and 
from  what  we  linovv  of  Greek  military  engines  and  of  those 
in  general  use  at  a  later  time. 

§  21.  The  missile  weapon  Caesar  almost  universally  calls 
tormenfum.  This  word  (from  torquere,  to  twist)  plainly 
refers  to  the  source  of  power,  viz.,  the  elasticity  of  torsion, 

§  22.  There  seems  no  reasonable  doubt  that  the  Greek 
and  Roman  artillery  of  the  same  age  had  about  the  same 
construction ;  and,  further,  that  there  had  been  no  material 
change  in  that  construction  at  Caesar's  time  for  some  two  or 
more  centuries.  Then  we  shall  be  quite  near  the  truth  if 
we  examine  the  Greek  artillery  of  a  somewhat  earlier  day 
than  Caesar's. 


M.  si8. 


M.  523. 


Fig.  10.     Catapult. 


§  23.   The   heavy  missile  weapons  were   of  two   kinds:  r.k. pp.378 
those  for  hurling  their  missile  in  a  direction  horizontal,  or  ^^^^* 
nearly  so,  and  those  that  threw  a  heavy  mass  at  a  consider- 
able angle.     The  former  shot  large  arrows,  and  were  called 
catapults  {catapultae).     The  latter  kind  usually  cast  heavy 
stones,  but  were  sometimes  provided  with  blocks  of  wood.  - 
They  were  called  ballistae. 


22 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


§  24.  Catapult  and  ballista  alike  had  three  essential  parts  : 
the  standard,  a  track  for  the  missile,  and  the  arrangement 
that  provided  motive  force. 

The  standard  (/,  Figs.  10,  11)  was  made  strong  and  heavy, 
so  that  the  machine  might  rest  firmly  on  the  ground  and  be 
unshaken  by  use. 

The  track  for  the  missile  {ab,  Figs.   10,  11)  was  a  stout 

framework  in  which  fitted 
a  slide  (ycd)  which  slipped 
smoothly  up  or  down  the 
track.  The  missile  was 
placed  in  a  groove  on  the 
upper  side  of  the  slide. 
By  a  system  of  levers  the 
track  of  the  catapult  could 
be  aimed  to  direct  the 
missile  at  a  greater  or  less 
vertical  angle.  By  a  simi- 
lar arrangement  a  varia- 
tion in  the  horizontal  aim 
could  be  made. 

The  apparatus  for  pro- 
viding force  consisted  in 
the  first  place  of  a  framework  of  three  compartments,  formed 
by  two  horizontal  bars  or  sets  of  bars  {k,  i)  and  four  up- 
rights. Through  the  middle  compartment  extended  the 
missile  track  {cd^.  The  other  two  compartments  were 
fitted  alike.  A  block  {h,  g)  bored  with  a  vertical  hole  was 
placed  over  a  similar  hole  in  the  upper  part  (/)  of  the  frame- 
work. Strands  of  hair  were  passed  from  below,  through 
the  holes  in  the  frame  and  block,  over  an  iron  cross- 
pin,  and  back  down  through  the  holes  again.  The  other 
end  of  these  strands  was  passed  in  like  manner  around  a 
corresponding  cross-pin  on  the  under  side  of  the  framework. 
The  strands   were   then  stretched  to  their  utmost  tension 


Fig.  11.     JBallista. 


THE    ORGANIZATION,  23 

(the  cross-pins  meanwhile  being  twisted  in  opposite  direc- 
tions) and  the  blocks  on  upper  and  under  side  screwed  fast. 
There  was  thus  formed  a  strongly  twisted  rope  or  cluster  of 
ropes.  A  rigid  bar  of  wood  or  metal  was  then  inserted 
through  each  cluster.  These  bars  rested  in  beds  cut  in  the 
two  outer  uprights.  The  inner  end  of  each  bar  rested 
against  the  front  of  the  corresponding  inner  upright.  The 
outer  ends  of  the  bars  were  then  connected  to  each  other 
by  a  strong  cord  (a  bowstring) . 

It  will  at  once  be  seen  that  when  the  bowstring  is  drawn 
back,  the  bars  are  drawn  from  the  beds ;  and  that  when  the 
bowstring  is  let  go,  the  torsion  of  the  ropes  at  once  throws 
the  bars  violently  back  against  the  beds  again,  thus  tautening 
the  bowstring  and  propelling  the  missile  along  the  track. 

In  using  the  tormentum  the  slide  was  pushed  forward 
until  its  hinder  end  was  at  the  bowstring.  This  was  then 
slipped  under  a  trigger-like  arrangement  near  the  end  of  the 
slide,  where  it  was  held  fast.  Through  a  ring  in  the  rear  of 
the  slide  was  tied  a  rope,  which  then  passed  around  a  wind- 
lass. By  means  of  this  windlass  the  slide  was  drawn  back, 
pulling  the  bowstring  with  it.  The  missile  was  then  laid  in 
the  groove  of  the  slide,  and,  the  trigger  being  raised,  the 
bowstring  was  released,  and  drove  the  missile  towards  its 
destination. 

§  25.   The  weight  of  a  heavy  catapult  has  been  estimated,  r.k.  pp.  38s 
according  to  size,  at  from  84  lbs.  to  600  lbs.  ^^'^^* 

At  least  two  men  would  be  required  to  manage  the  small- 
est. Of  course  each  increase  in  the  size  of  the  weapon 
would  demand  more  men. 

From  a  statement  of  Philo,  we  can  estimate  the  cost  of  a  Phiio,  p.  62. 
rather  small  catapult  of  his  day,  allowing  for  change  in  the 
purchasing  power  of  money,  at  about  ^200. 

The  distance  to  which  a  missile  could  be  cast  was  not 
more  than  1200  ft. 


24  Caesar's  army. 

A.  31.  a.  The  scorpio  (Fig.  12)  was  a  small  catapult  capable  of 
being  managed  by  one  man.  It  consisted  of  a  firm  frame- 
work, on  which  was  fastened  a  bow  of  steel.  This  was  bent 
by  a  windlass,  and  shot  its  arrow  (18  in.  long)  to  a  distance 
of  some  300  to  400  ft. 


Fig.  13.     Scorpio. 

§  26.  The  weight  of  the  ballista  was  considerably  greater 
than  that  of  the  catapult.  At  least  six  men  would  be 
required  to  manage  the  smallest. 

The  cost  of  course  would  depend  on  size.  A  ballista 
throwing  a  weight  of  10  minse  (9  lbs.)  perhaps  cost  ^1600 
in  Philo's  time. 

The  range  of  the  ballista  was  about  the  same  as  that  of 
the  catapult. 

§  27 .  The  weight  of  the  ancient  attillery  was  considerably 
greater  in  proportion  than  that  of  modern  times.  A  mortar 
throwing  a  bomb  of  120-130  lbs.  weighs  about  40  lbs.  A 
ballista  which  threw  a  stone  of  135  lbs.  weighed  about  200 
lbs. ;  i.e.,  five  times  as  much  as  the  mortar. 

This  circumstance  would  of  itself  account  for  the  fact  that 
the  Greeks  and  Romans  made  much  less  use  of  field  artillery 
than  do  modern  armies.  Then,  too,  the  clumsy  construction 
of  catapult  and  ballista  made  them  much  more  difficult  to 
transport  than  a  modern  field  battery. 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  2^ 

Another  objection  to  their  employment  in  the  field  was 
the  long  time  required  to  make  them  ready. 

§  28.  The  main  use  of  artillery,  then,  was  to  defend  a  for-  Sch.  5. 
tified  town  or  camp.  In  almost  every  fortified  town  of  the 
Greeks  or  Romans,  they  were  kept  in  considerable  numbers  ; 
and  when  needed  for  siege  operations  were  obtained  from 
such  towns.  The  walls  of  a  camp  were  often  defended  by 
what  we  might  call  light  artillery,  catapults  of  small  caliber  e.g.  ii,  8. 
and  scorpions. 

In  attacking  fortifications  the  ballista  was  used  to  break 
down  the  battlements,  the  catapult  to  sweep  the  wall  of 
defenders  and  thus  protect  the  column  of  assault  or  the 
workmen  busied  with  the  agger  or  the  battering-rams. 

Ships  of  war  were    often  provided  with   artillery,  some-  B.G.lll.u 
times  placed  on  towers.     These  were  used,  not  merely  against 
a  hostile  fleet,  but  often  against  an  enemy  on  the  land. 

There  seems  no  doubt  that  artillery  was  conveyed  with  ^."  *    '^.' 
Caesar's  army  in  the  field.     Riistow's  statement  to  the  con-  a.  31,77: 
trary  is  certamly  erroneous.     Quite  likely  a  certain  amount  r.  p.  26. 
was  assigned  to  each  legion  ;  though  of  this  we  have  no  cer- 
tain evidence.    Whenever  the  army  took  a  position  of  defence,  ^•^-  '^^^i' 
the  artillery,  posted  behind  the  legionaries,  played  a  promi- 

T?  C    IT    8* 

nent  part.*     The  walls  of  the  camp  were  often  lined  withyjj"    'g^ 
catapultae  and  ballistae. 

In  the  time  of  Vegetius  (probably  at  the  close  of  the  fourth  century  c.  51,  56. 
A.D.)  each  legion  was  provided  with  55  carroballistae  and  10  onagri. 
The  carroballista  was  a  small  catapult,  and  the  onager  a  light  ballista. 
The  onager  (wild  ass)  was  so  called  from  the  story  that  that  animal  in 
fleeing  from  its  enemies  cast  stones  against  them  with  its  hind  heels.  " 

In  the  Austrian  army,  to-day,  112  pieces  of  artillery  are  attached  to  an 
army  corps  of  about  50,000  men.  Other  nations  employ  about  the 
same  ratio. 


*  From  this  same  passage   (B.  G.  VIII,  14)  we  must  infer  that  Caesar 
took  artillery  from  the  camp  and  used  it  in  the  field. 


26  -       Caesar's  army. 

8.  THE  STAFF  AND  STAFF  TROOPS. 

§  29.  The  general  staff  of  an  army  consisted  of  the 
commanding  general,  the  legates,  the  quaestors*  the  as- 
sistants, the  guards,  and  the  engineers   {fabri) . 

§  30.  The  legates  {legati)  were  men  of  senatorial  rank, 
who  were  assigned  to  the  proconsul  in  greater  or  less 
numbers  by  the  senate.  In  military  service  they  were  the 
lieutenants  of  the  commanding  general,  and  were  by  him 
often  placed  at  the  head  of  detachments  of  one  or  more 
legions,  with  varying  powers.  But  all  their  powers  were 
derived  from  the  general.  Caesar  made  a  great  improve- 
ment in  organization  by  placing  a  legate  regularly  in  com- 
B.G.  1, 52.  mand  of  each  legion.  Such  legate  was  afterwards  known, 
M.  p.  457-  under  the  empire,  as  legatus  kgionis,  by  way  of  distinction 
from  a  legate  with  greater  powers. 

§  31.  The  quaestor,  assigned  by  lot  to  superintend  the 
finances  of  a  province,  also  had  charge  of  the  supplies  of 
the  army.  In  the  execution  of  this  duty  he  saw  to  the  food, 
pay,  clothing,  arms,  equipments,  and  shelter  of  the  troops. 
To  do  all  this,  he  must  have  had  under  him  a  numerous 
body  of  men.  He  filled  the  place  both  of  adjutant-general 
and  of  quartermaster-general  in  a  modern  army. 

§  32.  There  always  followed  the  general  a  number  of 
young  men  as  his  attendants  {contubernales,  comites  prae- 
torii),  who  were  volunteers,  and  who  aimed  to  learn  the  art 
of  war.  They  composed  the  nobler  part  of  the  cohors 
praetoria,  or  attendants  of  the  general. 

Many  of  them  could  be  used  as  aids  in  the  administra- 
tive department  of  the  army,  or  on  the  field  of  battle.  When 
they  were  very  numerous,  they  were  formed  into  detach- 
ments, or  sometimes  joined  the  body-guard,  and  could  thus 
directly  take  part  in  battle. 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  2/ 

§  33.  The  inferior  part  of  the  cohors  praetoria  was  com- 
posed of  apparitores,  Uctors,  scribes,  and  servants.  There 
were  also  included  the  speculate  res,  or  spies. 

The  speculatores  were  men  selected  for  obtaining  news  M-  p-  547- 
and  carrying  despatches.  They  preceded  a  marching  column, 
and  also  accompanied  the  flanks,  at  a  considerable  distance, 
so  that  no  surprise  or  ambuscade  might  be  met.  There 
were  usually  ten  to  each  legion.  Of  course  the  commanding 
general  had  an  indefinite  number  at  his  disposal. 

§  34.  By  the  body-guard  we  must  understand,  not  choice 
legions,  especially  honored  by  the  commander,  as  was  the 
Tenth  by  Caesar,  but  troops  which  constantly  stood  in  a 
near  relation  to  the  general.  In  Caesar's  army  these  were,  e.g.  vii, 
in  the  first  place,  mercenary  troops,  possibly  small  bodies 
of  German  cavalry,  which  he  used  as  a  personal  escort; 
and,  in  the  second  place,  the  evocati. 

§  35.  The  evocati  \\QYQ  those  who  had  completed  their 
term  of  service  and  still  remained  with  the  army ;  or  even  c.  iii,  91. 
having  returned  to  their  homes,  had  resumed  their  place  in 
the  ranks  at  the  solicitation  of  their  old  coTnmander.  Such 
men,  centurions  and  privates,  must  have  been  of  priceless 
value  to  a  general  who  aimed  at  sovereignty,  as  did  Caesar. 
They  must  have  exerted  much  more  influence  on  the  mass 
of  the  army  than  could  higher  officers.  They  were  on  the 
same  plane  in  every  way  as  the  common  men,  and  so  would 
more  easily  lead  them  to  their  own  way  of  thinking. 

The  evocati  in  Caesar's  army  were  formed  into  a  regular 
organization,  divided  into  centuries.  They  enjoyed  special 
privileges.  Although  footmen,  they  had  not  only  pack- 
animals,  but  riding-horses  as  well,  and  used  them  on  the 
march.  They  could  thus  also  be  employed  by  the  general 
as  orderlies,  to  carry  commands,  or  as  scouts.  In  battle  the  65. 
evocati  were  formed  near  the  general,  for  the  protection  of 


SObK.r.  t^^LLEGE  uaRAPy 


28  CESAR'S    ARMY.  ^ 

his  person.  In  their  ratiks  were  those  of  the  voluntarii  who 
were  not  otherwise  employed,  and  who  could  have  no  better 
school  in  which  to  learn  the  art  of  war.  These  veterans, 
composing  the  flower  of  the  whole  army,  were  ready  to 
give  examples  of  courage  to  all. 

§  36.  The  engineers  {fabri),  at  whose  head  was  the 
praefectus  fabricm,  or  chief  of  engineers,  must  have  belonged 
to  the  staff.  They  were  employed  in  building  bridges, 
constructing  winter  quarters,  and  very  likely  in  repairing 
weapons.  We  must  notice  that  the  main  Roman  weapon, 
the  pilum,  was  useless  after  it  was  hurled ;  but  when  the 
victory  was  gained,  the  pila  could  be  collected  from  the 
field,  and  no  great  skill  or  apparatus  was  needed  to  make 
them  effective  again. 

G.  V,  II.  It  must  be  noted  that  fabri  were  often  called  from  the 

ranks  of  the  legions.  Very  likely  men  expert  for  the  duty 
immediately  at  hand  were  thus  detailed,  and,  when  the 
duty  was  completed,  returned  to  their  places  in  the  ranks. 

Sch.  9.  Schambach  thinks  that  the  artillery  was  managed  by  details 
from  the  infantry,  as  was  done  in  the  main  in  modern  armies 
so  late  even  as  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century.  In 
that  case  it  is  clear  that  the  men  detailed  must  have  been 
of  sufficient  intelligence  and  mechanical  skill  not  merely  to 
use  the  tormenta,  but  also  to  see  to  their  repair. 

§  37.  There  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  composition  of  the 
antesignani.  Goler  thinks  that  the  term  applies  merely  to 
the  four  cohorts  that  formed  the  first  line. 

It  is  Riistow's  opinion  that  they  were  a  detachment 
separate  from  the  cohorts.  Each  maniple  possibly  had 
one  contubernium,  or  ten  men,  of  antesignani,  chosen  for 
their  experience  and  efficiency.  When  needed  they  could 
move  out  from  their  cohorts  in  front  of  the  legion,  and  act 
as  light  troops,  or  skirmishers.     They  would  be  more  valu- 


THE    ORGANIZATION.  29 

able  and  steady  for  such  service  than  the  auxiliaries,  and 
could  form  a  valuable  support  for  cavalry.  On  the  march 
they  were  always  without  heavy  baggage  {expediti).  This 
service  furnished  abundant  advantages  for  training  sub- 
alterns ;  and  Caesar  himself  regarded  the  body  as  a  school  c.  i,  57. 
for  centurions. 


II.     THE   LEGIONARY. 

§  38.  The  main  strength  of  a  Roman  army  was  in  the 
legionary  infantry.  Of  these,  naturally,  then,  we  have  the 
most  satisfactory  accounts.  About  the  auxiliary  troops,  cav- 
alry and  infantry,  we  have  already  spoken  (§§  17,  18).  Of 
the  legionary,  we  must  now  speak  more  in  detail. 

1.    ENLISTMENT. 

§  39.  In  the  earlier  days  of  the  republic  the  army  was  a 
compulsory  levy  of  all  the  able-bodied  male  citizens  of  suita- 
ble age.  None  but  Roman  citizens  were  admitted  to  the 
legion.  All  Roman  citizens  must  serve.  At  the  close  of  the 
campaign  the  troops  were  disbanded,  and  returned  to  their 
homes  and  their  usual  avocations.  Thus  the  army  was  a 
body  of  citizen  soldiers,  or  militia. 

But  with  the  great  increase  in  the  number  of  citizens, 
especially  after  the  social  war,  only  a  part  were  needed  for 
military  duty ;  and  at  the  same  time  a  plenty  were  found 
who  were  willing  to  enter  the  service,  led  by  hope  of  gain 
and  glory.  So  the  armies  became  less  and  less  a  Jevy  of 
citizen  soldiery,  and  more  and  more  a  body  of  mercenary 
volunteers.  From  this  fact  certain  results  speedily  appeared. 
As  the  Roman  army  grew  to  be  a  disciplined  organization  of 
professional  soldiers,  it  became  all  the  more  effective ;  and 
the  men  were  the  more  readily  attached  to  their  chosen 
leader.  Meanwhile  the  peaceful  citizens  who  remained  at 
home,  to  a  great  degree  lost  that  military  spirit  and  knowl- 
edge which  had  always  before  characterized  the  Roman 
people.  Thus  the  way  was  paved  rapidly  and  surely  for  the 
coming  of  a  military  despotism. 


The  Ziegionary. 

Note.  — The ///«»«  and  braccae  belong  to  the  time  of  the  empire. 


To  face  page  30, 


.1 


THE    LEGIONARY.  3I 

§  40.  The  enlistment  of  barbarians  in  the  legions  of 
Caesar,  however,  was  altogether  exceptional.  We  do  read 
of  one  legion,  the  Alauda,  which  was  wholly  composed  of 
barbarians.  Yet  it  is  undoubtedly  substantially  true  that 
Caesar's  legionaries  were  enrolled  from  Roman  citizens,  and 
spoke  the  Latin  tongue. 

§  41.  The  second  condition  of  enlistment  in  the  legions 
was  that  of  age.  This  we  know  in  the  early  centuries  of 
Rome  was  from  17  to  46.  In  all  probability  these  were  the 
limits  in  the  time  of  Caesar.  In  the  army  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  time  of  war,  the  age  of  the  recruit  must  be 
between  i8  and  45. 

§  42.  In  the  third  place,  those  only  would  be  enlisted 
who  had  sound  bodily  health,  and  were  of  suitable  size. 
What  the  limit  of  height  was  in  the  Roman  army  we  do  not 
know.  In  our  infantry  no  one  is  received  whose  height  is 
less  than  5  ft.  4  in.,  or  more  than  5  ft.  10  in.  From  the  fact 
that  the  legionary  fought  with  sword  and  spear,  instead  of 
with  the  breech-loading  rifle  of  modern  wars,  we  may  infer 
that  he  must  have  been  more  muscular  and  agile  than  is  now 
necessary ;  but  we  cannot  infer  that  he  was  of  unusual  size. 
On  the  contrary,  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  soldiers  who 
conquered  the  world  for  Caesar  were  as  a  rule  rather  under- 
sized. The  historians  always  emphasized  the  bigness  of  the  t.g.  i,  4. 
Germans;  and  Caesar  expressly  mentions  the  small  stature  jj  q/^^' 
of  his  troops.  The  Romans  had  learned  the  lesson  of  civil- 
ization, that  victories  in  war  are  gained,  not  by  huge  bones  and 
big  bodies,  but  by  the  trained  skill  of  scientific  organization 
and  tactics.  Any  one  of  the  German  giants  might  perhaps 
have  been  more  than  a  match  for  any  individual  of  his  puny 
Italian  enemies ;  but  the  barbarian  mob  of  Ariovistus  was 
shattered  when  hurled  against  the  spears  of  the  legions. 


32  CiESAR'S    ARMY. 


2.     CLOTHING. 

§  43.  All  the  soldiers  of  the  legion  were  clothed,  armed, 
and  equipped  alike  (Legionary  p.  30,  and  Fig.  8) .  Next  the 
skin  was  worn  a  sleeveless  woollen  shirt  {tunica).  Over 
this  was  a  leathern  coat  strengthened  by  bands  of  metal 
across  the  breast  and  back  and  over  the  shoulders  (Joricd) . 
The  troops  in  Trajan's  column  are  represented  with  tight- 
fitting  trowsers  {braccae)  extending  below  the  knee.  It 
seems  likely,  however,  that  these  did  not  come  into  use 
among  the  Romans  until  after  Caesar's  time.  Strips  of  cloth 
were  quite  probably  worn  wound  around  the  thighs  {femi- 
nalid)  and  around  the  shins  {crm-alia).  The  feet  were  pro- 
tected by  sandals  {calcei),  or  by  strong  shoes  not  unlike 
those  worn  at  the  present  time.  Then,  in  cold  or  wet 
weather,  the  person  was  covered  by  the  military  cloak 
{saguin),  a  sort  of  woollen  blanket.  Of  course  this  was 
laid  aside  in  battle. 


3.    ARMOR. 

§  44.  The  defensive  armor  consisted  of  helmet,  greaves, 
and  shield. 

a.  The  helmet  of  the  legionary  (The  Legionary,  p.  30) 
was  either  of  iron  {cassis) ,  or  of  leather  or  cork  strengthened 
with  brass  {galea) .  That  of  the  officer  was  distinguished  by 
a  plume  of  red  or  black  feathers  (crista) . 

b.  The  greaves  {ocreae)  were  of  bronze.  They  were  used 
to  protect  the  leg  below  the  knee,  and  were  held  in  place 
sometimes  by  straps,  sometimes  by  their  own  stiffness.  Usu- 
ally but  one  was  worn,  on  the  right  leg,  as  this  was  the  one 
advanced  in  the  fight. 

c.  The  shield  {scutum,  Fig.  13)  was  of  wood,  covered 
with  leather  or  with  iron  plates.     In  the  centre  was  a  boss 


THE    LEGIONARY. 


33 


{umbo) ,  which  was  merely  a  knob  designed  to  strengthen  and 
bind  all  together.  The  shield  was  about 
4  ft.  long  and  2  ft.  wide.  Often  it  was 
curved  so  as  partially  to  encircle  the  body. 
On  the  outside  was  painted  the  badge  of 
the  cohort — a  wreath  or  a  winged  thunder- 
bolt, for  instance.  On  the  inside  was  the 
name  of  the  soldier,  with  the  number  of 
the  cohort  and  century,  or  maniple ;  per- 
haps also  the  number  of  the  legion.  For 
protection  from  dust,  rain,  and  the  like, 
during  the  march  the  shield  was  kept  in  a 
leathern  case. 


Fig.  13. 


ARMS. 


§  45.    The  offensive  weapons  were  the  sword  and  spear. 

a.  The  sword  {gladius  Hispanicus,  Fig.  14)  had  a  blade 
about  2  ft.  long,  and  several  inches  wide.  It  was 
two-edged  and  pointed,  being  thus  adapted  either 
for  cutting  or  thrusting.  The  latter,  however,  was 
its  customary  use.  What  fearful  wounds  could  be 
inflicted  with  this  weapon  we  may  see  from  Liiy, 

30.  34- 

It  hung  seldom  from  a  body  belt,  generally  from 

a  shoulder  belt  {palteus) .     This  passed  over  the 
left  shoulder.     Thus  the  sword  was  on  the  right 
side,  this  being  more  convenient,  since  the  shield 
Fig.  14.    was  carried  in  the  left  hand.     As  the  higher  offi- 
cers had  no  shields,  they  wore  their  swords  on  the  left  side, 
and  a  dagger  {pugio)  at  the  right. 

b.  The  spear  {pilum,  Fig.  15)  was  the  characteristic 
weapon  of  the  legionary.  We  have  no  exact  account  of 
it  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  Caesar.  From  the  way  in  which 
he  mentions  its  use,  however,  we  may  infer  that  it  did  not 


34 


C^SAR  S    ARMY. 


P.  VI,  23. 


materially  differ  from  the  pilum  of  days  not  very  remote 
from  his,  and  of  which  we  can  form  some  tolerably 
definite  idea. 


i 


B.G.  I,  25. 


The  pilum  of  the  time  of  Polybius  had  usually  a 
square  wooden  shaft,  4.}  ft.  long  and  2}  in,  thick.  On 
one  side  was  a  groove  extending  half  the  length 
of  the  shaft,  to  receive  the  iron.  This  latter  was  also 
4I  ft.  long.  One  half,  square  in  shape,  was  fitted  into 
the  groove,  and  held  in  place  by  two  iron  nails.  The 
other  half,  of  pyramidal  form,  projected  from  the  wood 
and  was  sharpened  at  the  end.  At  the  base  of  the 
shaft  there  was  undoubtedly  an  iron  shoe,  so  that  in 
camp  or  bivouac  the  pilum  might  be  thrust  into  the 
ground.  The  length  of  the  e«tire  weapon  appears 
then  to  have  been  6|  ft.,  and  the  weight  can  hardly 
have  been  less  than  11  pounds.  Riistow  considers 
this  (Fig.  15)  to  have  been  essentially  the  pilum  of 
Caesar. 

The  researches  of  Dr.  Lindenschmidt  leave  little 
doubt  as  to  the  pilum  used  during  the  empire  (Fig  16). 
The  iron  was  longer  than  the  shaft,  with  a  distinct 
head,  which  produced  the  effect  of  barbs.  The  entire 
weapon  was  probably  somewhat  lighter  than  that  of 
Polybius.     It  was  much  like  a  modern  harpoon. 

Polybius  says  that,  besides  the  heavy  javelin,  the 
soldier  carried  also  another  lighter  one.  Caesar  makes 
no  mention  of  a  second  piluui,  and  all  the  circum- 
stances of  its  use  lead  us  to  think  that  his  legionary 
Fig.  15.  undoubtedly  had  but  one.  This,  says  Riistow,  was 
probably  the  heavy  one.  It  seems  quite  as  likely 
that  when  the  light  spear  (designed,  of  course,  to  be  used 
first,  as  it  could  be  cast  to  a  greater  distance)  was  discarded, 
the  heavy  one  was  somewhat  reduced  in  weight,  so  as  to 
increase  its  range.  This  reduction  could  not  have  been  so 
great,  however,  as  materially  to  impair  its  efficiency. 

In  the  time  of  Marius,  the  upper  of  the  two  nails  which  held 
the  iron  in  place  was  of  wood.  When  the  missile  struck,  this  pin  would 
be  apt  to  break,  and  the  momentum  of  the  shaft  would  cause  the  iron 
to  bend,  thus  making  it  useless  to  the  enemy.  Caesar  makes  no  men- 
tion of  the  wooden  pin,  but  he  often  speaks  of  the  bending  of  the  iron- 


Fig.  16. 


THE    LEGIONARY.  35 

*Ve  can  hardly  infer,  as  does  Riistow,  that  the  wooden  pin  was  not 
used  in  the  pila  of  Caesar.  On  the  contrary,  so  many  other  contri- 
vances of  the  sagacious  Marius  were  retained,  and  so  few  years  had 
elapspd  from  his  day  when  the  Gallic  wars  began,  that  it  seems 
altogether  probable  that  the ///«;«  of  Caesar  was  quite  the  same  as  that 
of  Marius.  At  any  rate,  had  Caesar  contrived,  or  even  authorized,  any 
material  change  in  this  most  important  weapon,  we  can  hardly  doubt 
that  a  writer  so  scrupulous  as  he  in  assigning  to  the  conqueror  of  Gaul 
his  full  meed  of  praise  would  have  been  very  careful  to  narrate  this 
instance  also  of  his  hero's  ingenuity. 

The  bending  of  the  iron  clearly  implies  that  it  was  comparatively 
slender  and  soft.  So  we  may  conclude  that  it  was  hardened  only  at 
the  end.  Now  this  bending,  accomplished  in  the  piluju  of  Marius  by 
the  breaking  of  the  wooden  pin,  would  have  resulted  in  that  described 
by  Lindenschmidt,  from  the  extreme  slenderness  of  the  iron  as  com- 
pared with  the  shaft;  and  this  slenderness  would  have  been  made  pos- 
sible by  the  head,  which  was  of  sufficient  size  and  hardness  not  to  be 
affected  itself  by  the  impact. 

The  point  of  bending  in  the  piluin  of  Marius  was  undoubtedly  in 
the  part  of  the  iron  which  lay  in  the  wood;  that  of  the  \7i.i&c  pilum  was 
as  undoubtedly  above  the  shaft. 

The  history  of  the  piliim,  as  we  get  glimpses  of  it  from  time  to  time, 
certainly  shows  a  slow  evolution.  In  the  light  of  this  fact,  it  seems 
probable  that  in  the  time  of  Marius  and  Caesar  it  held  an  intermediate 
position  between  the  heavy  and  somewhat  clumsy  spear  described  by 
Polybius  and  the  more  elegant  javelin  of  the  later  empire.  The  shaft 
was  probably  round.  The  iron  was  in  all  likelihood  fitted  in  a  groove, 
and  not  in  a  socket.  Where  it  entered  the  wood,  the  head  of  the  shaft 
was  probably  protected.  The  iron  was  slender,  easily  bent,  hence 
hardened  only  at  the  end  and  provided  with  a  head.  The  weight  need 
not  have  been  more  than  two  or  three  pounds  less  than  that  estimated 
by  Riistow. 

Lindenschmidt  objects  to  this  estimate  (ii  lbs.)  that  it  was  too 
great  for  comfort  in  carrying,  and  for  hurling  to  any  distance.  The 
first  objection  is  trivial,  that  being  just  about  the  weight  of  the  modern 
musket.  And  the  trained  muscles  of  the  Roman  veteran  could  have 
found  little  difficulty  in  hurling  an  eleven-pound  spear  with  force  to  a 
distance  of  many  feet. 


36  ,    Cesar's  army. 

5.     BAGGAGE. 

§  46.  Besides  his  arms  and  armor,  the  legionary  was  ac- 
customed to  carry  various  entrenching  tools,  such  as  saws, 
spades,  axes,  and  baskets ;  articles  for  obtaining  and  cook- 
ing food,  as  sickles,  cords,  and  cooking  vessels  ;  spare  cloth- 
ing and  material  for  repairing  any  of  the  clothes  or  equip- 
ments. 

R.  p.  14.  §  42^    ^YiQ  ration  of  food  for  one  day  weighed  probably 

about  i^  lbs.  On  short  expeditions,  the  soldier  must 
carry  his  own  provisions.  As  many  as  17  days'  rations, 
amounting  to  28  lbs.,  are  known  to  have  been  provided 
and  carried.  The  ration  was  usually  in  the  form  of  coarse 
flour,  or  of  unground  grain  which  the  soldier  must  crush  for 
himself. 

§  48.  According  as  the  food  was  for  a  longer  or  shorter 
time,  the  weight  carried,  exclusive  of  arms  or  armor,  must 
have  reached  30  to  45  lbs. 

§  49.  For  the  convenient  carriage  of  all  this  baggage, 
Marius  contrived  what  were  known  by  his  name  as  "  Mar- 
ius's  mules"  {inuli Mariani).  The  baggage  was  packed  in 
bundles  {sarcinae) ,  and  these  fastened  to  the  upper  end  of 
a  pole  {/urea),  which  was  forked  at  the  top.  On  the  march 
the  legionary  carried  this  pole  on  his  shoulder.  When  a 
temporary  halt  was  made  without  laying  aside  the  baggage, 
the  lower  end  of  the  furca  was  placed  on  the  ground,  and 
the  soldier  could  lean  on  it  to  rest.     (Fig.  8.) 

6.    WORK. 

§  50.  The  legionary  was  not  allowed  to  rust  from  idle- 
ness. When  the  day's  march  was  done,  he  must  lay  aside 
baggage  and  arms,  and  do  his  part  in  fortifying  the  camp. 


THE    LEGIONARY.  37 

Some  were  detailed  to  the  trench  and  wall,  some  to  erect 
the  tents,  some  to  prepare  food  for  the  various  messes. 
When  a  long  time  was  spent  in  camp,  even  then  each  hour 
brought  its  allotted  task.  There  were  the  regular  tours  of 
guard  duty,  the  ordinary  work  of  keeping  the  camp  clean, 
and  of  making  ready  the  meals,  and  regular  drills,  including 
gymnastic  exercises,  which  kept  each  muscle  at  its  best. 


7.    PAY. 

§  51.  Caesar  fixed  the  pay  of  his  legionaries  at  225  m. p 
denarii  a  year  (about  ^45 .00) .  A  day  laborer  in  Rome  at 
that  time  earned  three-fourths  of  a  denarius  a  day ;  or,  in  a 
year  of  300  working  days,  just  as  much  as  a  legionary. 
Thus  the  soldier  was  better  off  than  the  laborer  by  merely 
one  thing ;  to  wit,  his  shelter. 

For  food  and  equipments,  so  far  as  they  were  provided 
by  the  state,  a  deduction  from  his  pay  was  made.  As  pro- 
vision, each  man  was  allowed  per  month  four  measures  (8.67 
litres,  or  a  little  less  than  a  peck)  of  wheat.  The  measure 
may  be  estimated  to  be  worth  at  the  highest  three-fourths  of 
a  denarius.  Thus  the  amount  deducted  for  food  cannot  have 
exceeded  36  denarii  per  year.  However,  in  the  provinces, 
the  food,  if  not  given  outright,  was  reckoned  at  a  very  low 
price  j  and  the  same  must  have  been  true  of  clothing  and 
equipments.  Moreover,  the  soldier  in  active  service  always 
expected  an  increase  to  his  income  from  booty,  and  from 
the  gifts  of  his  general. 

§  52.    We  have  no  certain  account  of  the  relation  borne  Dr 

by  the  pay  of  the  soldier  to  that  of  the  officer.    But  we  read,  g^^^^^"  ^^'^^^ 

on  occasion  of  a  present  to  the  troops,  that  the  centurion  Piut-  Cses, 

55. 
received  twice  as  much  as  the  private,  the  tribune  and  the 

cavalry  prefect,  four  times  as  much.     On  another  occasion,  g.  8,  4. 

we  know  that  the  centurion  received  ten  times  as  much  as 


38  Cesar's  army. 

the  private.  The  former  seems  Ukely  to  have  been  the 
ordinary  relation  of  the  pay ;  especially  as  we  must  remem- 
ber that  the  centurion  stood  in  rank  and  duties  about  mid- 
way between  a  sergeant  and  the  captain  of  a  company  in  a 
modern  army.  In  the  army  of  the  United  States,  the  private 
of  infantry  is  paid  ^13.00  a  month;  the  sergeant  $17.00; 
and  a  captain  receives  ^1800  a  year.  All  are  provided  with 
food,  clothing,  and  shelter.  A  day  laborer  in  most  of  our 
cities  can  earn  about  $1.50  a  day;  about  the  rate  of  the 
private  in  the  army,  considering  that  the  laborer  has  to  pro- 
vide for  himself. 

8.    DISCIPLINE. 

§  53.    During  the  civil  wars,  the  stern  discipline   of  the 

old  Roman  armies  became  much  relaxed,  and  commanders 

had  to  resort  to  all  manner  of  means  to  hold  their  armies  in 

T.ange,  pp.    order.    The  transition  from  a  citizen  soldiery  to  a  mercenary 

26  seqq.  _  "^ 

army,  on  the  other  hand,  paved  the  way  for  a  discipline 
more  unrelenting  than  ever. 

But  the  best  means  of  maintaining  order  then,  as  now,  lay 
in  constant  employment.  On  the  march,  the  daily  fortifi- 
cation of  the  camp  left  the  soldier  little  time  to  think  of 
anything  but  his  duty.  On  occasion  of  a  longer  pause  than 
usual,  the  camp  was  to  be  further  fortified  and  arranged, 
and  guard  duty  must  be  performed  constantly.  The  Roman 
method  of  war  made  the  personal  activity  of  the  man  an 
indispensable  condition  of  success.  Hence  constant  prac- 
A.  71. 72-  tice  in  the  use  of  weapons  was  necessary ;  and  this  would 
quite  fill  out  the  time. 

Then,  too,  zeal  and  courage  were  rewarded  no  more  by 
mere  crowns  of  leaves,  but  by  more  substantial  gifts  in  good 
coin.  So  we  see  that  the  Roman  general  was  not  confined 
for  his  discipline  to  mere  brutality. 

When  generals  endeavored  to  attach  their  soldiers  to  their 
persons,  they  had  to  allow  them  far  more  license  than  mere 


THE    LEGIONARY.  39 

discipline  would  warrant.     Violence  to  the  conquered,  mis- 
use of  power  towards  them,  robbery  and  plunder,  were  at 
times  allowed.     What  the  Romans  regarded  as  purely  mili- 
tary crimes,  such  as  mutiny,  desertion,  cowardice,  abuse  of  Suet.  Caes. 
authority  in  the  army,  were  punished  severely ;    not  infre-  ^/'  ^^- 

A.  4D»  54' 

quently  the  penalty  was  death.  c.  in,  74. 

In  a  modern  army,  comparatively  trivial  offences,  such  as 
drunkenness,  for  instance,  are  often  punished  by  detention 
in  the  guard-house,  and  sentence  to  some  disagreeable  labor, 
as  cleaning  the  camp,  or  the  like.  Expedients  hke  this 
must  have  been  used  in  ancient  armies  as  well. 


III.    TACTICS    OF   THE    LEGION. 

§  54.  The  tactics  of  a  body  of  troops  consists  of  their 
arrangement  for  battle  and  their  movements  in  the  fight, 
their  order  of  march,  their  disposition  in  camp,  and  all  evo- 
lutions in  passing  from  one  of  these  forms  to  another.  The 
order  of  battle  is  chiefly  important,  because  all  the  other 
formations  are  made  with  reference  to  this  :  and  to  under- 
stand the  order  of  battle  of  any  organized  body  of  soldiers, 
we  must  first  of  all  study  the  arrangement  of  the  tactical  unit 
of  that  body. 

MILITARY    TERMS. 

§  55*    W^  must  explain  a  few  military  terms  in  common  use. 

I.    English. 

A  tactical  unit  is  a  body,  of  a  number  of  which  a  larger  body  is  com- 
posed, and  which,  in  relation  to  that  larger  body,  is  thought  of  as  undi- 
vided. The  tactical  unit  of  the  legion  was  the  cohort ;  of  the  cohort, 
the  maniple,  etc. 

A  body  of  troops  is  in  line  when  the  greatest  extent  of  the  body  is 
at  right  angles  to  the  direction  in  which  they  are  facing  (Fig.  18);  in 
column,  when  the  greatest  extent  of  the  body  is  in  the  direction  in 
which  they  are  facing  (Fig.  21). 

Troops  are  said  to  deploy  when  they  pass  from  column  to  line, 
retaining  the  same  facijig.  In  FigUire  20,  the  cohort  is  marching  in 
column.  If  they  simply  halt  and  face  to  the  left,  they  are  in  line  of 
battle,  as  in  Figure  18.     This  they  have  done  without  deploying. 

Alig7iment  is  making  a  line  of  troops  straight. 

A  soldier  is  said  to  face  when,  standing  still,  he  merely  turns  on 
his  heel  (to  the  right,  or  left,  or  entirely  about). 

Fascines  are  bundles  of  brush  bound  together.  They  are  often 
used  for  filling  a  ditch. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION. 


41 


Fig.  31 

Cohort  (§74). 


Fig.  33. 

Cohort  (§  76). 


K 

^ 

JV 

,^-'i 

^ 

iV 

^^ 

,/x 

JV. 


ft- 


il 


Fig.  18.    Cohort  (§62). 


2.   Latin. 

Aciem  insiruere,  to  form  line  of  battle. 

Aciein  dirigere,  to  align  the  front. 

Cohortes  disponere,  to  deploy  the  cohorts. 

Consistere,  to  halt. 

Legiones  explicare,  to  deploy  the  legions. 

Torquere  agiyien  ad  dextram  {sinistravi), 
to  change  the  direction  of  the  march  (right  or 
left). 

A.     ORDER    OF   BATTLE. 

I.  The  Cohort. 

§  56.  The  tactical  unit  of  the  legion 
of  Csesar  was 
the  cohort  {^  6). 
The  men  of  any 
one  cohort  as 
a  rule  remained 


Fig.  30. 


Cohort  (§  73). 


together,  and  all  movements  of  the  legion  were  made  by 
cohorts. 

We  may  estimate  the  front  of  a  cohort  in  line  of  battle  at 

I20  ft. 

§  57*  Ii^  all  estimates  of  extent  of  the  legion  in  battle,  march,  or 
camp,  we  follow  RUstow's  figures,  which  are  based  on  the  average  field 
strength  of  the  legion,  3600  men,  not  on  its  nominal,  or  full,  strength. 

In  relating  a  fight  at  Ilerda,  in  Spain,  Caesar  states  that  his  troops 
were  drawn  up  across  the  top  of  a  ridge,  along  which  the  enemy  were 
advancing.  He  then  says  that  this  ridge  was  just  wide  enough  for 
three  cohorts  in  order  of  battle  (Jres  instructae  cohortes,  C.  I,  45).  The 
ridge  is  readily  recognized  to-day,  and  measures  just  about  360  feet 
across.  The  circumstances  of  the  fight  were  such  as  to  leave  no  doubt 
that  the  cohorts  were  drawn  up  without  any  intervals  between  them; 
so  that  this  measure  gives  us  the  actual  front  of  the  cohorts.  Thus  we 
get  the  estimate  of  120  ft.  for  the  front  of  one  cohort. 

The  three  maniples  of  a  cohort  might  have  been  arrayed  side  by 
side,  or  one  behind  the  other.  Rustovv  holds  to  the  former  arrange- 
ment, and  Goler  to  the  latter.      The  reasoning  of  Rustow  (R.  p.  36 


42  ,        CiESAR  S    ARMY. 

seqq.)  seems  conclusive,  in  the  light  of  our  present  knowledge ;  and  w* 

have  adopted  the  arrangement  of  the  maniples  side  by  side.  In  that 
case  the  two  platoons  {centuriae^  ordines)  of  each  maniple  doubtless 
stood  one  behind  the  other. 

§  58.  Assuming  the  three  maniples  to  have  been  arrayed 
side  by  side,  this  would  allow  40  ft.  as  the  front  of  each 

maniple.  Allowing  4  ft.  for  the  in- 
EaBBHEHEiBaaa^  terval  between  each  two  maniples,  in 

which  mtervais  the  centurions  were 
HEBEBHHHBHaB  pfobably  pkced,  and  a  correspond- 
EiEiEiEHEiEiaEieiBH  Ing  dlstancc  of  4  ft.  for  the  centu- 
0E,B0in0000BBB^  j.-Qj^  ^^  ^j^g  J.-  j^^  Qf  ^^g  maniple  which 

E100EB0000000  formed  the  right  of  the  Kne,  there 
EHEEEiBEiHBEEEi  would  be  Icft  7)^  ft.  front  in  each 
BBi3B0aE0eB!EiEi      maulplc  for  the  privates.     As  each 

Fig.  17.     Maniple.  ^^-^^^^  ^^^^^    ^^^^.^^    ^^    j^^^^    ^    ^^_ 

of  space,  the  maniple  would  consist  of  12  files  (Fig.  17). 

§  59*  In  military  language,  z.Jile  is  a  number  of  men  in  a  single, 
line,  placed  one  behind  another.  A  number  of  men  in  a  single  iine^ 
placed  side  by  side,  is  called  a  rank. 

The  interval  of  four  feet  between  the  maniples  w^ould  be  none  too  mucL 
for  the  centurions.  The  officer  would  naturally  need  more  room  than 
a  private,  as  his  attention  must  not  only  be  given  to  the  enemy,  but  also 
to  his  own  troops  down  the  line  to  his  left.  So  it  seems  likely  that  the 
first  centurion  was  at  the  right  of  the  front  rank  of  the  first  platoon 
{or do),  and  the  second  centurion  at  the  right  of  the  front  rank  of  the 
second  platoon.  Thus  the  latter  officer  could  keep  to  their  duty  the 
men  behind  the  fighting  line,  and  could  see  that  vacancies  ahead  should 
be  promptly  filled. 

§  60.  The  distance  from  breast  to  breast,  in  the  file,  was 
probably  at  least  4  ft.  Thus  the  file  was  10  men  deep 
{i.e.,  there  were  10  ranks),  and  the  maniple  would  form  a 
square  of  40  ft.  on  a  side. 

In  the  United  States  army,  the  breadth  of  a  man  is  taken  at  22  in., 
his  depth  at  12  in.;   and  there  is  a  distance  between  ranks,  in  column 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION.  43 

gf  march,  of  32  in.  from  back  to  breast,  or  of  44  in.  from  heel  to  heel. 
In  hne  of  battle,  the  distance  from,  back  to  breast  is  22  in.,  from  breast 
to  breast  34  in.  {^Upton''s  U.S.  Army  Infantry  Tactics,  65,  209). 

§  61.  We  have  assumed  that  each  man  in  the  front  rank 
of  the  maniple  occupied  3  ft.  This  would  be  sufficient 
space  to  march  without  being  crowded,  and  to  throw  the 
pilum.  It  would  not  give  room,  however,  for  using  the 
sword.  Vegetius  says  that  each  man  needed  6  ft.  for  that 
purpose.  The  men  in  each  rank  were  numbered,  from  right 
\o  left;  and  at  the  command  i^^Laxaie  manipulos'"^  each  e.g.  11, 25, 
odd  number  stepped  forward,  thus  gaining  the  desired 
^pace. 

§  62.  By  our  estimate,  a  cohort  in  hne  of  battle  would 
^orm  a  rectangle,  120  ft.  front  by  40  ft.  deep  (Fig.  18). 
Die  maniple  would  contain  120  men,  and  the  cohort  360, 
'ixclusive  of  officers. 

2.  The  Legion. 

§  63.  The  order  of  battle  may  be  offensive  or  defensive. 
When  arrayed  for  the  first  purpose,  the  legion  formed  either 
two  lines  {acies  duplex),  or  three  lines  {acies  triplex). 

§  64.  In  the  acies  duplex  there  were  5  cohorts  in  each 
line.*  When  the  legion  was  in  3  lines  (Fig.  19),  4  cohorts  were 
placed  in  the  first  {^acies prima),  and  3  in  each  of  the  others 
{secunda  and  tertia  acies).  Between  the  cohorts  in  the 
first  line  were  intervals  equal  to  about  the  front  of  the 
cohort  (120  ft.).  Behind  these  intervals  stood  the  cohorts 
of  the  second  line.     The  third  line  was  still  further  in  the 


*  C.  I,  83.  Caesaris  triplex  {acies  fuif)  ;  sed primam  aciem  quaternae 
cohortes  tenebant,  has  subsidiariae  ternae  et  rursus  aliae  totldem  suae  cujusque 
legionis  subsequebantur ;  sagitfarii  funditoresque  tnedia  continebantur  acie, 
■<quitatus  latera  cingebat. 


44 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


^ 


rear,  and  was  used  as  a  reserve  for  the  support  of  the  other 
two.  The  most  experienced  and  rehable  soldiers  of  the 
legion  were  in  the  four  cohorts  of  the  front  line. 


Fig.  34. 


I 

i 
t«- 


^ 


S  D5'  Both  Roman  and  Gaul  depended 
greatly  for  success  in  battle  on  the  shock  of 
the  first  charge.  Hence  the  Romans  put  their 
best  men  in  front.  This  arrangement  is 
probably  to  be  attributed  to  Marius. 

Goler  has  an  elaborate  theory  of  the  acies  G.  p. 
duplex  and  triplex  quite  different  from  this.  ^^5" 
According  to  his  view,  a  triple  hne  of  battle 
contained  three  divisions  —  a  right  wing 
{cornu  dextrum),  a  centre  {acies  media),  and 
a  left  wing  {cornu  sinistru?n).  A  double  line 
merely  had  no  centre  {acies  media'),  thus 
having  two  divisions.  The  centre  of  a  triple 
line  was  always    termed   tnedia   acies  to  dis- 


^   ^ 


ic 


^      ^      ^■- 


^^ 


IC 


10  ^ 


& 


*" 


Fig.  19.* 


Fig.  33. 


Fig.  19.  Legion  in  triple  line  of  battle. 
Fig.  23.  Legion  marching  in  lines  (§  82  a). 
Fig.  24.  Legion  marching  by  wings  (§  82  b). 

tinguish  it  from  the  middle  line  of  the  cohorts  of  a  legion,  secunda 
acies.     Each  division  had  a  legatus  in  command. 

This  theory  is  hardly  borne  out  by  the  facts.  One  who  reads  E.G. 
I,  49  with  care  M'ill  see  that  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  reconcile 
Goler's  view  with  Cresar's  account.  Further,  in  A.  13  we  have  a  simplex 
acies  with  both  right  and  left  wings  specifically  mentioned;  and  in  E.G. 
Ill,  24  a  double  line  {duplex  acies)  has  a  centre  {media  acies).  From 
these  considerations  it  seems  plain  enough  that  Caesar  used  the  terms  right 
wing,  left  wing,  and  centre  quite  as  they  are  used  of  a  modern  army; 


*  These  diagrams  of  battle  and  march  are  after  Riistow. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION.  45 

applying  them  in  an  indefinite  way  to  those  parts  of  a  line  of  battle,  but 
not  necessarily  implying  distinct  divisions  under  separate  commanders. 

§  66.  The  distance  between  the  Hnes  was  probably 
equal  to  the  front  of  a  cohort  (120  ft.).  Thus  the  entire 
depth  of  the  legion  in  this  order  of  battle  was  about  600  ft. 
The  front  would  extend  840  ft.,  or,  if  supported  by  another 
legion,  960  ft.,  including  the  interval  between  the  legions. 

§  67.  For  defensive  battle  the  legion  was  arranged  in  one 
of  two  ways  :  in  one  line  {ades  simplex),  or  in  a  circle 
{orbis) . 

§  68.  The  former  was  most  commonly  used  to  defend 
the  walls  of  the  camp  (§  153).  Here  a  second  line  was 
unnecessary ;  and  also  considerable  depth  was  needless.  Five 
ranks  (the  depth  of  a  single  ordo)  would  do ;  one  or  two, 
according  to  the  width  of  the  wall,  on  the  rampart,  and  the 
rest  in  reserve  at  its  foot.  Allowing  6  ft.  (instead  of  3  ft.) 
for  each  man  in  the  front  rank,  and  arraying  the  ordines  side 
by  side,  we  see  that  a  single  cohort  would  cover  480  ft.  of 
the  wall,  or  a  legion  4800  ft.,  allowing  no  intervals  between 
the  cohorts. 

§  69.  This  arrangement  in  one  line  without  intervals  was  A.  13. 
also  used  in  the  open  field  to  meet  an  attempt  at  outflank- 
ing by  superior  numbers,  and  also  to  resist  incursions  of  cav- 
alry or  light  infantry  through  the  intervals.  In  this  case, 
however,  the  cohorts  would  have  their  normal  front  and 
depth,  merely  closing  the  intervals  and  thus  giving  the 
legion  a  front  of  1200  ft. 

§  70.  The  circle  {orbis)  was  designed  for  use  in  the  field 
in  case  of  attack  on  all  sides. 

As  the  circumstances  for  which  this  arrangement  was 
intended  must  have  been  essentially  the  same  then  as  now, 
we  may  conclude  that  a  cohort  would  form  in  a  solid  square, 
a  smaller  division  in  a  solid  circle,  and  a  detachment  of  sev- 


4^  Cesar's  army. 

eral  cohorts  in  a  hollow  square.  This  latter  might  have 
been  made  circular,  to  resist  attack  at  the  angles.  A  legion 
could  form  the  square  by  placing  the  first,  second,  and  third 
cohorts  in  front,  the  eighth,  ninth,  and  tenth  in  the  rear,  the 
fifth  and  sixth  in  the  right,  and  the  fourth  and  seventh  on 
the  left.  There  would  then  be  a  front  of  360  ft.  and  a 
flank  of  320.  The  inner  hollow  space  would  be  280  ft.  long 
and  240  ft.  broad,  thus  making  67,200  sq.  ft.  This  would 
contain  more  than  1000  pack-animals. 

cm, 89.  §  71'  Under  some  circumstances  we  read  also  of  a  quad- 
ruple line  of  battle.  This  was  designed  to  meet  a  flank 
attack.  Some  cohorts  were  taken  from  the  rear  line  {tertia 
acies)  and  placed  in  line  on  the  right  (or  left)  flank  at  right 
angles  with  the  main  line  of  battle. 


B.     THE    ORDER    OF    MARCH. 

The  order  of  march  is  developed  from  the  battle  array, 
So  we  must  begin  with  the  cohort. 

I.    The  Cohort. 

§  72.   The  line  of  march  {agmen)  of  the  cohort  was  one 
of  two,  —  column  of  maniples  and  column  of  centimes. 

§  73.  The  column  of  maniples  {jnanipulatim^  was 
formed  from  order  of  battle  by  merely  facing  to  the  right 
(or  left).  Thus  the  maniples,  it  will  be  seen,  were  in  col- 
umn (Fig.  20),  and  the  centuries  in  each  maniple  were  side 
by  side.  If  the  cohort  was  faced  to  the  right,  the  order  was 
pilani,  principes,  hastati.  As  the  depth  of  the  cohort  in  line 
of  battle  was  40  ft.,  of  course  the  column  of  maniples  was 
40  ft.  wide.  But  this  was  a  loose  order.  Allowing  3  ft.  to 
each  man,  the  column  could   easily  have  been  made  only 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION.  47 

30  ft.  wide.  And  again,  this  wide  column  could  have  been 
reduced  to  half  the  width  by  the  right  (or  left)  century 
moving  straight  on,  and  the  other  falling  in  its  rear.  Instead 
of  12  ranks  of  10  men,  there  would  be  24  ranks  of  5  men. 
This  would  make  really  a  column  of  centuries  by  the  flank. 

§  74.  The  column  of  centuries  proper  {centuriatim,  ordi- 
natim)  was  formed  from  the  order  of  battle  merely  by  hav- 
ing the  maniple  on  the  right  (or  left)  wing  of  the  cohort 
march  straight  forward,  and  the  others  successively  follow. 
Thus  the  centuries  would  be  arranged  in  column  (Fig.  21)  ; 
and  the  order  would  be  pilani,  prificipes,  hastati,  or  the  re- 
verse, according  as  the  right  or  left  wing  moved  off  first. 
The  width  of  the  column  would  be  the  same  as  the  front  of 
a  maniple,  i.e.,  40  ft.,  including  the  centurion  on  the  flank. 

§  75.  When  a  cohort  marched  directly  forward,  the  col- 
umn of  centuries  would  naturally  be  adopted.  In  this  order, 
then,  it  is  hkely  that  Caesar  marched  across  the  Rhine.  But 
we  know  that  he  made  his  bridge  40  ft.  wide.  It  does  not 
seem  at  all  likely  that  this  distance  was  that  between  the 
piles  at  the  bottom  of  the  river.  As  the  water  varied  in 
depth,  it  could  hardly  be  measured  exactly,  and  different 
sets  of  piles  quite  likely  had  different  distances  on  the  river 
bottom.  On  the  top,  however,  an  exact  distance  could  have 
been  measured,  and  must  have  been  preserved.  Thus  in 
Daesar's  bridge  is  another  support  of  our  estimate  of  the  front 
of  the  maniple. 

§  76.  If  the  march  was  on  a  regular  road  or  street  less 
than  40  feet  wide,  the  breadth  of  the  column  could  easily  be 
reduced  from  40  ft.  to  20  ft.  The  right  (or  left)  half  of 
each  century  would  move  straight  on,  and  the  other  half 
would  fall  in  the  rear  (Fig.  22).  Thus  the  century  would 
consist  of  10  ranks  of  6  men  each,  instead  of  5  ranks  of  12 
men  each. 


48  CiESAR's    ARMY. 

§  77.  On  the  march,  we  should  estimate  4  ft.  from  breast 
to  breast.  Then  a  cohort  of  360  men  would  reach  to  the 
following  length :  — 

In  column  of  centuries  120  ft. 

In  column  of  centuries,  with  double  number  of  ranks, 
240  ft. 

In  column  of  maniples,  144  ft. 

In  column  of  maniples,  with  double  number  of  ranks, 
288  ft. 

§  78.  The  line  of  battle  {acies)  was  formed  from  the 
column  of  march  {agmen)  as  follows :  from  column  of 
maniples  by  the  commands  halt !  front !  (facing  to  the  left, 
if  the  original  march  was  to  the  right ;  to  the  right,  if  the 
original  march  was  to  the  left)  ;  from  column  of  centuries, 
the  leading  maniple  would  halt,  and  the  others  successively 
march  alongside,  aligning  themselves  on  the  right  or  left,  as 
the  case  might  be. 

§  79.  We  may  assume  that  the  usual  formation  of  the 
column  of  centuries  was  with  the  right  in  front,  i.e.,  in  the 
order  pilani,  principes,  hastati.  But  we  must  observe  that 
to  form  line  from  this  column  requires  a  deploying  to  the  left. 
Should  the  enemy  be  near,  this  would  expose  to  them  the 
unshielded  right  side  {latus  apertunt).  So  we  may  conjec- 
ture that,  for  instance,  in  a  sally  from  the  gate  of  a  camp 
against  a  near  enemy,  the  cohort  would  march  with  the  left 
in  front  and  deploy  towards  the  right. 

2.   The  Legion. 

§  80.  The  legion,  or  a  still  greater  number  of  cohorts, 
marched  in  one  of  three  orders,  —  in  column  {agmen  pila- 
tum)  ;  in  order  of  battle  {acie  instructa)  ;  in  square  {agmen 
quadrafum). 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION,  49 

§  8i.  When  the  legion  is  in  column,  the  cohorts  march 
according  to  their  number.  If  the  march  is  from  the  right, 
the  first  cohort  has  the  lead,  then  follows  the  second,  and 
so  on.  If  the  march  is  from  the  left,  the  tenth  cohort  leads, 
followed  by  the  ninth,  etc.  Each  cohort  is  in  column  of 
centuries. 

Between  each  two  cohorts  there  must  have  been  a  small 
distance.  Suppose  this  to  have  been  20  ft.  Then  the 
length  of  the  legion — the  cohorts  marching  in  column  of 
centuries  of  the  usual  width  —  would  have  been  1400  ft. 
When  the  cohorts  doubled  their  number  of  ranks,  the  length 
of  the  legion  was  2600  ft. 

For  the  train  of  a  legion,  we  estimate  520  pack-animals 
as  the  normal  strength.  In  a  road  40  ft.  wide,  8  animals 
can  easily  find  room  abreast.  Then  the  train  would  have 
had  65  ranks.  Allowing  each  rank  10  ft.  depth,  the  train 
would  extend  650  ft.  When  the  road  is  only  20  ft.  wide, 
the  pack-animals  would  march  4  abreast,  and  would  extend 
1300  ft. 

Then  a  legion  with  its  baggage  in  column  of  march 
would  extend  2050  or  3900  ft. 

§  82.  The  march  in  order  of  battle  is  of  two  kinds,  — by 
lines  and  by  wings. 

a.  If  the  legion  marches  by  lines,  there  are  as  many 
columns  as  there  are  lines  in  the  formation.  Thus  in  Cae- 
sar's army  there  would  usually  be  three  columns  (Fig.  23). 
In  the  first  column  are  cohorts  i  -4  ;  in  the  second,  cohorts 
5-7  ;  and  in  the  third,  cohorts  8-10.  Each  cohort  marches 
in  column  of  maniples.  So  by  simply  facing  to  the  right  or 
left,  the  legion  is  again  in  order  of  battle. 

b,  A  legion  that  marches  to  the  front  by  wings  forms 
three  columns  (Fig.  24).  In  the  first  are  the  cohorts  of 
the  right  wing,  i,  5,  and  8.  In  the  second  are  the  cohorts 
of  the  centre,  2,  6,  and  9.  In  the  third  are  the  cohorts  of 
the  left,  4,  3,  7,  and  10.     The  columns  must  be  as  far  apart 


so 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


as  the  distance  between  their  leading  cohorts  when  in  line 
of  battle.     Each  cohort  is  in  column  of  centuries. 

§  83.  The  march  in  square  (Fig.  25)  was  employed  for 
a  similar  purpose  for  which  the  orbis  was 
formed.  One  division  of  troops,  in  col- 
umns of  centuries,  leads.  Then  follows 
the  baggage  train,  and  then  a  second  divis- 
ion of  troops  in  column  of  centuries. 
On  either  wing  marches  a  body  in  column 
of  maniples.  Thus  by  a  simple  facing  of 
the  wings  to  the  right  and  left,  and  de- 
ploying of  the  van  and  rear,  the  square  is 
i^egion  in  Square,   ready  to  meet  the  enemy. 

§  84.  These  are  conservative  estimates.  To  compare  the  Roman 
army  with  one  of  modern  days,  we  quote  a  very  comprehensive  calcu- 
lation from  the  New  York  Evening  Post.  It  must  be  remembered  that 
an  American  brigade  of  four  regiments  corresponded  very  nearly  with 
the  Roman  legion. 

"A  company  of  infantry  moving  in  column  of  fours,  the  usual  march- 
ing formation,  takes  up  about  33  yards  of  depth.  A  regiment  of  ten 
companies  will  require  330  yards,  a  company  of  cavalry  about  100 
yards,  and  a  battalion  of  four  companies  about  450  yards,  A  six-gun 
battery  of  field  artillery  in  column  of  sections,  and  accompanied  with 
the  usual  baggage,  requires  about  225  yards.  From  these  figures  we 
calculate  the  length  of  a  column  moving  on  a  single  road.  An  infantry 
brigade  of  four  regiments  will  take  up,  exclusive  of  baggage,  1350 
yards.  The  baggage,  including  ammunition,  will  require  nine  six- 
mule  wagons  to  each  regiment.  Each  wagon  with  its  team  requires 
20  yards  depth,  and  for  the  entire  brigade  the  depth  will  be  over 
700  yards.  Add  this  to  1350  yards,  and  we  have  nearly  2100  yards, 
or  a  mile  and  a  quarter  for  the  depth  of  the  column.  If  we  allow  but 
three  regiments  to  the  brigade,  we  can  reduce  the  depth  to  about  1,600 
yards.  For  the  baggage  belonging  to  different  headquarters  we  must 
allow  a  depth  of  200  yards. 

"  Now,  coming  to  a  division  of  infantry,  we  have  but  to  multiply  the 
foregoing  total  by  the  number  of  brigades  in  the  division.  But  when 
we  take  up  an  army  corps,  we  have  to  make  calculations  for  artillery 
and  cavalry,  extra  baggage  and  supply  trains.     Suppose  we  take  as  a 


TACTICS    OF    THE    LEGION.  51 

maximum  figure  an  army  corps  composed  all  told  of  42,000  men.  It 
has  four  divisions  of  infantry,  eight  to  twelve  batteries,  and  at  least  four 
regiments  of  cavalry.  Were  it  able  to  march  close  up,  on  a  single  road, 
with  all  its  trains,  including  reserve  supplies,  it  would  stretch  out,  at 
the  least  calculation,  about  eighteen  miles.  But  it  is  impossible  for  a 
column  of  this  length  to  keep  from  stretching,  or  "  lengthening  out," 
as  it  is  technically  termed,  and  so  the  best  authorities  make  an  allow- 
ance of  25  per  cent,  which,  added  to  the  18  miles,  makes  22^  miles,  or 
a  distance  which  would  take  a  mounted  messenger  moving  from  the 
head  of  the  column  to  the  rear,  if  he  made  good  speed  and  met  with 
no  obstruction,  at  least  three  hours  to  make,  or  moving  from  the  rear  to 
the  head,  nearly  half  a  day. 

"Gen.  McClellan,  in  one  of  his  reports,  says:  'If  I  had  marched 
the  entire  army,  100,000  men,  in  one  column,  instead  of  on  five  different 
roads,  the  column,  with  its  trains,  would  h^.ve  stretched  out  50  miles.' 
In  the  Franco-Prussian  war  it  was  found  that  a  Prussian  army  corps  of 
42,512  men,  90  guns,  13,800  horses,  and  1300  vehicles  took  up  on  a 
single  road  27  miles,  18  miles  occupied  by  the  troops  and  9  miles  by 
the  trains. 

"If  roads  were  all  broad  enough  and  in  good  condition,  columns 
could  march  with  a  far  greater  front,  and  the  depth  be  vastly  reduced. 
But  in  this  country,  at  least,  there  are  feM'  roads  where  there  is  room 
for  a  column  of  greater  width  than  a  set  of  fours  to  move  and  leave 
sufficient  space  for  the  unimpeded  progress  of  orderlies  and  staff 
officers,  or  for  vehicles  which  have  to  go  in  an  opposite  direction.  It 
may  be  asked  why  the  column  cannot  be  kept  closed  up,  why  it  has  to 
lengthen  out?  Sometimes  a  wagon  breaks  down.  It  is  hauled  to  one 
side  for  repairs  and  the  others  pass  on.  But  to  haul  it  to  one  side  con- 
sumes some  time,  mayhap  only  a  few  moments,  and  a  few  moments 
again  when  repaired  to  re-enter  the  column.  The  consequence  is  a 
halt  of  everything  in  the  rear.  Neither  men  nor  horses  can  be  marched 
steadily  without  a  halt  and  rest  every  hour,  and  a  halt  at  the  head  of 
the  column,  or  in  resuming  the  march,  occasions  loss  of  time  to  all 
regiments  in  rear,  which  cannot  start  at  once,  but  must  do  so  succes- 
sively. 

"  Again,  perhaps,  a  bridge  has  to  be  crossed,  and  time  is  lost  by  the 
breaking  of  step,  or,  perhaps,  the  change  of  formation.  Perhaps  a 
stream  has  to  be  forded,  or  some  obstacle  is  met  in  the  road.  It 
must  be  remembered  that,  in  addition  to  the  actual  distance  accom- 
plished in  marching,  many  other  things  are  required  of  the  soldier. 
He  has  to  go  on  guard  or  picket,  he  is  sent  out  perhaps  as  a  flanker  on 


52  CESAR'S    ARMY. 

the  march,  or  arriving  at  camp  he  has  to  collect  fuel  and  water;  more- 
over, he  carries  a  heavy  load,  his  kit,  gun,  ammunition,  and  day's 
rations,  averaging  from  fifty  to  sixty  pounds.  So  that  perhaps,  were  we 
able  to  calculate  all  that  he  has  done,  we  should  find  he  has  expended 
as  much  strength  as  would  take  the  ordinary  pedestrian  over  25  to  30 
miles  of  road." 


IV.     TACTICS   OF   THE   CAVALRY. 

§  85.  The  small  tactical  unit  of  the  Roman  cavalry,  or  of 
that  formed  on  the  Roman  plan,  was  the  tunna,  of  32  horses 
in  rank  and  file.  This  was  probably  arranged  in  4  ranks 
of  8  horses.  Allowing  5  ft.  front  room  to  each  horse,  the 
turma  would  have  a  front  of  40  ft.,  equal  to  that  of  the 
maniple.  Taking  10  ft.  depth  for  each  rank,  the  depth  of 
the  turma  would  also  be  40  ft.,  again  equal  to  that  of  the 
maniple.  The  order  of  march  could  easily  be  formed  from 
this  order  of  battle. 

§  86.  A  regiment  {ala)  of  400  horses  consisted  of  12 
turmae.  The  battle  array  of  the  cavalry  would  very  likely 
resemble  that  of  the  infantry.  It  would  then  consist  of 
several  lines,  two  or  three,  with  intervals  between  the 
turmae.  A  regiment  of  1 2  turmae  in  2  lines  would  have 
6  in  each  line ;  and  the  front,  including  intervals,  would  be 
440  ft.  Of  course,  if  it  should  be  desired  to  overwhelm  the 
enemy  with  the  momentum  of  the  mass  of  horse,  the  inter- 
vals would  be  closed  up. 

§  87 .  If  the  number  of  cavalry  should  be  considerable,  a 
larger  tactical  unit  would  be  desirable.  Three  tur7nae, 
arrayed  side  by  side,  would  amount  to  about  100  horses, 
with  a  front  of  120  ft.,  equal  to  that  of  a  cohort.  A  regi- 
ment {ala^  of  400  horses  would  contain  4  such  divisions. 

§  88.  In  attacks  in  mass,  doubtless  columns  were  formed 
of  entire  alae,  perhaps  3  turmae  front  and  4  turmae  {i.e., 
16  ranks)  deep.  After  the  success  was  won,  the  turmae  in 
the  rear  could  be  brought  up  in  the  front  {turma tim)  to 
pursue  the  scattered  foe. 


54  C^SAR  S    ARMY. 

§  89.  Of  course  the  tactics  of  the  cavalry  would  depend 
largely  upon  their  arms,  as  well  as  upon  their  numbers.  If 
provided  with  missiles,  they  would  doubtless  be  arrayed  in 
turmae  only,  and  would  never  form  columns  for  attack. 

§  90.  Cavalry  were  sometimes  strengthened  by  infantry 
mingled  with  them.  Caesar  used  with  good  effect  his  ante- 
signapi  for  that  purpose. 

§  91.  The  usual  order  of  march  of  the  ala  of  400  men 
was  probably  in  column  of  turniae.  If  there  was  room  for  a 
column  40  ft  wide,  the  normal  order  of  battle  would  be 
kept  by  each  turma.  The  ala,  not  including  the  train, 
would  extend  48<i  ft.  The  train  must  have  been  considera- 
ble, and  would  hare  added  at  least  a  half  to  the  length  of 
the  line.  A  column  of  10  alae,  or  4000  men,  which  Caesai 
sometimes  had,  would  have  extended  7200  ft. 

§  92.  If  the  road  allowed  the  column  a  breadth  of  only 
20  ft.,  the  turma  would  march  with  a  front  of  4  horses  and 
a  depth  of  8.  The  ala  would  .then  need  960  ft.,  without 
baggage,  and  with  it  1440  ft.  A  columr^  o.^  lo  -alat  would 
require  14,400  ft. 


V.    TACTICS   OF   THE   ARMY. 

A.     THE    BATTLE. 

§  93.  The  core  of  the  Roman  army  was  the  legion. 
Hence  we  see  that  in  describing  the  battle  array  of  the 
legion,  we  have  very  nearly  explained  the  mode  of  battle 
of  the  army  as  a  whole. 

I.   Offensive. 

§  94.  It  is  clear  that  the  normal  order  with  the  Romans 
was  the  offensive.  Caesar  usually  employed  the  triple  line 
{acies  t7'iplex).  The  legions  that  composed  the  hne  of 
battle  stood  side  by  side,  each  in  three  lines. 

The  third  line  was  designed  as  a  reserve  for  the  other  two. 
The  Roman  method  was  to  hurl  the  first  line  against  the 
enemy.  Should  this  onset  not  suffice,  or  should  the  first 
line  become  exhausted,  then  the  second  line  in  turn  took  up 
the  attack,  while  the  first  retired  between  the  intervals  and 
rested.  Thus  the  two  lines  alternately  assailed  the  foe,  until 
the  latter  should  break.  Meanwhile  the  third  line  was  in 
reserve.  Should  the  enemy  attempt  a  flank  movement,  this 
line  was  deployed  to  the  left  or  right  to  meet  it.  If  no  such 
movement  was  attempted,  or  if  auxiliaries  were  at  hand  to 
meet  it,  the  third  line  was  held  in  reserve  until  the  crisis 
of  the  battle.  Then  it  was  hurled  at  the  enemy  in  a  decisive 
charge. 

Often,  also,  the  third  line  was  busied  in  fortification,  while  e.g.  i,  25, 
the  first  and  second  covered  the  work.  89^  ^^ " 

§  95.  In  case  a  reserve  seemed  unnecessary,  or  a  greater 
extension  of  front  was  desirable,  the  legions  .were  formed  in 


56  CiESAR's    ARMY. 

C.I, 83.       two  lines  {acies  duplex).     On  the  other  hand,  circumstances 

might  demand  a  double  reserve,  and  the  legions  were  then 
^3/^4.'^'^'     ill   fo^^  Xwi.'t'i  i^acies  quadruplex).     In  this   case,  the  third 

line  was  held  to  support  the  attack,  and  the  fourth  to  guard 
•  the  flanks.     For  this  last  service,  the   fourth  line  was  not 

behind  the  third,  but  was  deployed  on  one  side  or  the  other 

of  it  —  sometimes  at  right  angles  to  the  main  line  of  battle. 

The   fourth   line  was    usually  weaker   than   the  other  two. 

Sometimes  one  flank  of  the   army  was  in  three  lines,  and 

the  other  in  four. 

§  96.  We  must  notice  that  the  Romans  placed  great 
dependence  on  their  first  charge.  And  it  is  significant,  in 
this  connection,  that  the  first  line  was  the  strongest  of  the 
three,  and  contained  the  most  experienced  cohorts. 

§  97.    The  cavalry,  in  an  offensive  battle,  was  used  for 

guarding  against  a  flank  movement,  for  taking  the  enemy  in 

flank,  and  for  hurling  upon  the  enemy  when  routed,  thus  to 

complete  his  destruction. 

B.G.  Ill,  For   these    purposes,  the   cavalry  was  commonly  placed 

CI  8  'in  ^^  ^^^  flanks  of  the  legions.      Sometimes    it  was   placed 

88, 89, 93.     behind  the   fourth  line.     Thus  the  latter  could  receive  an 

attack  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  —  which  being  repulsed,  the 

Roman  cavalry  could  issue  between  the  intervals  to  attack 

g  Q  J         in   turn.      Often    the    cavalry  was    drawn    up    behind    the 

24, 25.  legions.      It  was  then  placed  behind  the  first  cohorts,  as 

thus  they  could  more  easily  pass  through  the  intervals  for  a 

charge. 

C.I, 83;  A.      §  98.    The  light  troops,  archers,  and  slingers  were  either 

13,  60,  81.     placed  in  the  intervals  of  the  cavalry,  or  thrown  out  in  ad^ 

vance  of  the  legions  as  skirmishers,  or  placed  on  the  wings 

to  resist  flanking  movements.     Of  course  they  were  of  no 

avail  for  making  a  charge. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  5/ 

§  99.    The  front  of  the  Ime  of  battle  was  divided  into  e.g.  i,  52; 
three  parts,  the  right  and  left  wings  {cornu  dextrum,  sinis-  c'/n  6  • 
truui),  and   the  centre    {acies  media).     These  were   often  a.  60, 81. 
placed  under  kgati  detailed  for  the  purpose. 

§  100.    The  most  experienced  legions  were  usually  placed  c.  iii,  89; 
on  the  wings ;  on  the  wing  which  was  to  begin  the  attack,    '  °' 
the   best  of  all.     This,  again,  was  in  accordance  with  the 
Roman  custom  of  trusting  much  to  the  impetus  of  the  first 
onset. 

§   loi.    When  the  line    of  battle  was   formed  {acie  in-  e.g.  11,20 
structd),  the  general  passed  from  legion  to  legion,  addressing    "      '  ^°' 
each  with  a  brief  speech  of   encouragem.ent   (cohortatio). 
He  then  proceeded  to  his  own  post  (usually  the  wing  that 
was  to  begin  the  attack).     When  the  right  moment  arrived, 
he  ordered  his  trumpeter  to  give  the  signal  for  the  onset 
{signum).     This  signal  was  taken  up  by  the  trumpets  of  the  c.  iii,  92' 
other  legions,  and  passed  down  the  line.     So  the  attack  was  ^'  ^^' 
made  by  the  legions  successively.     The  cavalry  was  held  in 
reserve  on  the  flanks,  ready  to  receive  flank  attacks,  and  in 
turn  to  assail  the  enemy  in  the  flank. 

The  general  oversaw  the  battle,  supplied  reserves,  and  e.g.  vii, 
was  present  himself,  or  sent  one  of  his  stafl",  at  every  critical  ^'^' 
point.  If  victory  was  won,  the  cavalr)'^  was  hurled  on  the 
broken  enemy  to  complete  the  rout ;  or  infantry  was  ad- 
vanced to  overcome  renewed  resistance.  If  the  Romans 
were  beaten,  the  general,  with  a  cloud  of  cavalry  and  light 
troops,  covered  the  retreat  to  the  fortified  camp. 

2.    Defensive. 

§  102.  The  fundamental  ideas  of  the  Roman  defensive 
were,  to  make  use  of  ground  that  would  cause  as  much 
weariness  to  the  enemy  as  possible,  to  delay  their  approach. 


58  Cesar's  army. 

to  weaken  them  meanwhile   by  missiles,   and   then,  at  the 
right  moment,  to  assail  them  at  their  weakest  point. 

§  103.  Modern  armies  are  much  better  provided  for 
defensive  battle  than  were  the  Romans.  Our  troops  are 
armed  with  missile  weapons  which  are  not  useless  as  soon 
as  used  and  which  are  still  effective  for  hand  to  hand  work. 
The  vast  improvement  in  the  modern  arms  of  precision  is 
daily  making  this  truth  more  emphatic.  An  excellent  illus- 
tration of  a  collision  between  the  modern  power  of  resistance 
and  the  ancient  power  of  attack  is  afforded  by  the  battles  at 
Teb  and  vicinity  between  the  British  troops  under  General 
Graham  and  the  Arabs  of  Osman  Digma,  in  1884.  The 
Arabs,  armed  with  spear  and  shield,  and  inspired  with  fran- 
tic courage,  rushed  in  crowds  upon  the  British  squares.  But 
the  incessant  volleys  of  the  repeating  rifles  poured  a  cease- 
less deluge  of  balls  upon  them,  and  not  many  of  the  blacks 
lived  to  reach  the  bayonets.  At  a  few  points,  where  the 
line  was  for  a  moment  broken,  the  lithe  Arab  with  his  spear 
proved  a  deadly  foe ;  but  rifle  and  revolver  restored  the 
day. 

§  104.  The  only  missile  weapons  of  the  ancients  that 
had  any  great  range,  capable  of  being  used  in  the  field,  were 
bow  and  sling.  But  the  Romans  never  had  many  archers 
and  slingers.  These  were  of  no  use  for  hand  to  hand  fight, 
and  the  legions  were  of  no  use  for  anything  else. 

§  105.  Hence  great  care  was  exercised  in  the  choice  of 
ground.  Whenever  it  could  be  done,  the  army  was  drawn 
up  where  approach  was  possible  only  on  one  side ;  and  this 
side  difficult  on  account  of  a  swamp,  a  watercourse,  or  some 
similar  natural  barrier.  If  necessary,  and  time  was  afforded 
for  the  work,  approach  was  further  hindered  by  ditches, 
chevaux-de-frize,  pitfalls,  or  something  of  the  sort. 


tactics  of  the  army.  59 

3.    Manner  of  Attack. 

§  106.    The    Roman   infantry  sought  always  to  gain  the  B.G.1,22, 
advantage  of  a  higher  place  {superioris  loci).     Their  favor-  jt;^^!  y'^; 
ite  position  was  on  the  side  of  a  gently  sloping  hill,  so  that  vi,  46;  vii, 
the  enemy  were  below  them.     The  enemy  had  then  a  dis- g^'     '  j'lj^' 
advantageous  place  {locus  tjiiqims).     If  at  the  foot  of  this  46. 
hill  there  was  a  plain,  and  the  enemy  were  at  a  greater  dis-  b.g.  ii,  23, 
tance  than  the  cast  of  a  javelin  (10  to  20  paces  ;  i.e.,  25   to  '^'^\'^^\  ^' 
50  ft.),  then  to  the  enemy  was  left  the  initiative.     If,  how-  c.i,  45. 
ever,  their  adversaries  were  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  or  had  set 
out  to  climb  it,  then  the  Romans  rushed  against  them. 

§  107.    If  the  distance  was  considerable,  say  250  pacesc.  i,  87. 
to  an  enemy  just  setting  out  to  the  attack,  or  120  paces  to    '  "       '^' 
an  enemy  evidently  intending  to  await  the  onset,  then  the 
cohorts  at  first  moved  forward  at  a  walk,  probably  at  an  equal  b.g.viii,9. 
pace  {certo  gradu) .     Having  reached  the  proper  distance, 
they  set  out  at  a  run   (cursus),  sword  in  sheath,  the  first  c.  :ii,  92. 
ranks  with  spears  raised  in  the  right  hand  ready  to  hurl 
{puis  in/eslis).     At  a  distance  of  10  to  20  paces,  the  first  cm, 93. 
ranks  hurled  the  spears.    This  volley  at  short  range  threw  the  b.g.  i,  25: 
enemy  into  confusion,  inflicting  numerous  fearful  wounds.     '^s^A.id 
The  dead  and  wounded  fell,  and  thus  gaps  appeared  in  the 
hostile  array.     Here  and  there  a  pilum  remained  sticking  in 
a  shield,  and  thus  embarrassed  its  bearer ;  or  in  the  thick 
phalanx  two  shields  were  bound  together,  and  so  two  of  the 
enemy  were  rendered  useless  for  the  fight,  unless  they  let 
their  shields  go  and  exposed  their  unprotected  bodies  to  the 
Roman  weapons. 

§  108.  As  the  spears  could  be  thrown  only  from  a  short  b.g.  i,  52. 
distance,  it  is  clear  that  sometimes  a  rapidly  advancing 
enemy  would  get  near  too  soon,  —  the  right  moment  would 
have  passed,  —  and  the  Romans  must  then  drop  their  jave- 
lins and  engage  with  the  swords.  But  usually  the  volley  of 
heavy  spears  preceded  the  use  of  the  sword. 


6o  CiESAR's    ARMY. 

B.G.  II,  23;       §  109.    As  soon  as  the  first  ranks  have  hurled  the  spears. 

VII   88*  C  ' 

111/46. '  ^^^y  draw  their  swords  and  rush  forward  to  take  advantage 
of  the  confusion  and  gaps  in  the  enemy's  hne.  The  odd 
numbers  of  the  first  rank  spring  forward  to  gain  room ;  the 
even  numbers  and  the  entire  second  rank  follow  as  a 
support. 

Along  the  front  of  the  cohort  exists  now  a  series  of  single 
combats.  The  third,  fourth,  and  fifth  ranks  press  close  up 
to  aid  their  comrades  and  to  take  the  places  of  any  who 
fall,  and  meanwhile  throw  their  spears  over  the  heads  of  the 
combatants  among  the  throng  of  the  enemy  behind.  The 
remaining  five  ranks  of  the  cohort  stand  fast,  as  a  reserve. 

§110.  The  various  acts  of  the  attack  are  sharply  distin- 
B.G.vi,  45;  guished  in  military  parlance.  Advancing  to  attack  was 
c.  II,  93.  called  signa  inferre.  Then  followed  the  run  {concursus), 
then  the  volley  of  spears  {einissio  piloruni) .  If  the  enemy 
B.G.  1, 25,  still  held  out,  there  remained  the  last  resort,  the  onset  with 
52;  VI,  8.     ^j^g  swords  {impetus  gladiorum). 

§111.    It  will  be  seen  that  each  cohort,  if  only  two  ranks 
hurled    the   spears   at  once,   could   attack   five   times.      At 
R. pp.  49, 50.  Ilerda,  each  of  these  attacks  consumed  at  least  20  minutes. 

§  112.  Another  advantage  sought  by  the  Romans  must 
be  noticed.  We  must  remember  that  their  favorite  vantage- 
ground  was  a  hillside,  down  which  they  could  rush  against 
their  enemy.  Under  such  circumstances  more  than  two 
ranks  could  hurl  the  pila^  and  also  these  weapons  would  fall 
with  more  force. 

§  113.  Of  course  if  the  volley  of  spears  was  cast  too 
soon,  they  fell  harmless  on  the  ground.  It  was  often  quite 
likely,  in  the  confusion  of  battle,  that  such  a  mistake  would 
be  made.  Moreover,  the  Romans  were  accustomed  to  throw 
the  weapons  while  on  the  run  themselves,  and  against  an 


B.G.  I,  25. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  6 1 

advancing   enemy-      Should   the    latter   receive    the    onset 
standing,  as  did  Pompey's  men  at  Pharsalia,  the  volley  might  c.  111,92. 
easily  be  ineffective. 

§  114.  Running  to  the  attack  gave  an  impetus  that  was 
of  great  value.  But  if  this  run  should  be  begun  too  soon, 
there  was  danger  that  the  men  would  reach  the  enemy  out 
of  breath  and  tired,  and  also  that  the  ranks  would  be  more 
or  less  spread  apart. 

§  115.  It  was  much  in  favor  of  this  onset  to  be  made  on 
a  hillside  down  which  there  was  a  gentle  slope.  The 
momentum  thus  gained  would  carry  the  men  against  the 
enemy,  whether  they  would  or  not.  Also,  the  enemy  were 
more  likely  to  become  demoralized  at  sight  of  this  mass 
pouring  down  from  above.  Moreover,  the  same  circum- 
stance which  made  the  attack  heavier,  would  make  it  less 
effective  for  the  enemy  to  make  a  charge  to  meet  it. 

§  116.    The  rush  was  usually  made  by  a  line  at  once  ;  or,  e.g.  1,52; 
the  cohort  on  one  wing  would  begin,  and  the  rest  of  the^'g^^'^^' 
line  would   immediately  take  it  up.     The  second  line  fol- 
lowed the  first  at  the  usual  distance   (about  200  ft.),  and 
halted  as  soon  as  the  first  became  engaged. 

§  117.  Should  the  legions  thus  attack  a  continuous  line  of 
the  enemy,  it  is  clear  that  they  would  impinge  on  that  line 
only  at  certain  places,  and  there  was  danger  that  the  enemy 
would  pour  into,  the  intervals  and  attack  the  cohorts  in  flank, 
especially'  on  the  right  side,  unprotected  by  the  shields  e.g.  i,  25; 
{Jatus  apertum).     This  could  be  met  by  advancing  the  sec-  ^^'  ^3'  ^  I 

44* 

ond  line,  thus  losing  the  advantage  of  using  this  as  a  reserve  ; 
or,  the  rear  ranks  of  the  first  line  could  be  deployed  to 
right  and  left  into  the  inter^'^als.  We  find  in  fact  that  the 
second  line  was  generally  used  as  a  reserve,  through  whose 
intervals  the  exhausted  first  line  could  retire,  and  behind 
which  it  could  re-form. 


62  Cesar's  army. 

§  ii8.  How  long  one  line  would  remain  in  the  fight 
before  it  was  relieved  we  have  no  definite  knowledge. 
But  we  may  easily  conjecture  that  it  could  hardly  have  been 
more  than  15  minutes  in  general.  Then  the  second  line 
would  advance  to  the  attack,  the  first  would  assemble  behind 
it,  re-form,  rest,  and  be  ready  in  turn  again  to  take  up  the 
fight. 

§  119.  Csesar  usually  fought  in  three  lines  rather  than  in 
two.  We  may  suppose  that  he  brought  the  third  line  into 
action  only  in  case  the  blows  inflicted  by  the  other  lines 
successively  proved  insufficient  to  cause  the  enemy  to  break. 
Thus  the  third  line  was  a  last  reserve. 

§  120.  We  see  that  we  must  imagine  the  cohorts  in  battle 
as  in  almost  constant  motion.  The  two  lines  are  hurled 
successively  against  the  enemy,  giving  the  latter  no  rest,  and 
wearing  them  out  by  the  incessant  blows  of  the  cohorts. 

§  121.  When  the  enemy  were  finally  routed,  the  cavalry 
was  hurled  on  the  fleeing  mass  to  complete  their  destruc- 
tion. Caesar  never  failed  in  this  way  to  follow  up  a  beaten 
foe.  Hence  his  victories,  like  Napoleon's  for  the  same 
reason,  seldom  proved  indecisive. 

B.     THE  MARCH. 

§  122.  Every  long  distance  was  divided  into  day's  marches 
{itinera) .  After  each  two  or  three  days  of  marching,  as  a 
rale,  followed  a  day  of  rest.* 

Each  day's  march  {iter)  was  from  one  camp  to  another ; 
E.G.  VII,     so  that  "  a  distance  of  five  camps  "  means  a  five  days'  march. 


36. 


§  123.    The  Romans  aimed  to  fight  only  near  their  own 
camp.     When  they  were  compelled  to  break  this  rule,  and 

*  If  no  such  rest  was  taken,  it  was  regarded  as  wholly  exceptional 
See  B.G.  I,  41,  Sepiimo  die,  cum  iter  non  intermitteret,  etc. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  63 

fight  on  the  march  {ex  itinere),  they  usually  allowed  only  a  e.g.  111,21, 
part  of  their  men  to  engage,  the  rest  being  employed  in  ^g  '  ^^' 
fortifying. 

§  124.  Vegetius  says  that  the  recruits  were  practised  to  v.  i,  9. 
march  in  five  summer  hours,  at  the  usual  pace  {militari 
gradu),  40,000  steps  (of  2^  ft.),  and  at  quick  step  48,000 
steps.  Five  summer  hours  are  equal  to  about  6|  of  our 
hours.  Then  in  the  first  case  there  would  be  100,  and  in 
the  second  case  120,  steps  to  the  minute.  Upton's  Tactics, 
the  standard  of  the  United  States  army,  as  now  revised, 
prescribes  a  step  of  30  inches,  from  heel  to  heel,  both  in 
common  and  quick  time,  and  a  cadence  of  100  steps  per 
minute  for  common  time  and  120  steps  for  quick  time,  ex- 
actly the  Roman  standard. 

§  125.  The  step  {gradus)  of  2  J-  (Roman)  feet,  was  the  dis- 
tance from  heel  to  heel,  and  was  one-half  a  pace  {passus) . 
This  latter  was  the  full  distance  from  the  point  at  which  the 
heel  leaves  the  ground  to  the  point  at  which  the  same  heel 
next  returns  to  the  ground,  and  was  reckoned  at  5  (Roman) 
feet.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  Roman  feet  probably 
was  about  0.9708  of  an  Enghsh  foot. 

§  126.    The  Roman  day's  march  ordinarily  covered  about  R.  p.  93. 
7  hours,  from  sunrise  (4  to  5  or  6  a.m.)   until  11   or  12. 
Allowing  time  for  rest,  it  seems  hardly  likely  that  they  would 
average   more  than   30,000  to   40,000   steps  in  that  time. 
This  would  be  14.6  to  19.5  English  miles. 

§  127-  The  average  day's  march  for  infantry  in  the  United  States 
army  is  from  15  to  20  miles  (§  84).  Rest  is  generally  allowed  at  the  U.  750, 
rate  of  10  minutes  an  hour.  Taking  these  facts  into  account,  we  see 
that  we  cannot  be  far  out  of  the  way  in  our  estimate  of  the  Roman 
march;  especially  when  we  consider  what  an  amount  of  work  had  to 
be  performed  in  fortifying  the  camp. 

Of  course  forced  marches  were  often  made,  continuing  sometimes 
even  all  night. 


64  Caesar's  army. 

§  128.  We  must  distinguish  three  forms  of  march, — the 
march  forward,  to  the  rear,  and  to  either  flank. 

I.    The  Advance. 

§  129.  When  the  column  is  marching  forward,  we  must 
BG  I  ty  distinguish  three  parts  of  the  army,  —  the  van  {primiim 
E.G.  II,  19.  agmen),  the  main  body  {exercitus,  omnes  copiae,  agmen 
B.G.  1, 15,  legion2ivi),  and  the  rear-guard  {agjnen  novissimu7?i,  agmen 
c'l^s.l;.  extremum). 

§  130.    The  van  may  have  one  of  three  objects. 

B.G.  II,  19.  {a)  The  first  is  to  engage  the  rear  of  the  enemy  so  as  to 
delay  their  march,  and  give  time  for  the  main  body  to 
deploy  and  for  the  commander  to  form  his  plans.  For  this 
purpose  a  body  of  cavalry  was  sent  forward,  sometimes  with 
the  addition  of  light  infantry. 

B.G.  1, 15,  (yF)  The  second  object  is  to  reconnoitre  the  country 
{loci  nattcram  perspicere,  iter  cogfioscere) ,  and  to  bring  news 
of  the  enemy.  To  accomplish  this,  special  detachments  of 
the  cavalry  were  sent  forward  {exploratores) ,  who  scoured 
the   country  far  in  front  and  on  both  flanks.      To   these 

A.  12.  detachments  were  often  assigned  trusty  staff-oflicers,  accom- 

panied by  spies  {speculatores') . 

B.G.  II,  17.  {c)  The  third  object  was  to  select  and  make  ready  the 
place  for  the  camp.  This  duty  was  entrusted  to  a  detail  of 
centurions  from  the  legions,  accompanied  by  a  few  men, 
and  usually  under  a  tribune  or  some  officer  of  the  general 
staff. 

§  131.  At  a  fixed  distance  after  the  van  marched  the 
main  body,  and  close  after  it  the  rear-guard.  This  last, 
during  a  march  to  the  front,  had  only  police  duty  to  per- 
form ;  i.e.,  to  pick  up  stragglers,  and  the  like. 

§  132.  The  main  body  may  march  in  one  of  three  forms  : 
a.  In  column,  each   legion  accompanied   by  its  baggage ; 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY,  6$ 

b.  In  column,  all  the  baggage  of  the  army  together ;  c.  In 
line  of  battle.     We  will  consider  these  in  their  order. 

§  133-  ^-  This  form  of  march  was  only  adopted  in  a  e.g.  il,  17 
friendly  country,  or  when  there  appeared  no  immediate 
danger  of  an  encounter  with  the  enemy.  The  legions  are 
in  single  column,  the  cohorts  in  column  of  centuries  with 
single  or  double  number  of  ranks,  according  to  the  width  of 
the  road.  Each  legion  is  followed  immediately  by  its  bag- 
gage, which  thus  divides  it  from  the  legion  next  following. 
The  last  legion  probably  detached  a  few  cohorts  to  follow 
the  baggage.  This  detachment  would  thus  form  the  rear 
guard  of  the  whole  army.  A  column  of  five  legions  in  this  • 
order,  with  a  breadth  of  40  ft.,  requires  10,250  ft.,  or  4100 
steps  {gradus)  in  length.  A  sixth  legion  would  need  40 
minutes  to  reach  the  head  of  this  column  so  as  to  join  in 
battle.  Of  course  if  the  march  was  with  double  number  of 
ranks,  so  much  more  t  'me  would  be  taken.*  It  is  clear  that 
if  the  enemy  could  niake  a  vigorous  attack  in  force  on  the 
head  of  the  column,  they  would  have  a  good  chance  to 
throw  it  into  confusion  and  entirely  prevent  it  from  properly 
deploying. 

The  legions  marching  in  this  order,  each  followed  by  its 
baggage,  cannot  be  called  ready  for  battle  {expeditae) . 

§  134.  b.  When  near  the  enemy,  if  it  is  not  desirable  to  e.g.  ii.  19, 
march  in  order  of  battle,  the  column  is  formed  as  in  a,  but  ^^'  ^^° 
the  baggage  of  the  whole  army  is  assembled.  The  greater 
part  of  the  legions,  usually  three-fourths  of  the  entire  num- 
ber, composes  the  head  of  the  column.  Then  followed  the 
collected  baggage.  The  remaining  legions,  usually  one- 
fourth  of  all,  brought  up  the  rear  {claiidiint  agmen),  as 
guard  for  the  baggage  and  rear-guard  for  the  army.     In  this 

*  See  ante,  §  84. 


66  '       CiESAR's    ARMY, 

B.G.  II,  19;  order  the  legions  can  much  more  rapidly  be  deployed,  and 

o'-^C  I  6    ^^y  properly  be  called  expeditae. 

Although  the  legions  can  readily  be  brought  into  action, 
we  cannot  consider  them  as  actually  ready  until  the  indi- 
vidual soldiers  have  made  their  preparations.  On  the  march, 
the  soldier  had  to  carry  his  personal  baggage  (sarcinae). 
Also,  his  heavy  helmet  was  hanging  at  his  breast,  his  shield 
was  in  a  leather  case,  his  field  badges  {insignia),  plumes, 
and  the  like,  carefully  protected  fi-om  the  dust. 

Then  if  a  legion  marching  expedita  is  attacked  in  the 
march  {in  agmine,  sub  sarcinis,  in  itinere),  before  being 
able  to  meet  the  enemy  the  legionaries  must  first  pile  their 

E.G.  I, 24;     T  ^  .  . 

VII,  18;  A.  baggage  {sarcinae  in  acervuin  comportantur,  sarcinae  con- 

B^.G.  II  21.  f^>'untur),  draw  the  shields  from  their  coverings  {tegimenta 

B.G.  II,  21;  scutis  detrahutifur),  put   on    their   field    badges   {insignia 

accommodantur) ,  put  on  helmets  {galeae  induuntur,  galean- 

B.G.vii,i8.  tur),  and  get  their  weapons  ready  {arma  expeciiuntu^r,  legio 

armatur).    Of  course  time  was  needed  for  all  this,  and  time 

must  be  won  by  the   vanguard.     An    enterprising   enemy, 

knowing  these  facts,  would  seek  to  attack  the  Roman  army 

B.G.  II,  17;  on  the  march    {sub  sarcinis  adoriri,  impeditos  in    agmine 

1^66^'^A       adoriri),  and  meanwhile  give  as  httle  time  as  possible  for 

making  the  proper  preparations  to  resist. 

§  135.  c.  The  advance  in  order  of  battle  {acie  ins  true  fa) 
could  occur  only  for  short  distances.  We  find  it  made  on 
two  occasions  for  a  distance  of  16,000  steps,  or  about  three 
hours'  time.  This  formation  could  only  be  employed  when 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  and  when  the 
ground  was  suitable. 

When  marching  in  order  of  battle,  the  legions  marched 

in  columns,  as  has  been  explained  under  the  tactics  of  the 

legion.     And  when  in  this  order  it  is  clear  that  the  men 

B.G.  VIII,    must  all  be  ready  for  immediate  battle  {kgiones  armatae  et 

^^'  ins  true  fae).     This  alone  would  prevent   a   march   to   any 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  6/ 

great  distance,  as  the  baggage   {sarcinae)   must  all  be  left 
in  camp. 

2.    The    Retreat. 

§  136.  A  retreat  in  presence  of  the  enemy  is  less  con- 
venient than  an  advance.  It  was  usually  in  one  of  two  forms  : 
a.  The  retreat  in  column,  with  baggage  massed ;  b.  The  re- 
treat in  square  {agmine  quadrato). 

§  137.    a.    For  the  retreat   in   column,  the  baggage  wasc.ni,  7-;. 
sent  out  of  camp  as  soon  as  possible,  under  escort  of  a  de-  ^''" 
tachment  of  infantry,  often  of  an  entire  legion.     This  body 
would  constitute  the  vanguard.     With  them  marched  a  de- 
tail of  centurions  and  men  whose  business  was  to  stake  out 
the  new  camp. 

Then  followed  the  main  body,  the  cohorts  in  column  of 
centuries.  Finally,  at  a  suitable  distance  followed  the  rear 
guard  {agme7t  novissimum). 

It  was  the  duty  of  these  last    to  delay  the  enemy,  thus 
giving  the  army  time  to  push  on,  or  to  deploy,  if  the  attack 
should  be  made  in  force.     The  rear-guard  was  composed  of  b.g.  1,24. 
cavalry,  with  archers  and  slingers.     When  necessary,  they 
would  be  supported  by  troops  from  the  legions.     Sometimes 
the  antesignani,  and  again  legionary  cohorts  ready  for  battle  c,  ni,  75; 
{expeditae),  or  even  entire    legions,  marched  between  the    ' '^* 
main   body  and    the    rear-guard.      Often    the    legions    did 
this    duty  by  turns    {legiones  invicem   ad  extremum   agmen  a.  70. 
evocabai) . 

§  138.  b.  The  retreat  in  square  {agmen  quadratum')  was  B.G.vn,67 
chosen  when  surrounded  by  the  enemy ;  for  instance,  on  a 
march  through  a  rebellious  country,  and  also  when  the 
enemy  had  numerous  cavalry.  A  single  square  could  be 
formed  from  all  the  legions,  with  the  united  baggage  of  the 
army  in  the  centre  ;  or,  each  legion  could  form  a  square  by 
itself;  with  its  baggage  within.     This  last  would  be  the  mode 


68  -         CiESAR's    ARMY. 

when  the  army  was  originally  marching  in  column  with 
divided  baggage,  and  was  compelled  to  make  front  suddenly 
on  all  sides,  without  time  for  the  baggage  to  assemble.  But 
one  square  of  all  the  legions  seems  to  have  been  customary. 
The  cavalry,  supported  by  the  archers  and  slingers  and  by 
the  antesignani,  remained  outside  the  square,  and  skir- 
mished around  it  on  all  sides. 

3.    The  March  to  the  Flank. 

§   139.    Flank  marches  were  made  only  for  a  short  dis- 
tance, and  always  in  order  of  battle.     The  legions  marched 
cm,  67;     in  a  column  of  lines,  so  that  there  would  be  two  or  three 
E.G.  1, 49.    parallel  columns,  according  to  the  formation. 

A.  67.  §   140.    The  baggage   train  would   either  march  on  the 

side  opposite  the  enemy,  or  between  the  legions,  each  being 
followed  by  its  own  pack-animals.  The  latter  mode  might 
be  used  when  the  army  was  divided  from  the  enemy  by 
some  considerable  obstacle,  like  a  river,  or  when  the  side 
remote  from  the  enemy  was  difficult  to  traverse ;  for  in- 
stance, when  the  army  was  marching  in  the  valley  of  a 
stream,  so   that  the  water  was    on   the   flank   towards   the 

E.G.  VII,     enemy,  and  hills  and  woods  on  the  other  flank.     In  such 
34-36.  -" 

case  as  last  mentioned,  no  guard  of  light  troops  would  be 
necessary  between  the  army  and  the  enemy.  But  in  open 
ground  such  a  detachment  would  have  to  be  made,  and 
would  perform  the  same  duties  as  the  vanguard  during  an 
advance,  and  the  rear-guard  during  a  retreat. 

§  141.  To  form  line  of  battle  from  a  column  of  march 
by  the  flank  was  a  simple  matter,  unless  the  baggage  was 
between  the  legions.  It  was  done  simply  by  facing  right  or 
left,  as  the  case  might  be. 

P.  VI,  40.  §   142.    In  every  march  of  a  large  body  of  troops   the 

order  of  march  was   changed  daily,  and  the  legions  daily 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY. 


69 


PONSA  CyiSARE  IN  RHENO  FACTUS. 


a  a.  tigna  bina  sesquipedalia.      b  b.  trabes  bipedales.      c  c.  fibulae. 

dd.  directa  materia,  longuriis  cralibiisque  constrata. 

ee.  sublicae  ad  infeiiorem  partem  fliimiiiis  pro  ariete  oblique  actae. 

f  f.  sublicae  supra  pontem  immissae. 

g.  castellum  ad  caput  pontis  positum. 


Fig.  36. 


70  CiESAR  S    ARMY. 

took  turns  in  leading,  so  that  each  in  turn  might  come  first 
to  the  camp. 

4.   Crossing  Streams. 

§  143.  Rivers  were  crossed  either  by /<?r<?'j- or  by /^;7*^^j-. 
The  Romans  could  cross  deeper  fords  than  we,  as  they  had 
no  powder  to  keep  dry.  Caesar  preferred  fords  whenever 
practicable,  as  they  required  no  previous  preparation.  Some- 
B.G.vii,  56.  times  an  artificial  ford  was  made.  Often,  when  the  current 
was  strong,  a  line  of  cavalry  was  stationed  up  stream  from 
the  point  of  crossing,  and  another  line  down  stream,  and  the 
infantry  crossed  in  this  shelter.  The  upper  line  of  cavalry 
broke  the  force  of  the  current,  and  the  lower  line  saved  any 
men  who  were  carried  from  their  footing. 

§  144.  When  fords  were  not  available,  bridges  had  to  be 
built.  ^These  were  of  many  kinds.  The  simplest  were  to 
cross  a  mere  ravine,  and  consisted  of  long  tree  trunks  cov- 
ered with  branches  and  earth.  The  most  elaborate  of 
which  we  know  was  the  footway  40  ft.  wide  with  which 
Caesar   twice   spanned    the    Rhine.      A  river   in    Spain   he 

H.  5.  bridged  by  sinking  baskets  filled  with  stones,  as  foundations 

for  his  piers.  Other  streams  were  crossed  by  bridges  of 
boats.  A  bridge  of  any  importance  had  to  be  protected  by 
strong  fortifications  at  each  end ;  and,  when  it  was  desired 
to  retain  it,  these  were  held  by  suitable  garrisons  {praesidid) . 

B.G.  IV,  17;  Caesar's  bridges  on  the  Rhine  (Fig.  26)  were  of  this 
'  ^'  description.     They  were  masterpieces  of  military  engineer- 

ing, and  were  held  securely  while  the  army  moved  into 
Germany. 

C.     THE    CAMP. 

§  145.  The  Romans  distinguished  two  kinds  of  camp  : 
the  field,  or  summer  camp  {castra  aesfiva),  made  at  the 
close  of  each  day's  march,  to  be  abandoned  the  next  morn- 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  /I 

ing ;  and  the  winter  camp  {^castra  hiberna),  in  which  the 
army  spent  the  time  between  two  campaigns. 

§  146.  We  have  no  exact  account  of  the  camp  in  the 
time  of  Caesar.  Our  only  complete  information  on  this 
subject,  in  fact,  is  of  the  time  of  the  second  Punic  war, 
given  by  Polybius,  and  in  the  time  of  Trajan,  by  Hyginus. 
Riistow  interprets  by  the  following  rule:  Whatever  is  com-  r.  p.  75. 
mon  to  both  may  be  set  down  at  once  as  true  of  Caesar. 
Where  the  authorities  differ,  Hyginus  may  be  preferred,  as 
the  organization  of  the  army  in  the  time  of  Polybius  differed 
more  from  that  of  Caesar  than  did  Trajan's.  However,  Caesar 
customarily  used  fewer  auxiliaries  than  did  Trajan. 

I.    The  Summer  Camp. 

I.    The  Site. 

§  147.  When  possible,  the  camp  was  always  placed  on 
the  slope  of  a  gentle  hill,  so  that  its  front  had  before  it  still 
a  portion  of  the  descent,  and  its  rear  lay  on  the  summit. 
Thus  the  legions  could  pour  from  the  gates  and  form  against 
an  approaching  enemy  in  readiness  to  make  their  favorite 
onset  down  hill  {ex  loco  superiore).  If  at  the  foot  of  the  b.g.  i,  24; 
declivity  was  some  obstruction,  as  a  stream  or  a  morass,  it  jh^^^'^'^' 
was  all  the  better.  At  any  rate,  there  should  be  before  the 
camp  room  for  the  accustomed  order  of  battle.  Of  course 
water  was  necessary.  Therefore  the  camp  was  usually 
placed  on  the  sloping  side  of  the  valley  of  some  stream.  If 
the  army  had  to  cross  a  river,  the  camp  could  be  made  on 
either  side.  But  the  conditions  were  usually  best  met  by 
placing  it  on  the  hither  side.  Much  wood,  too,  was  needed, 
for  cooking,  and  for  the  various  uses  to  which  it  was  put  in 
the  fortifications.  But  yet  the  camp  must  not  be  so  near  a 
forest  as  to  allow  the  enemy  to  collect  in  numbers  under  its 
shelter,  and  then  make  a  sudden  onset. 


72 


CAESAR  S    ARMY» 


§  148.  It  is  evident  that  all  these  conditions  could  not 
always  be  fulfilled,  and  often  a  camp  must  be  pitched  where 
necessity  demanded  {in  loco  necessario).  But  to  place  the 
camp  on  low  ground  instead   of  on  a  hill  was  considered 


B.G.  VIII,    \i2i£\>dxo\ys>  {more  barbard).  „ 
36.  po>/-^ 


'Lfei. 


O^A 


-eg. 


Porta  Principalis 
Sinistra. 


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^ 


4.^ 


vJ> 


>,=« 


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legatTrih. 


legatTrib. 


^ 


2f 


^>^ 


..»<* 


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I'm,    principalis 


« 
^ 


Vi  a-  qiv  intan-a- 


X 
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'^^ 

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a*^ 

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v/mo;. 


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Jux. 


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Porta  Principalis 
Dextra. 


J 


Porta  Decumana. 
Fig.  37.     The  Snnimer  Camp. 

Note.  —  12=  First  legion,  second  cohort,  etc.    This  camp  is  planned  for  5  legions, 
with  cavalry  and  auxiliaries. 


R.  pp. 75 
seqq. 


A.  80. 


2.    T/ie  Fortification.— a.  The  Ground  Plan. 

§  149.  The  right-angled  quadrilateral  was  in  Caesar's  time 
probably  the  only  form  of  a  Roman  camp.*     The  quadrilat- 

*  The  castra  lunata  mentioned  at  Thapsus  was  doubtless  a  series  of 
rectangular  camps,  arranged  in  crescent  form,  with  intervals,  connected  by 
wall  and  ditch. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  73 

eral  was  also  the  prevailing,  if  not  the  only,  form  of  the 
small  redoubts  which  among  the  Romans  were  known  as 
castella,  or  little  camps.  We  find  these  in  the  circumvalla- 
tion  of  towns  under  siege,  connected  by  lines  of  fortification. 
The  castella  very  likely  were  quadrilaterals  with  side  equal 
to  the  front  of  a  cohort.  They  could  then  each  be  easily 
garrisoned  and  defended  by  one  cohort. 

The  corners,  both  of  castra  and  castella,  were  rounded,  so 
as  to  afford  more  room  for  defence. 

§  150.  The  gates  of  the  camp  were  usually  merely  open- 
ings, probably  as  wide  as  the  front  of  a  maniple  (40  ft.). 
They  were  defended  by  semi-circular  tambours,  or  by  a 
traverse  {tilulum^  reaching  to  a  corresponding  distance. 
Very  likely  on  the  inside  was  a  corresponding  traverse. 
Usually  the  gates  were  not  closed  up.  When  it  was  neces-  e.g.  v,  5c 
sary  to  defend  the  camp,  one  or  more  of  these  might  be 
closed,  however.  In  small  redoubts  (^castella),  only  a 
narrow  opening  was  needed,  and  this  might  easily  have  had 
a  real  gate.  In  lines  of  fortifications,  openings  must  be  left 
at  intervals  for  sorties. 

b.  The  Elevation. 

§  151.  The  normal  Roman  fortification  consists  of  a  wall  e.g.  v,  39, 
{agger,  vallum^),  on  which  the  defenders  place  themselves; 
and  before  it  a  ditch  {fossa),  from  which  comes  most  of 
the  material  for  the  wall,  and  which  keeps  the  enemy  from 
approaching  and  stops  them  at  the  distance  of  a  good  spear 
cast  (Fig.  28). 

I.   The  Ditch. 

§  152.   Vegetius  gives  in  two  places  the  size  of  a  ditch,  v.  i,  24'' 

TTT    8 

In  the  one  which  is  more  like  those  found  in  Caesar,  he 
speaks  of  a  ditch  whose  width  at  the  top  was  9  or  12  ft., 
and  whose  depth  in  the  first  case  was  7  ft.,  and  in  the  latter 
was  9  ft.,  vertically  downward  {sub  line  a) . 


74 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY, 


;5 


We  notice  that  the  width  is  in  each  case  divisible  by  3, 
and  that  the  depth  is  two-thirds  of  the  width,  plus  i. 

Caesar  often  speaks  of  ditches  whose  width  is  divisible  by  e.g.  vil 
3,  of  12,  15,  and  18  ft.,  for  instance;  and  only  once,  in  the  q'i^' 
works  at  Alesia,  of  20  ft.  Further,  Caesar  gives  always  only 
one  dimension  of  the  ditch.  This  would  seem  to  imply  that 
the  other  dimensions  stood  invariably  in  a  fixed  ratio  to 
the  one  given.*  He  gives  expressly  both  dimensions  of  his 
ditches  only  when  they  are  unusual.  For  the  customary 
fortification  of  a  camp,  it  seems  likely  that  the  width  was  9 
ft.,  and  the  depth  7.  Figure  28  is  to  be  interpreted  as 
follows  :  — 


ad  is  the  escarpment  or  scarp. 
cd  is  the  counterscarp. 


5c  is  the  bottom. 

gc  ox  fb  is  the  vertical  depth. 


§  153.    Hyginus  speaks  of  two  forms  :  the  fossa  fastigata 
(Fig.  28),  in  which  both  scarp  and  counterscarp  are  sloping ; 


Fig.  30. 

md  ^Q,  fossa punica  (Fig.  29),  with  sloping  scarp  and  ver- 
tical counterscarp.     Caesar  adds  a  third  form  (Fig.  30),  with  e.g.  vil, 
vertical  sides  {directis  lateridus)  ;  i.e.,  both  the  scarp  {latus  ^^' 
interius)  and  the  counterscarp  {latus  exfe?'ius')  were  vertical. 
This  ditch  had  of  course  the  same  width  at  bottom  as  at  top. 

§  154.  We  may  infer  that  the  fossa  fastigata  was  the 
usual  form,  merely  because  generally  earth  would  be  apt  to 

*  Goler  thinks  that  he  named  but  one  dimension  because  the  other  was 
always  the  same ;  and  that  that  uniform  depth  was  most  likely  9  ft.,  because 
more  than  that  would  render  it  difhcult  to  cast  up  the  earth.  But  we  must 
remember  that  the  Romans  relied  much  on  baskets  for  carrying  earth, 
rather  than  on  the  shovel  alone. 


yG  Cesar's  army. 

cave  in  either  of  the  others.  Modern  engineering  makes 
the  slope  of  the  scarp  greater  than  that  of  the  counterscarp, 
the  better  to  oppose  the  fire  of  artillery.  But  the  fortifica- 
tions of  the  ancients  had  little  to  fear  from  missiles ;  so  it 
seems  probable  that  scarp  and  counterscarp  had  the  same 
slope. 

§  155.  Remembering  that  the  width  adxi  always  divisible 
by  3,  it  at  once  seems  likely  that  one-third  the  width  is  to 
be  reckoned  for  af,  one-third  for  dq,  and  the  remaining  one- 
third  for  qf,  or  its  equal,  be.  Then  the  depth  qc  is  equal  to 
2y^cb-\-\.  The  area  of  the  vertical  section  of  such  a  ditch 
is  2  cb  {2cb-\-\)  sq.  ft.  Or,  representing  one-third  oi  adhj 
X,  qc=  (^2x-\-j)  ft.,  and  the  area  of  the  vertical  section  abed 
=  2jj;  (2Jt:-f-i)  sq.  ft.  Thus  for  each  running  foot  in  the 
length  of  the  ditch,  there  would  be  2.t(2jc"+i)  cu.  ft.  of 
R.  p.  86.       earth  for  the  construction  of  the  wall. 

2.    T/ie  IVall. 

§  156.  We  think  of  a  wall  mainly  as  a  breastwork,  behind 
which  soldiers  are  sheltered  from  the  fire  of  the  enemy. 
But  it  was  quite  different  with  the  Romans.  They  had  little 
need  for  shelter  from  missiles.  What  they  aimed  at  mainly 
was  a  high  position,  inaccessible  to  the  enemy,  from  which 
to  hurl  their  spears. 

§  157.  The  section  of  such  a  wall  we  may  consider 
practically  a  rectangle,  mnop  (Fig.  28),  of  sufficient  height 
and  width.  The  width  mn  should  be  enough  to  give  room 
for  standing  firmly,  and  for  moving  backward  and  forward  to 
hurl  the  javelins.  Six  feet  would  do.  The  height  should  be 
as  great  as  possible,  though  of  course  this  would  be  limited 
by  the  fact  that  the  earth  which  formed  the  wall  came  from 
the  ditch.  Of  course  if  towers  were  placed  on  the  wall,  the 
latter  had  to  be  made  wider.     The  usual  height  seems  to 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  77 

have   been   two-thirds  of  the   upper  width   of  the   ditch. 

Caesar  often  speaks  of  a  ditch  15  ft.  wide  and  a  wall  of  10  e.g.  11,5. 

ft.,  and  the  like. 

§  158.  The  outer  slope  niz  could  be  made  very  steep,  as 
there  was  no  fire  of  cannons  to  withstand.  But  to  keep  the 
earth  of  the  wall  in  place,  there  must  have  been  a  facing  of 
some  more  tenacious  material.  For  this  purpose  there  were 
used  sods,  cut  in  digging  the  ditch ;-  also  timber  and  brush. 
This  last  was  put  up  in  bundles,  in  the  form  that  we  call 
fascines. 

§  159.  Vegetius  says  that  the  Romans  cut  sods  i^  ft.  v.  iii,  & 
long,  I  ft.  wide,  \  ft.  thick,  for  use  in  fortifications.  Two 
such  sods,  packed  one  on  the  other,  gave  a  height  of  i 
ft.  to  the  facing  for  each  foot  in  the  length  of  the  wall; 
assuming  the  sods  to  have  been  placed  endwise  to  the  wall. 
Every  3  ft.  in  the  width  of  the  ditch  gave  two  such  sods,  or 
a  foot  high  of  the  facing.  Then  from  a  ditch  9  ft.  wide 
could  be  cut  6  sods  to  the  running  foot,  or  3  ft.  in  height  of 
facing.  With  these  sods  one-half  the  height  of  the  wall 
could  be  faced,  leaving  the  other  half  to  be  strengthened 
with  sod  cut  elsewhere,  or  with  fascines. 

§  160.  The  Romans  were  not  always  content  with  this 
facing  of  the  outer  slope.  When  they  sought  to  give  the 
wall  especial  height,  they  made  it  firmer  by  several  lines  of 
wicker  work,  or  hurdles,  rs,  ttt,  parallel  to  the  length. 

§  161.  Then  the  rampart  must  be  easily  mounted  from 
the  inside.  For  this  purpose  steps  were  made,  kl.  These 
were  of  brush,  or  at  least  strengthened  with  brush.  So  it 
was  clear  that  a  Roman  camp  needed  much  wood ;  and  also 
that  the  section  of  the  wall  was  greater  than  the  section  of 
the  ditch. 


y8  Cesar's  army. 

§  162.  The  vertical  section  of  a  wall  6  ft.  in  height  and 
width,  well  faced,  and  provided  with  steps,  contains  about 
56  sq.  ft.  The  ditch  {fossa fastigatd) ^  9  ft.  wide  and  7  ft. 
deep,  has  a  section  of  42  sq.  ft.  But  the  earth  would  loosen 
itself  about  one- sixth  in  digging.  That  gives  49  sq.  ft.  sec- 
tion for  the  earthwork,  leaving  7  sq.  ft.  for  brushwork.  Of 
this,  at  least  6  sq.  ft.  must  be  allotted  to  the  steps. 

E.G.  V,  40;  §  163.  When  the  wall  was  wide  enough,  on  its  top  was 
placed  a  breastwork  {lo7'ica,  loricula)  of  stakes  (z/^///),  with 
only  a  few  twigs  left,  which  were  firmly  bound  together. 
This  breastwork  was  either  of  a  uniform  height  of  4  to  5  ft., 
so  that  the  soldiers  could  easily  see  over  it  and  cast  their 
spears,  or  there  were  pinnacles  {pinnae')  placed  on  it,  2  or 
3  ft.  high,  between  which  were  gaps. 

§  164.    There  were  often  erected  on  the  wall,  from  point 
to  point,  wooden   towers.      At  such  points  both  wall  and 
E.G.  V.  40;  ditch  had  to  be  wider.     Sometimes  there  were  two  ditches 
at  such  places. 

§  165.  Caesar  at  his  camp  against  the  Bellovaci  had  two 
ditches  with  vertical  sides,  15  ft.  wide.  If  these  were  11  ft. 
deep,  they  would  yield  385  cu.  ft.  of  earth  for  each  foot  in 
the  length  of  the  wall.  A  wall  12  ft.  high  could  here  have 
a  width  of  24  ft.  including  the  outer  slope  and  the  steps. 
On  such  a  wall  could  be  placed  towers  with  a  square  base  of 
16  to  20  ft.  on  a  side,  yet  leaving  a  passage  round  them  of 
8  to  4  ft.  wide.  x\s  such  a  tower  must  exert  a  considerable 
pressure  on  the  side  of  the  ditch,  a  space  of  at  least  a  foot 
must  have  been  left  between  the  ditch  and  the  foot  of  the 
wall. 

3.    The  Interior. 

§  166.  The  camp  was  generally  a  square,  or  a  rectangle 
whose  sides  were  as  2  to  3  (Fig.  27).  Tht  front  was  the 
side  towards  the  enemy,  or  towards  which  on  the  following 


VII,  72. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  79 

day  the  march  would  be  taken  up.*  The  rear  was  of  course 
opposite,  and  the  other  two  sides  were  right  and  left  to  one 
facing  the  front. 

§  167.  The  depth  of  the  camp  was  divided  into  three 
nearly  equal  parts.  Beginning  at  the  front,  they  were  the 
praete7itura,  the  latera  praetorii,  and  the  retentwa.  These 
three  divisions  were  made  by  two  broad  streets,  parallel  to 
the  front,  the  via  principalis  and  the  via  quintana.  The 
former  ends  at  each  side  of  the  camp  with  a  gate,  the  porta 
principalis  dextra  and  the  porta  principalis  sinistra.  Very 
likely  in  large  camps  there  were  gates  at  the  ends  of  the  via  e.g.  hi,  19 
quintana  also.  Ji'.^^'  ^^^^ 

§  168.    In  the  middle  of  the  front  wall  is  the  porta  prae-  e.g.  ii,  24; 
toria  ;  and  opposite,  in  the  rear  wall,  is  the  porta  decumana.  JJJ'  ^^'  ^' 

§  169.  From  the  porta  praetoria  to  the  via  priiicipalis 
extends  a  street,  the  via  praetoria.  Opposite  this,  in  the 
middle  part  of  the  camp,  is  the  praetorium,  a  wide  space,  c.  iii,  82. 
in  which  were  the  headquarter  tents,  the  altars,  and  the 
tribunal.  This  space  occupies  in  length  all  the  middle  of 
the  camp,  but  extends  only  100  or  150  ft.  each  side  of  the 
middle  line. 

§  170.  In  the  retentura  was  a  similar  place,  the  quaes- 
torium.  Here  were  the  quarters  of  the  administrative  staff,  . 
here  hostages  and  prisoners  were  kept,  and  forage  and  booty 
were  placed.  Outside  of  the  camp,  back  of  the  porta  decu- 
mana, were  the  booths  of  the  sutlers  {mercatores)  who 
followed  the  army.  •  e.g.  vi,  37. 

§  171.  In  the  praetentura  were  stationed  from  one-fourth 
to  one-fifth  of  the  cohorts,  equally  divided  between  the  two 
sides.     These  cohorts   occupied  the  tents  facing  the  wall. 

*  But  see  Nissen,  Das  Templum,  p.  23  seqq.  _^ 


8o  -        Caesar's  army. 

Also  in  the  praetentura,  along  the  via  principalis,  facing 
this  and  the  middle  of  the  camp,  was  the  place  for  the  tents 
of  the  legati  and  tribuni  militum.  Again,  in  each  half  of  the 
praetentura,  in  the  space  enclosed  by  the  cohorts  along 
the  wall,  by  the  tents  of  the  legati  and  tribuni,  and  by  the 
via  principalis,  were  encamped  one-fourth  of  the  cavalry 
and  one-half  of  the  archers  and  slingers.  Thus  in  the  entire 
praetentura  were  quartered  one-half  of  the  cavalry  and  all 
the  archers  and  slingers,  ready  to  move  from  the  front  gate 
and  form  the  advanced  guard. 

§  172.  On  each  flank  of  the  mid-camp,  next  the  wall,  was 
a  hne  of  cohorts  :  on  each  side  one-tenth  of  the  entire  num- 
ber in  the  army,  or  one -fifth  altogether.  Next  the  prcRto- 
rium,  along  both  its  longer  sides,  were  placed  the  staff, 
except,  of  course,  the  legati  and  tribuni.  Between  the 
cohorts  that  were  along  the  wall  and  the  staff  troops,  were 
encamped  on  each  side  one-fourth  of  the  cavalry,  or  one- 
half  in  the  whole  mid-camp.  Their  front  was  towards  the 
via  principalis,  unless  there  were  gates  at  the  ends  of  the 
via  quintana.     In  that  case  one-half  (or  one-fourth  of  the 

E.G.  V,  50,   whole)  would  front  toward  each  street,  and  they  would  be 

5^'  ready  to  rush  out  at  either  side. 

In  the  rear  part  of  the  camp,  on  each  side  of  the  quaes- 
torium  and  equally  divided  by  it,  lay  the  rest  of  the  cohorts, 
*  about  one-half  of  all  in  the  army.  Their  front  was  towards 
the  wall  on  the  flanks  and  rear.  Enclosed  by  these,  by  the 
quaestorium,  and  by  the  via  quintana,  was  the  place  for  the 
auxiliary  infantry,  excepting  the  archers  and  slingers. 

§  173.  Entirely  around  the  camp,  within  the  wall,  ex- 
tended a  broad  street.  This  would  at  once  prevent  the 
likelihood  of  hostile  missiles  reaching  the  tents,  and  would 
allow  room  for  moving  troops  to  defend  the  walls.  Polybius 
gives  the  width  of  this  as  200  ft.,  and  Hyginus,  as  60.     The 


^  TACTICS    OF    THE   ARMY.  8 1 

latter  seems  too  small  for  all  the  movements  of  an  energetic 
defence.  As  we  know  that  in  Caesar's  time  much  stress  was 
laid  on  skill  in  defending  the  camp,  we  may  conclude  that 
this  street  was  quite  wide,  probably  at  least  1 20  ft. 

4.    Arrangement  of  the  Cohorts. 

§  174.  The  order  in  camp  naturally  depends  on  the 
order  of  march.  It  seems  reasonable  to  conclude  that  this 
was  usually  in  column  of  centuries.  Hyginus  gives  the 
arrangement  of  a  cohort  of  six  centuries. 

§  175.  The  cohort  encamped  in  a  space  of  120  ft.  front 
and  180  ft.  depth.  This  was  divided  on  lines  parallel  to  the 
front  into  6  portions  of  120  ft.  by  30  ft.  Each  of  these  was 
for  one  century. 

From  the  length  of  the  front,  12  ft.  are  to  be  deducted 
for  the  street  dividing  the  cohort  from  the  adjacent  one. 
That  leaves  108  ft.  for  the  tents.  Each  century  had  8  tents  : 
6  for  the  soldiers,  i  for  the  centurion,  and  i  for  the  servants. 
As  each  tent  is  10  ft.  square,  the  length  actually  covered  by 
tents  would  be  80  ft.  This  leaves  28  ft.  for  the  7  intervals 
between  the  tents,  or  4  ft.  for  each  interval.  The  3  first 
centuries  of  the  3  maniples  had  their  front  towards  the  wall, 
and  the  3  second  their  front  from  the  wall.  Thus  the  2 
centuries  of  one  maniple  would  be  stationed  back  to  back. 
The  second  of  one  maniple  would  face  the  first  of  the  next, 
divided  from  it  by  a  street  12  ft.  wide,  parallel  to  the  wall. 

§  176.  From  the  30  ft.  depth  of  the  space  allotted  to  the 
century,  6  ft.  must  be  allowed  for  their  half  of  the  street; 
10  ft.  for  the  tents ;  5  ft.,  behind  the  latter,  for  stacking  the 
w^eapons ;  and,  finally,  9  ft.  for  the  pack-animals.  The  c.  ill,  76. 
several  cohorts  of  a  legion,  according  to  the  room,  could  be 
placed  in  a  line,  side  by  side,  or  in  several  lines. 


82  ,       Caesar's  army. 

5.    Arrangement  of  the  Cavalry  in  Camp. 

§  177.  In  camp  there  would  suffice  for  each  turma  a 
space  of  120  ft.  by  30  ft.,  the  same  as  for  a  century  of 
infantry.  Then  one  ala  of  cavalry  would  take  the  same 
room,  and  be  arranged  in  the  same  way,  as  two  cohorts  of 
infantry.  Of  course  in  particulars  the  arrangement  must 
have  been  varied  to  adapt  it  to  the  convenience  of  that  arm 
of  the  service. 

j5.    Time  needed  for  Fortifying  the  Camp. 

R.  pp.  90,91.  §  178.  Let  us  assume  the  normal  measure  of  the  ditch 
to  be  9  ft.  wide  and  7  ft.  deep.  Of  course  a  part  of  the 
men  must  be  under  arms.  We  may  suppose  that,  under  all 
ordinary  circumstances,  in  a  body  of  troops  of  at  least  two 
legions,  the  men  of  one  cohort  could  be  used  for  each  240 
ft.  of  wall.  In  digging  a  ditch  of  9  ft.  wide,  in  240  ft. 
length  not  more  than  60  men  can  conveniently  work.  Then 
in  the  same  space  allot  30  men  to  the  wall,  and  30  men  to 
make  the  fascines  and  gather  material,  and  we  see  that  an 
equal  number  are  at  work  on  wall  and  ditch,  and  the  two 
go  on  at  an  equal  rate.  As  120  men  compose  the  normal 
strength  of  the  maniple,  and  as  there  are  three  maniples,  it 
is  clear  that  there  could  be  three  reliefs.  A  relief  of  the 
ditch-diggers  would  be  necessary,  but  it  would  hardly  be  so 
with  the  rest.  Remembering  that  there  were  always  some 
soldiers  who  were  exempt  from  such  work  {imniunes,  benefi- 
ciarii),  there  might  be  in  a  maniple  100  men  disposable 
for  the  work  of  fortifying.  Then  there  could  easily  be  three 
details  for  digging  the  ditch,  with  men  to  spare. 

§  179.  A  skilful  digger,  who  works  only  one  hour  and  is 
then  relieved,  can  easily  excavate  from  50  to  60  cu.  ft. 
(Roman)  in  that  time.  But  the  Roman  legionaries  were 
above  all  things  skilful  at  digging.     As  the  cross- section  of 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY. 


83 


the  ditch  was  4^-  sq.  ft.,  and  each  of  the  60  men  in  one 
rehef  had  a  length  of  4  ft.  to  excavate,  there  would  be  for 
each  man  in  the  relief,  or  at  least  for  3  men,  one  in  each 


relief,  168  cu.  ft.  to  throw  out.  This  was  the  work  of  from 
3  to  4  hours.  Then,  if  the  camp  was  begun  at  noon,  by  4, 
or,  at  the  latest,  5  p.m.,  the  fortification  would  be  complete. 


84  -      Cesar's  army. 

7.    Camp  Duties, 

§   180.    When  the  van  of  the  army  reacned  the  camp- 
ing-ground selected,  it  was  immediately  formed  with  front 
towards    the    enemy  to    cover    the    work    of    fortification. 
Strong   details   of    cavalry   reconnoitred    in    all    directions, 
while  the  engineers  set  to  work  immediately  at  measuring 
C.  Ill,  13.     and  staking  out  the  camp.      As  the  legions  arrived,  they 
proceeded  each  to  its  allotted  place,  and  laid  aside  baggage 
and  arms  (excepting  swords)  in  the  space  behind  the  site 
C.  Ill,  76.     for  the  tents  {^arnia  in  contubernio  deposita).     The  cohorts 
assigned  to  guard  duty  of  course  retained  their  arms,  and 
proceeded  at  once  to  their  posts.      Baggage  and  arms  being 
laid  aside,  the  legions  marched  to  the  wall  street,  and  were 
there  told  off,  some  for  work  within  the   camp,  some  for 
fortifying.     The  latter  work,  having  been  already  measured 
E.G.  II,  19.    {opere   dijnenso),    was    begun    at    once    {castra   ponunfur, 
E.G.  1, 49;    muniimfii?-) .     When   the    baggage    train   arrived,   the    ani- 
j  g^j'  ^^'     '  mals  were  unloaded  by  the  servants  {calones) .     The  tents 
as  a  rule  were  only  pitched  when  the   fortifications  were 
completed.      When    not    near    the    enemy,    however,    and 
especially  in  stormy  weather,  the  tents  would  be   pitched 
C.I,  80,  81.    {tabernaatia  constitner.e,  statitere)  immediately  on  arrival. 

§   181.    As  soon  as  the  fortifications  were  finished,   the 

bulk  of  the  cavalry  was  withdrawn  into  the  camp.     A  few 

E.G.  V,  50.   squadrons  were  left  on  picket  without  {equites  in  statione), 

E.G.  II,  11;  and  these  sent  scouts  iexploratores)  in  all  directions.     Any 

T  T  T         •    \f  T  T  \        J-  -'         .  -' 

44.'*'       '  special  duty  of  gaining  information  was  performed  by  spies 
E.G.  II,  11;   {speculatores^ . 

V,  49. 

§   182.    One   cohort  of  each  legion  was  usually  placed 

on  guard  at  each  gate  {cohors  in  statione  ad  portafn).      In 

E.G.  IV,  11;  the  daytime,  few  sentries  were  posted.    But  duriug  the  night 

VI,  37;  c.    (doubtless  each  cohort  on  guard  lined  the  redan  before  the 

gate,  and  its  side  of  the  wall,  thickly  with  sentinels.     Of 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  85 

course  in  special  cases  the  guard  was  strengthened.  Be- 
sides the  guards  at  the  gates,  one  cohort  at  least  was  detailed 
for  duty  in  the  camp,  and  was  stationed  in  the  praetori24,m 
and  quaestorium. 

§   183.    As  soon  as  the  fortification  was  completed,  the 
supper  was  prepared  and  eaten.     For  this  purpose  the  staff 
assembled  in  the  praetorium,  and  remained  until  nightfall.  Livy, 
The  general  during  this  time  could  conveniently  promulgate  ^^^^^^  s 
orders  for  the  night  and  for  the  next  day.     At  nightfall,  also, 
the  musicians  of  the  army  assembled  to  sound  the  tattoo.       Livy, 

XXX    s. 

This  was  the  signal  for  setting  the  night  watch.      The         '  ^* 
cavalry  pickets  were  drawn  into  camp,  except  a  few  single 
horsemen  as  outlying  sentries   i^speciilatoi-es) .     The  guard  e.g.  ii,  ir 
cohorts  were  probably  changed  at  the  tattoo,  the  new  guard 
going  on  duty  now  to  serve  24  hours.     The  night  sentries 
(vigiks)  were  at  once  posted  on  the  tambours  {tifula)  and  b.g.  vili; 

35* 

wall.  The  night,  from  sunset  to  sunrise,  was  divided  into  4 
equal  watches  {zngiliae) .  Each  cohort  on  guard  was  divided 
accordingly  into  4  reliefs,  one  of  which  should  be  on  duty 
during  each  watch.  The  other  3  reliefs  could  rest,  of 
course,  on  their  arms.  If  the  cohort  contained  only  about 
300  men,  it  will  readily  be  seen  that  70  men  could  compose 
one  relief.  This  number,  for  2100  ft.  of  wall,  would  give  one 
sentinel  for  each  30  ft.  The  different  reliefs  were  signalled 
by  the  trumpeters  ibiiccinatores).  c.  11,35. 

§  184.  At  daybreak  the  musicians  sounded  the  reveille. 
If  the  march  was  not  to  be  resumed,  the  guard  cohorts 
drew  in  their  night  sentries  and  posted  the  less  numerous 
sentinels  for  the  day.  The  cavalry  pickets  took  their  posts 
{staiiones),  and  sent  out  their  scouts  {exploratores) .  At 
noon  this  cavalry  guard  was  relieved.  Livy,  XL, 

33;V.III,a 

§  185.  During  the  night  the  rounds  of  the  sentries  were 
probably  made  by  the  centurions  of  the  guard.     On  occa- 


S6  ,        Cesar's  army. 

sion,  also,  the  tribunes  on   duty,  and  the  general  himself, 
would  inspect  the  guard. 

§  i86.    If  camp  should  be  made  in  the  presence  of  a 

threatening    enemy,    the    usual    vanguard    would    not    be 

E.G.  1, 49;    enough  to  cover  the  operation.     One  or  two  legions  would 

'  '  '*^'       then  be  deployed  in  line  of  battle  to  keep  off  the  enemy, 

and  a  third  would  do  the  work  of  fortifying. 

§  187.  The  army  might  leave  the  camp  either  to  attack 
a  near  enemy,  or  in  order  to  continue  the  march. 

a.    In  the  first  case,  the  tents  were  left  standing,  the  bag- 
gage remained  in  its  place,  and  a  guard  was  left  in  charge. 
B.G.lii,  26:  This  guard  might  consist  of  a  detail  from  each  legion,  or  of 
JT,  8;  c.  I,    gi^^jj-g  legions.      The  latter  would  be  likely  to  occur  when 
there  were  legions  of  raw  recruits  present.      These  would 
naturally  be  left  within  the  walls. 

^.  In  case  of  continuing  the  march,  the  camp  was  aban- 
doned. At  the  first  signal  (signum  profectionis),  the  tents 
c.  Ill,  85.  were  struck ;  at  the  second,  they  and  the  rest  of  the  bag- 
C.iii,37,7s.  gage  were  packed  on  the  beasts  {vasa  conclamantur)  \  at 
the  third,  the  march  began.  To  conceal  the  departure 
from  the  enemy,  the  signal  might  be  omitted.  Yet  it  was 
deemed  a  point  of  military  honor  to  sound  it. 

II.    The  Winter  Camp. 

§  188.    In  winter  quarters  the  Romans  did  not  billet  their 

soldiers  in  towns,  but  kept  them  together  in  winter  camps 

{castra  hibernd).     When  a  portion  of  a  town  was  needed, 

for  strategical  or  other  reasons,  then  the  inhabitants  had  to 

B.G.  Ill,  I.  leave,  as  we  see  in  the  case  of  Galba  at  Octodurus. 

§  189.  The  general  arrangement  of  the  winter  camp  must 
have  resembled  that  of  the  castra  aestiva.  There  must 
have  been  the  same  fortifications  and  streets.  But  doubtless 
the  convenience  of  the  men  was  more  regarded  than  when 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  8^ 

in  the  field.  In  place  of  tents  {tabet-nacula,  pelles),  the 
winter  camp  afforded  huts  which  gave  better  protection 
against  wind  and  weather.  The  arms  were  doubtless  kept 
in  the  huts,  and  the  pack-animals  in  sheds.  Also  more 
room  could  be  taken  than  in  the  field. 

D.     THE    SIEGE. 

§  igo.    The   Romans  were  accustomed   to  assail  strong- R,pj 
holds    in  three  ways,  —  by  blockade   {obsidto),  by  assault  ^^^^• 
{oppngnatio  repentina),  and  by  formal  siege  {oppugnatio) . 

1 .  Blockade  was  used  against  places  of  great  strength,  b.g.  vii, 
especially  if  poorly  provided  with  provisions  ;  and  further  if  3^'  ^9- 
the  location  allowed  a  complete  environment. 

2.  Assault  {^oppugnatio  j-epentina,  Fig.  32)  was  made  one.  111,80 
places  of  smaller  importance,  with  weak  fortifications,  and 

well  supplied  with  food.  Of  course  emergencies  might  lead 
to  the  same  method  of  attack  on  very  strong  places. 

3.  Formal  siege  was  resorted  to  against  positions  that  b.g.  vii 
were  strongly  fortified  and  well  provisioned,  so  that  neither  "• 

of  the  preceding  methods  was  of  avail. 

I.    Blockade. 

§  191.    The  blockade  was  accomplished  by  means  of  the 
circumvallation   {circuinvallatio) .     The  besieged  place  was  b.g.  vn, 
surrounded   by  fortifications.      These    consisted    of  strong 
redoubts  {castella)  at  convenient  places,  connected  by  lines  c.  iii,  43; 
of  wall  and  ditch  {niunitiones ,  brachia)  .*     Outside  of  these  69. 
lines  lay  the  camp,  or  camps,  of  the  blockading  army.     If  b.g.  vii, 
an  attempt  at  relief  from  without  was  to  be  feared,  another  41.'    "     ' 
line  of  works  must  be  created,  outside  the  first,  and  facing 
outwards.     In  modern  warfare  this  latter  line  is  called  the 
circumvallation,    and    the    inner    one    the    contravallation. 
Caesar  does  not  use  the  latter  term,  and  applies  the  former 
as  has  been  explained. 

*  See  Fig.  42. 


88 


CiESARS   ARMY. 


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TACTICS    OF    THE   ARMY.  89 

§  192.  It  is  clear  that  the  strength  that  must  be  given 
to  the  fortifications  depends  upon  the  relative  strength  of 
besiegers  and  besieged.  If  the  besiegers  are  weak,  their 
works  must  be  correspondingly  stronger. 

§  193.   The  redoubts   {castelld)  were  held  by  garrisons  g  g.  vii 
(^praesidid) .    These  in  the  daytime  merely  threw  out  a  hne  ^9;  c,  iii, 
of  sentries   {stationes),  which    they  were  ready  to   support 
immediately.     At  night  strong  pickets   {excubitores)   occu- 
pied the  works.      In  the  redoubts  were  always  ready  the  c.  iii,  65. 
means  of  making  signal — smoke  by  day,  and  fire  by  night 
— in  case  of  attack.     Constant  watch  was  kept  lest  at  any 
point  a  sortie  might  be  made  by  the  enemy. 

2.    Assault. 

§  194.  The  principal  article  used  in  assaults  was  the 
scaling-ladder.  Breaching-huts  {musciili,  §  210)  were  also  cm, 80. 
used.  These  were  low,  small  houses  with  sloping  roofs,  and 
built  of  strong  materials,  to  resist  the  showers  of  missiles 
from  the  wall.  These  were  pushed  forward  on  rollers,  and 
under  their  shelter  battering-rams  (§  213)  were  brought  to 
bear  on  the  wall. 

§  195.  As  soon  as  the  ladders  were  ready,  the  breaching- 
huts  (§  210),  were  built  fascines  and  fagots  were  prepared 
for  filling  the  ditch,  and  hurdles  were  made  ready  for  pro- 
tecting the  archers  and  slingers.*  These  troops  were  then 
pushed  forward,  thus  protected,  in  order  to  clear  the  walls  of 
the  defenders.  Behind  the  missile  troops  were  formed  the 
legionaries,  usually  in  several  columns.  Thus  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  would  be  distracted,  and  at  one  of  the  points 
of  attack  success  might  follow.  At  the  head  of  each  column 
was  a  body  of  laborers  with  ladders  and  fascines.  As  soon 
as  the  archers  and  slingers  had  cleared  the  wall,  the  facines 
were  cast  into  the  ditch,  the  ladders  were  set  up,  and  the 

*  Also  see  \  28. 


go 


C^SAR  S    ARMY. 


legionaries  mounted  to  the  attack.  If  a  lodgment  was 
effected,  the  assailants  sought  to  spread  out  each  way  and 
gain  a  gate,  in  order  to  open  it  to  their  comrades.  Mean- 
time the  battering-ram  was  at  work  at  various  points,  thit 
no  resource  might  be  wanting. 


3.    Regular  Siege. 


R.  p. 142 

li?3o;  VII,  mound  {agger,  Figs.  2>Z^  34,  35). 


24; 

15- 


C.  II,  I, 


Fig.  33. 
Horizontal  Section  of  Agger. 


§  196.    The  principal  work  of  a  regular  siege  was  the 

This  was  always  begun 
at  a  distance  from  the  wall,  very 
nearly  out  of  reach  of  missiles- 
It  was  then  gradually  extended 
in  the  direction  of  the  point  to 
be  attacked,  and  was  at  the 
same  time  gradually  increased 
in  height  until  on  a  level  with 
the  top  of  the  walls,  or  even 
higher.     When  this  mound  was 

completed,  the  storming  party  moved  on   its  top  to  the 

attack. 

§  197.  The  height  of  the  mound  was  often  considerable. 
Before  Avaricum  it  was  80  ft.,  and  as  much  before  Massilia. 
The  length  of  course  depended  oh  the  power  of  the  enemy's 
missile  weapons.  It  seems  probable  that  those  built  in 
assaulting  the  Gallic  towns  would  not  have  been  very  long. 
The  least  distance  from  the  enemy  at  which  the  construction 
could  have  been  begun  was  from  400  to  500  ft. 

§  198.  The  width  above  must  have  been  enough  for  a 
storming  column,  very  likely  of  the  usual  formation.  If  we 
take  this  to  be  the  front  of  a  maniple,  the  least  breadth 
would  have  been  50  ft.  The  sides  might  be  quite  steep,  £^s 
we  shall  see  further  on.  A  fabric  80  ft.  high  and  50  ft,  wide 
on  top  might  have  been  60  ft.  wide  on  the  ground. 


TACTICS    OF    THE   ARMY.  9 1 

§  199.  To  the  building  of  the  agger,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, everything  else  in  the  siege  was  subordinated. 

By  way  of  preparation  for  its  construction,  first  of  all  the 
ground  must  be  levelled  for  the  foundation.  This  could  be 
done  by  workmen  protected  by  vineae  (§  211),  stout  mova- 
ble sheds.  Then  the  workmen,  both  those  building  the  agger 
and  those  providing  the  material,  must  be  guarded  from  the  R.k.  p.  310 
missiles  of  the  enemy.  The  former  were  protected  by  plutei 
'  (§  214),  large  standing  shields,  which  could  be  advanced  c.  11, 2. 
from  time  to  time.  The  others  brought  the  material  in  cov- 
ered galleries.     These  were  composed  of  a  series  of  vineae  b.g.  ii.  30; 

TTT  •    C^ 

reaching  to   the    point  of  beginning  the  agger.     Also,  the  jj  '^^' 

workmen  were  protected  by  archers,  slingers,  and  artillery, 

drawn  up   parallel  to   the  hostile  walls.     The   archers   and 

slingers  were  themselves   protected  by  pliitei ;  the  artillery  e.g.  ii,  30; 

was  placed  usually  in  moving  towers.     These  parallels  must  J    is^'c^n' 

have  had  covered  approaches  of  long  lines  of  huts.     Under  ^^■ 

shelter   of  these,  also,  were    posted   bodies    of  legionaries 

{cohortes   expeditae) ,    to    cover   the    operations    and   resist  e.g.  vii, 

sorties.      Farther  in  the  rear  bivouacked  strong  bodies  of^^' 

troops,  outside  the  camp,  ready  to  support.  •  e.g.  vii, 

24. 

§  200.  The  strength  of  the  various  protections  would  of 
course  depend  on  the  power  of  the  enemy's  missiles.  Usu- 
ally the  side  walls  of  the  vineae  were  only  of  a  sort  of  wattled 
work.  Before  Massilia,  however,  all  the  covering  devices 
had  to  be  made  of  logs  of  considerable  thickness.  c.  11, 10. 

§  201.  Sometimes  towers  {turres  ambulatoriae)  were 
placed  on  the  agger.  In  such  cases  the  top  of  the  agger 
was  designed  to  be  a  smooth  roadway ;  and  the  height  b.g.  ii,  30, 
needed  only  to  be  enough  for  the  tower  to  have  sufficient  ^^'  ''^^' 
elevation.  This  probably  was  a  quicker  way  of  approach, 
as  it  saved  building  a  considerable  part  of  the  agger ;  but  it 
was  not  so  convenient  for  a  column  of  attack.     As  a  rule. 


92 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  93 

however,  the  tower  accompanied  the  construction  of  tne 
agger,  at  its  side  ;  and  served  as  a  battery  to  clear  the  enemy 
from  the  wall,  and  as  a  redoubt  in  the  line  of  approaches 

a.    Construction  of  the  Agger. 

§  202.  While  we  have  no  detailed  accounts  of  the  mode 
of  building  the  agger,  we  do  know  the  following  facts  :  —        R-  p- 147 

.  -,  ^  seqq. 

1.  That  it  contained  much  woodwork  ;   (a)  because  the 

^  E.G.  VII, 

agger  was  frequently  set  on  fire  by  the  enemy,  and  (^b)  be-  22, 24. 
cause  Trebonius  was  compelled  to  build  a  stone  agger,  for  ^  jj'  ^^' 
the  reason,  as  he  expressly  states,  that  there  was  no  more 
wood  in  the  region. 

2.  That  this  woodwork  was  not  merely  wattled  branches, 

but  was  mainly  logs  {^arbores,  fnateria).  C.  ll,  i,  15. 

3.  That  it  was  not  solid,  but  had  holes,  larger  and  smaller, 

which  would  admit  a  draft.     This  is  infeiTed  because  it  was  G.  vii,  24. 
sometimes  set  on  fire  from  below,  the  enemy  having  driven 
a  mine  beneath  it. 

4.  That  it  approached  the  wall  gradually,  and  that  the 
workmen,  meanwhile,  were  protected  from  missiles.     Thus 

it  must  have  been  erected  one  story  at  a  time.  b.g.  vii, 

From  these  facts  and  necessary  inferences,  we  may  draw  ^  *jj 
up  a  scheme  of  construction  which  cannot  be  far  from  the 
truth. 

§  203.  Figure  34  is  a  vertical,  longitudinal  section  of  the 
agger,  ah  is  the  city  wall  against  which  it  is  directed.  The 
entire  section  of  the  agger  when  completed  is  abcefhnda.  It 
is  clear  that  only  a  portion  of  this,  as  cefhnd,  can  be  con- 
structed with  regularity.  The  remainder,  abed,  is  so  near 
the  enemy  that  it  must  be  filled  up  with  a  rush  at  the  last 
moment.  We  speak  first  of  the  part  that  is  constructed 
regularly. 

§  204.  The  point  of  beginning  must  be  as  near  the  enem.y 
as  his  missiles  allow,  —  at  some  point  in  their  long  range. 


CESAR'S    ARMY. 


r^'~ 


Fig. 


General  View  of  Siege  Operations. 


ABCD.  Hostile  wall,  j  j.  Testudines  aggesiittae,Yi:oK.zz*'va%  those  levelling  the 
ground,  h  k.  Agger,  x  x,  x  x' ,  &c.  Plutei^  protecting  those  working  on  the 
agger,  e  f  g-  Line  of //«/^/,  manned  with  archers  and  .;llingers.  1 1.  Turres, 
also  manned  with  archers  and  slingers  nd  provided  with  tormettta.  r  o. 
Covered  way  of  z/z"«,?rt;^,  giving;  approach  to  archers  and  slingers.  I  q.  Covered 
way  of  vineae  approaching  the  point  of  beginning  the  agger,  f  g  .  Position  of 
plntei.  coverir.cf  the  he^inninsc  of  agger,  m  n.  Covered  gallery  through  the 
o-gge^.     n  »  -T;,  F-zc.     Steps  and  platiorms  of  the  several  stories. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY.  95 

'  First  of  all  a  line  of  breaching-huts  is  moved  forward  so  as 
to  make  a  safe  gallery  through  which  to  convey  material. 
Then  at  a  distance  of  perhaps  30  ft.  in  advance  of  this  point 
is  placed  a  line  of  large  shields  (^plutei,  x)  at  right  angles  to 
the  line  of  huts,  and  longer  than  the  width  of  the  agger. 
These  shields  must  be  strong  enough  to  turn  the  hostile 
missiles  and  high  enough  to  protect  the  space  of  about  30  ft. 
between  them  and  the  huts.  In  this  space  thus  protected 
the  workmen  set  about  the  aggei\  The  material  with  which 
they  work  consists  principally  of  logs  20  to  30  ft.  long,  and 
from  a  foot  to  a  foot  and  a  half  thick.  These  are  piled,  cob- 
house  fashion,  in  successive  courses,  each  course  crossing 
the  one  below  it  at  right  angles.  In  the  middle  is  left  a 
passage  {i?i7t)  10  or  12  ft.  wide.  This  passage  when 
covered  is  to  form  a  gallery  through  which  is  carried  the 
material  for  continuing  the  work.  The  spaces  between  the 
logs  are  filled  with  stones,  sods,  and  earth.  When  the  struc- 
ture has  reached  a  height  of  about  7  ft.,  a  course  of  logs 
{op)  is  placed  close  together  across  the  whole.  This  at  the 
same  time  covers  the  gallery  and  serves  as  a  floor  for  the 
second  story. 

This  completes  30  ft.  of  the  first  story.  The  shields 
(plutet)  are  now  pushed  on  30  ft.  farther,  and  the  work  con- 
tinued, material  being  brought  through  the  line  of  huts  and 
through  the  covered  gallery  in  the  portion  of  the  agger 
already  constructed.  In  like  manner  the  work  is  pushed 
on  by  successive  stages  of  30  ft.  each. 

§  205.  Meanwhile  at  the  point  of  beginning  steps  ^are 
made  so  as  to  mount  easily  to  the  second  story.  When  the 
first  story  has  advanced  perhaps  100  ft.,  a  transverse  row 
oi  plutei  {k)  is  placed  on  its  flat  roof,  and  a  second  story  is 
begun  and  pushed  on  in  like  manner  as  the  first.  The  be- 
ginning of  the  second  story  is  far  enough  forward  of  the 
beginning  of  the  first  to  leave  a  sufficient  space,  not  merely 


96  Cesar's  army. 

for  the  steps,  but  also  for  a  platform  {fg)  leading  to  the 
entrance  {n)  of  the  second  gallery.  Meanwhile,  the  outer 
sides  are  covered  with  green  hides,  as  a  protection  against 
fire. 

§  206.  Thus  the  work  goes  on,  story  by  story,  until  the 
agger  has  reached  the  required  height.  Each  story  has  its 
gallery  running  throughout  its  length,  its  platform,  or  land- 
ing, and  steps  leading  to  the  story  above. 

§  207.  We  come  now  to  that  part  near  the  enemy's 
wall,  which  can  only  be  made  by  pouring  in  material  helter 
skelter.  When  the  agger  has  reached  a  height  of  three  or 
four  stories,  and  has  been  brought  as  near  the  enemy  as 
is  consistent  with  the  safety  of  the  workmen,  then  a  great 
quantity  of  rubbish,  wood,  bundles  of  straw,  stones,  sod,  and 
the  hke,  are  brought  through  the  various  galleries  and  cast 
out  through  the  openings  {m),  until  the  space  between  the 
agger  and  the  wall  is  quite  filled  up. 

§  208.  The  great  size  of  the  agger  is  enough  to  show  that 
wood  was  largely  used  in  its  construction.  Then,  too,  wood 
is  on  the  average  only  one-third  as  heavy  as  earth.  It  can 
therefore  be  gathered  and  transported  more  easily.  Also, 
the  side  walls  of  a  wooden  agger  can  be  much  steeper  than 
if  of  earth.  An  agger  of  earth,  50  ft.  wide  on  the  top  and 
80  ft.  high,  should  be  210  ft.  wide  at  the  base,  and  therefore 
130  ft.  wide  at  the  middle  point  of  the  height.  One  of  wood 
would  need  to  have  an  average  width  of  only  55  ft. 

An  agger  of  earth  of  the  above  dimensions  and  600  ft. 
long,  would  require  6,240,000  cu.  ft.  of  earth.  The  mere 
excavation  of  this  mass  would  take   1000  workmen  at  least 

20  days. 

b.    Siege  Apparatus. 

§  209.  The  principal  work  of  a  regular  siege  was  the 
agger,  by  which  safe  approach  was  made  to  the  hostile  wall. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY. 


97 


Subsidiary  to  this  were  various  other  means  of  protection 
and  offence. 

§  210.  The  musculus  was  a  hut,  which  could  be  moved 
on  rollers,  for  the  protection  of  workmen  from  the  missiles 
of  the  besieged.     There  were  two  forms. 


Fig.  36. 

a.  The  first  form  (Fig.  2i^^  was  used  by  workmen  engaged 
in  levelling  the  ground  for  the  agger,  or  in  filling  up  the 
enemy's  ditch.     It  was  wedge-shaped,  and  built  of  strong 


Fig.  37. 


timbers  covered  by  heavy  planking.  The  forward  end  was 
constructed  of  two  triangles  put  together,  so  that  missiles 
would  glance  off. 


98 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


b.  The  second  form  (Fig.  37)  was  used  by  pioneers  who 
attempted  to  dig  out  the  foundation  stones  of  the  hostile 
wall.  As  it  came  so  near  the  enemy,  it  had  to  be  very 
strong,  to  resist  the  heavy  stones  thrown  down  from  the  bat- 


Fig.  38. 

tlements.  Those  used  in  the  siege  of  Massilia  were  probably 
cm,  10.  20  ft.  long,  5  ft.  high,  and  4  ft.  broad,  built  of  timbers  2  ft. 
thick.  Besides,  the  roof  was  covered  with  bricks  and  clay, 
to  guard  against  fire,  with  hides  over  all,  to  prevent  the  clay 
being  washed  off  by  water. 


§  211.  The  vineae  (Fig.  '^'^')  were  huts,  open  at  each 
end,  designed  to  form  a  safe  passage-way  to  the  muscu/us, 
or  to  any  point  where  the  siege  work  was  going  on.     As  they 


TACTICS    OF   THE    ARMY. 


99 


Fig.  40. 


wert-  not  brought  so  near  the  enemy  as  was  the  musailus, 
the  vineae  did  not  need  to  be  so  strong.  By  the  description 
of  Vegetius,  the  vinea  was  i6 
ft.  long,  8  ft.  high,  and  7  ft. 
wide,  the  side  walls  of  strong 
posts  connected  by  vaulted 
work,  and  the  roof  by  a  dou- 
ble thickness  of  planking.  It 
will  be  seen  that  the  vinea 
was  more  roomy  than  the 
inusculiis,  being  used  merely 
as  a  passage-way.  Often  the  roof  was  covered  with  green 
hides,  to  guard  against  fire 

§  212.  The  testudo  (Fig.  32,  ^)  was  a  hut,  much  hke 
the  mus cuius,  from  the  front  of  which,  however,  projected 
the  battering-ram  {aries) .  The  ram 
was  suspended  from  the  roof  of  the 
hut,  and  was  worked  by  a  number 
of  men  thus  protected. 

§  213.  The  battering-ram*  ((7n>j-, 
Fig.  32,  ^)  was  a  long,  heavy  log  of 
wood,  the  offensive  end  of  which 
was  strengthened  by  a  head  of  metal 
(iron  or  bronze),  sometimes  in  the 
shape  of  a  ram's  head.  Suspended 
at  its  middle  point  from  the  roof  of 
the  hut  {^testudo),  it  was  driven  with 
considerable  force  against  the  wall. 
The  ram  has  been  found  quite  effec- 
tive in  disjointing  stones,  although  its 
force  is  small  compared  with  that  of  a  cannon  shot.  The 
momentum  of  a  ram   28  in.  in  diameter  and  180  ft.  longj 


V.  IV,  IS 


Fig.  41. 


*  See  §  222,  at  end. 


lOO 


CiESAR  S    ARMY. 


V    P( 


weighing  41,112  lbs.  and 
worked  by  1000  men,  is  only 
equal  to  a  point-blank  shot' 
from  a  36-pounder. 

§  214.  The  movable  tower 
{turris  ambulatoria,  Fig.  32, 
c)  Caesar  used  continually  in 
his  sieges.  It  rested  on 
rollers,  was  several  stories 
high,  of  truncated  pyramidal 
shape,  and  constructed  of 
heavy  timbers.  The  stories 
were  connected  by  stairs  at 
the  side  remote  from  the 
enemy,  and  each  floor  was 
protected  by  a  high  bulwark. 
There  were  openings  through 
which  the  archers  and  sling- 
ers  could  send  their  missiles. 
The  tower  was  constructed 
out  of  range  of  the  enemy, 
and  then  advanced  on  rollers, 
preceded  by  musculi  con- 
taining workmen  who  leveled 
the  road.  The  use  of  the 
tower  was  as  a  battery  from' 
which  the  opposing  wall  could 
be  swept,  thus  protecting  the 
workmen  continuing  the  ag- 
ger. Also  when  near  enough, 
a  bridge  was  let  fall  upon  the 
wall  from  one  of  the  upper 
stories,  and  thus  soldiers 
could  rush  to  the  assault. 


TACTICS    OF    THE    ARMY, 


lOI 


§  215.  The  pluteus  (Figs.  39,  40,  41)  was  a  movable 
shield,  running  on  three  wheels,  one  at  each  end  and  one 
in  the  middle.  It  was  usually  made  of  osier  work  covered 
with  hides. 


L- 


lilxTiin.. 


ab  =  t  feet. 
cd=  ■>,  feet. 


^ig:.  43.     1j Ilium. 


VI.     THE    SHIPS    AND    SEA-FIGHTS. 

3.G.  III,  §  216.    This  subject  belongs  properly  to  a  discussion  of 

82-26,'28,29;  the  Roman  army,  as  the  actual  fighting  on  shipboard  was 
^,10,  i^.      always  done  by  details  fi-om  the  legions. 


A  A,  etc.  Lowest  bank  of  rowers. 
B  B,  etc.  Highest  bank  of  rowers. 
C  C,  etc.    Intervals  between  ribs. 


Fig.  44.* 

Section  of  Galley  with  five  Banks  of  Oars,  showing  the  position  oi  the  rowers. 


§  217.  The  Roman  ships  were  propelled  both  by  sails 
and  oars.  For  the  war-ships,  however,  the  latter  were  the 
main  reliance.  The  rowers  (slaves)  in  a  ship  of  any  size  sat 
under  the  deck,  on  benches  arranged  in  tiers  (Fig.  44) .    Each 

*  From  Scheffer,  De  Militia  Nnvali  Veierum,  Upsala,  ,1654  A.D. 


THE    SHIPS    AND    SEA-FIGHTS.  IO3 

rower  was  chained  to  his  bench  during  his  period  of  duty. 
The  working  crew  of  a  war-ship  comprised  a  few  sailors  to 
manage  the  sails  and  enough  slaves  to  work  the  oars  in  re- 
liefs, each  usually  working  four  hours  at  a  time.*  The  gal- 
leys {naves  longae')  were  very  long  and  swift,  having  usually 
three  tiers  of  oars.  The  fighting  crew,  as  above  said,  con- 
sisted of  a  number  of  legionaries. 

§  218.  The  war-ship  was  fitted  with  a  beak  {rostrii'ni) 
of  bronze  at  the  prow.  With  this  it  was  attempted  to  run 
down  and  sink  a  hostile  ship.  There  was  usually  a  detach- 
ment of  slingers  and  archers  on  board,  and  a  supply  of 
artillery.  Towers  were  sometimes  raised  on  the  deck,  so  as 
to  send  missiles  down  among  the  enemy.  This  was  espe- 
cially the  case  when  a  low  ship  was  attacking  a  higher  one. 
When  two  ships  grappled,  the  legionaries  boarded  with 
shield  and  sword. 

The  galleys  were  of  so  light  draft  that  they  could  be 
drawn  up  on  the  beach.  Of  course  the  largest  ships  of  the 
Romans  would  be  very  small  to  modern  eyes. 

§  219-  The  distinction  between  military  and  naval  science  is  of 
quite  recent  origin.  Even  so  late  as  the  seventeenth  century  a.d.  the 
same  men  were  employed  on  land  or  sea  as  might  be  most  convenient. 
That  staunch  old  Puritan  admiral,  Blake,  who  made  the  arms  of  the 
commonwealth  as  much  feared  on  the  sea  as  Cromwell  did  on  land, 
was  originally  an  officer  of  cavalry,  — thus  being  a  veritable  "horse 
marine." 

*  For  a  vivid  modern  description  of  slave  life  in  an  ancient  galley,  see 
Wallace's  Ben  Hur,  Bk.  111. 


VII.     THE    ENEMY. 

A.    DEFENCE    OF  FORTIFIED    TOWNS. 

§  220.  The  sieges  that  Csesar's  armies  conducted  were 
against  two  sorts  of  fortifications,  —  the  walled  towns  of  the 
Gauls,  as  Alesia,  and  the  more  elaborate  works  that  de- 
fended haunts  of  Graeco- Roman  civilization,  like  Massilia. 

B.G.  II,  12.  §  221.  The  former  were  comparatively  simple,  and  fell 
usually  without    much    difficulty   before    the    resources   of 

c.  II,  1-15.  Roman  military  science.  The  defences  of  Massilia,  how- 
ever, had  been  planned  by  the  same  engineering  skill  that 
assailed  them,  and  the  town  was  supplied  with  every  appli- 
ance of  resistance  known .  to  the  military  art  of  the  day. 
The  siege  of  that  city  was  a  grapple  of  giants. 

B.G.vii,23.  §  222.  Csesar  gives  a  clear  account  of  the  construction 
of  a  Gallic  town  wall.     Logs  are  laid  on  the  ground,  two 


Fig.  45.    Horizontal  Section  of  Gallic  Wall. 

feet  apart,  their  length  at  right  angles  to  the  direction  of  the 
wall  (Fig.  42).  The  large  end  of  each  log  is  turned  with- 
out, the  small  end  within.  These  smaller  ends  are  then 
fastened  together  by  cross-timbers  some  40  feet  long,  and 
earth  is  piled  on  them.     Between  the  large  ends  are  placed 


THE   ENEMY.  10$ 

great  stones,  and  a  rubble  of  small  stones  is  poured  into  the 
remaining  space  between  the  large  stones  and  the  earth  at 
the  smaller  ends  of  the  logs.  Then  a  second  course  of  logs 
is  laid  in  like  manner,  only  so  that  each  log  of  this  second 
course  was  placed  over  the  stones  filling  the  space  between 
two  logs  of  the  first  course.  Thus  the  work  is  carried  on 
until  the  wall  has  reached  the  desired  height.  Such  a  wall 
was  quite  effective.  The  stones  protected  it  from  fire,  and 
the  timber,  firmly  bound  together  as  it  was,  made  it  quite 
secure  from  the  battering-ram. 

Perhaps  this  is  why  Caesar  so  seldom  mentions  the  ram  in  detailing  R.  p.  146. 

his  sieges.     Riistow  says  that  Csesar  nowhere  speaks  of  that  implement. 

This  statement  is  an  error,  as  reference  is  made  in  two  places.  Hxx        ^^' 

^  VII,  23. 

On  the  walls,  towers  were  often  erected  at  various  points. 


Fig:.  46.     Vertical  Section  of  Gallic  Wall. 

§  223.  In  the  siege  of  Massilia  we  learn  the  varied  re- 
sources of  defence,  only  a  few  of  which  were  knov^n  to  the 
Gauls. 

In  the  first  place,  the  rampart  was  lined  with  artillery,  so 
that  the  besiegers  had  to  push  on  their  works  under  a  b.g.  vii, 
shower  of  stones  and  darts.  Every  effort  was  made  to  set  q  h'^  ^.^^^ 
fire  to  the  agger  and  to  the  various  huts.  At  MassiHa  this 
at  one  time  succeeded,  and  all  the  offensive  works  were  con- 
'sumed.  Fire-balls,  made  of  tow  soaked  in  pitch  and  kin- 
dled, were  hurled  from  the  wall.  Mines  were  run,  beginning 
within  the  wall  and  ending  in  the  siege  works.  Through 
these  mines  the  besieged  made  sudden  sorties,  trying  to  get 
possession  of  the  works  and  set  them  on  fire.     If  the  ram 


I06  CiESAR'S    ARMY. 

was  brought  to  bear  on  the  wall,  fenders  were  let  down 
from  its  top  by  ropes  to  protect  the  stonework ;  and  it  was 
sought  by  great  hooks  to  catch  the  ra^m  and  draw  it  from 
its  fastenings.  As  the  agger  and  towers  increased  in  height, 
the  town  wall  and  towers  were  often  carried  up  to  correspond. 
If  the  wall  was  itself  successfully  assailed  and  began  to  crum- 
ble, another  wall  was  rapidly  constructed  on  the  inside.  If 
all  these  things  failed,  however,  and  at  last  a  clear  way  was 
made  for  assault,  the  town  usually  surrendered. 

B.    THE    GALLIC    ARRAY    AND    ARMS. 

§  224.  The  Macedonian  phalanx  had  a  front  of  about 
500  men  and  a  depth  of  16.  That  of  the  Gauls  and  Ger- 
mans was  doubtless  of  similar  form,  but  of  varying  numbers. 
The  men  stood  close  together,  forming  a  compact  mass. 
The  shields  of  the  front  rank  formed  a  vertical  wall,  and 
those  of  the  rest  were  held  overhead,  lapping  over  one 
another  hke  the  shingles  on  a  roof,  only  in  the  reverse  order. 
It  will  be  seen  that  the  phalanx  depended  for  its  success  on 
the  momentum  of  its  mass.  However,  only  those  on  its 
outer  edges  could  use  their  weapons,  while  the  rest  were 
practically  imprisoned  in  the  crowd.  Here  the  Romans  had 
a  great  advantage  ;  for,  from  their  open  and  pliable  order  of 
battle,  nearly  every  man  sooner  or  later  was  in  action. 
Hence,  although  they  might  be  greatly  inferior  in  number, 
they  could  bring  into  use  more  swords  and  spears  at  a  given 
point  than  could  their  enemies. 

At  the  battle  of  the  Alma  (fought  Sept.  20,  1854),  the  British 
troops  in  line  were  attacked  by  heavy  bodies  of  Russians  in  solid 
squares,  not  unlike  the  old  phalanx.  It  seemed  that  if  the  huge 
mass  of  Russians  should  ever  reach  the  thin  British  line  (only  two 
or  three  men  deep),  the  latter  would  be  shivered  like  a  pipe-stem 
But  the  impact  never  took  place.  Every  one  of  the  British  was  free 
to  use  his  rifle,  while  in  the  square  only  the  few  men  on  the  outer 
edges  could  do   any  firing.      The   result   was  that  the   squares   were 


THE    ENEMY.  10/ 

broken,  their  momentum  destroyed,  they  gradually  ceased  their  advance 
and  finally  retreated.  (Kinglake's  Invasion  of  the  Crimea,  Vol.  Ill, 
p.  114  seqq.) 

Such  a  defence  in  line  against  an  opposing  mass  can  only  be  made 
successfully  by  troops  of  considerable  individual  self-reliance.  Such 
was  the  case  undoubtedly  with  the  British  regiments  at  the  Alma. 
Such  was  the  case  with  Caesar's  legionaries.  And  so  the  open  order  of 
battle  of  the  Romans,  bringing  every  soldier  to  bear  on  the  enemy,  w^as 
possible,  and  was  much  more  economical  of  force  than  the  crowded 
phalanx  of  the  Gauls. 

It  should  be  noticed,  in  this  connection,  that  modern  improvements 
in  missile  weapons  are  causing  radical  changes  in  tactics.  Breech- 
loading  and  repeating  rifles  have  put  an  end  to  all  solid  formations  in 
actual  battle.  In  1871,  at  St.  Privat,  the  German  army  in  30  minutes 
lost  one-third  of  its  strength  under  the  fire  of  the  Chassepot  rifles, 
although  at  distances  from  the  French  infantry  ranging  from  half  a 
mile  to  a  mile  and  a  quarter.  In  1878  a  Russian  brigade  attempted  a 
bayonet  charge  on  a  Turkish  redoubt  in  the  Skuptschina  Pass.  The 
redoubt  was  manned  by  infantry  armed  with  the  Arrierican  Remington 
rifle  —  and  the  brigade  was  annihilated  in  15  minutes. 

Since  these  wars,  it  is  evident  that  the  old  tactics  must  be  revolu- 
tionized. The  skirmish  line  becomes  the  main  reliance.  More  and 
more  will  depend  on  the  intelligence  of  the  individual.  Of  late,  too, 
successful  experiments  have  been  made  in  the  use  of  dynamite  shells. 
This  destroys  the  last  possibility  of  mass  formations. 

Thus  the  experience  of  the  Romans  is  repeated  in  our  own  day. 
Modern  discoveries  and  inventions  applied  to  military  science  demand 
a  more  open  order  of  battle,  and  tend  steadily  to  replace  the  brute 
force  of  a  mob  by  scientific  skill. 

It  is  plain  enough  from  this  that  Upton's  Tactics  is  already  obsolete. 
A  Board  is  now  sitting  to  devise  a  new  system  for  the  army  of  the 
United  States. 

§  225.  The  Gallic  sword  was  very  long,  two-edged,  and 
sheathed  in  an  iron  scabbard  that  was  suspended  at  the  right 
side  by  an  iron  or  bronze  chain.  This  sword  had  no  point, 
and  hence  was  adapted  rather  for  cutting  than  thrusting. 
The  spear  had  a  blade  at  least  2  ft.  long  and  6  to  8  in.  wide, 
sometimes  of  an  undulated  form.  As  missile  weapons,  light 
iavelins,  bows,  and  slings  were  used.     The  helmet  was  of 


I08  CiESAR's    ARMY. 

metal,  adorned  with  the  horns  of  animals,  having  a  crest 
representing  a  bird  or  savage  beast,  and  surmounted  by  a 
high  and  bushy  plume  of  feathers.  The  shield  was  of  plank, 
at  least  5  ft.  long,  and  very  narrow.  The  body  was  guarded 
besides  by  an  iron  or  bronze  breastplate,  or  by  a  coat  of 
mail.     This  last  was  a  GaUic  invention. 

C.    THE   BRITISH   CHARIOTS. 

B.G.  IV,  33.  §  226.  In  Britain,  Caesar  met  a  new  kind  of  attack.  The 
squadrons  of  hostile  cavalry  were  intermingled  with  chariots 
{essedae) ,  two-wheeled  cars,  each  drawn  by  two  horses  and 

containing  six  soldiers  {essedarii) 
besides  the  driver  {aurigd) .  Their 


C\  t\  -  /")    r\  r\  /'  '""y  custom  was   to   charge    fiercely, 

r^fiAUij/Zr^^MUl/// r^  hoping  by  the  rush  of  their  horses 

Ttt   1  1  1  \    iR   \  \  '=  ••    ^iT  and  the  clatter  of  their  wheels,  as 

j+  y  r  t^      j!f  V  J'  r^  ^^Y\  as  by  the  spears  hurled  by 

Fig.  47.  the  essedarii,  to  throw  their  enemy 

A  A.  Roman  Legions.  jnto  coufusiou.    Failing  this,  they 

B  B  B.  British  Cavalry.  ,  .  .  . 

Vast  o{  essedarii.  rctumcd  to  a  position  among  the 


a  a  a. 


3^3.  Post  of  chariots.  sQuadrons  of  cavalry:  and  there 

ab,  etc.  Course  of  chariots.  ^  ■ 

the  spearmen  dismounted  and 
took  their  post  as  footmen.  Meanwhile  the  drivers  took 
the  chariots  to  the  rear,  and  there  waited. 


MAPS 

OF  THE  PRINCIPAL  CAMPAIGNS 

AND 

PLANS 

OF  THE   MOST   IMPORTANT   BATTLES  AND   SIEGEJ 
OF  THE  GALLIC   WAR. 

ADAPTED    FROM 

NAPOLEON'S  LIFE  OF  CiESARo 


1  Kilometer  =  .G2137  of  a  mile. 
0               12               3 
L I I J 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  I.    Fortifications  on  the  Hhone.    E.G.,  Bk.  I.  Chap.  8. 

The  dotted  h'nes  indicate  wall  and  trench;  the  dotted  sqziares,  redoubts.  In  the 
lower  corner  at  the  right  is  a  vertical  section  oi  mzirus  ?in6./bssa.  From  Geneva  to  Pas- 
de-rEcluse  (or  Pas-d'EcIuse),  185  (English)  miles  by  the  river,  is  only  half  that  distance 
in  a  straight  line» 


kli 


1  Kilometer  =  .62137  of  a  mile. 
Plan  11.    Sattle  with  the  Helvetians.    B.G.,  Bk.  I.  Chap.  24-26. 

1.  The  new  legions  and  auxiliaries.  3.  The  Helvetians'  baggage,  parked. 

2.  Caesar's  camp.  4.  Th^Boii  and  Tulingi. 

The  heavy  lines  show  the  first  position  of  the  two  armies.  The  mountain  to  which 
the  Helvetians  fled  lies  immediately  west  of  the  modern  village  of  Las.  Just  south  of 
that  village,  the  light  dotted  lines  show  the  position  of  the  Helvetians  at  their  second 
attack,  and,  facing  them,  the  second  position  of  the  first  two  lines  of  the  Romans.  The 
third  line  has  wheeled  to  the  right,  to  meet  the  flank  attack  of  the  Boii  and  Tulingi. 

112 


Longitttde  East        6°     from  Green-wich 


MAP  OF  THE 

CAMPAIGN  OF 

B.C. 58. 


Latin  Names  are  in  Eoman  Type. 
Modem  Names  are  in  Italic  Type. 


_  „     ,    1J  JOemartJ'^ 
Zeltenbcrg-^  "-^.^^Jhl* 

P^^- v/.  J^  S(cii 


(AttselSte.Xeil^y- 


Magetobriga?  M 

Ibracte^   QAuUnJ^ 

^ 

ifr 

y^^  ^t-^Vjr'^          ^^"^ 

"^f^ 

!f^-4/  ^^^ 

/ilr 

?Mjabillonuni 

^(CTiaion)       . 

^'^'^  f      ^i^T" 

«^-^  )l  J^ 

'^  J        c^^ 

JEi,Vl*^    z'    7  v.,jP  /      fl^/P 

7^  1  '^' 

^!> 

1  kilometer  =  .62137  of  a  mile. 


Scale  of  Miles. 

First  camp  of  Ariovistus.  d.  Caesar's  larger  camp. 

Hill  on  which  the  conference  was  held.  e.  Cesar's  smaller  camp. 

Second  camp  of  Ariovistus.  f.  Roman  line  of  battle. 

g.  German  line  of  battle. 


13 


1  kilometer  =  .62137  of  a  mile 
3 


Scale  of  Miles. 

Plan  IV.     Battle  on  the  Aisne  {Aaeona).     B.G.,  Bk.  II.  Chap.  5-10. 

C.  R.  Castra  Romana. 


T- — 


Longitudt  E-ast /rem   Grtem^'icA 


i 


1  kilometer  =  .62137  of  a  mile. 


Scale  of  Miles. 


Plan  T.     Battle  on  the  Sambre  (Sabis).    E.G.,  Bk.  II.  Chap.  19-27. 
c.  R.  Castra  Romana.  c.  B.  Castra  Belgica. 


115 


a.  Agger. 

b,  d,  etc.  Redoubts, 
connected  by  wall  and 
ditch,  thus  forming  a 
line  of  contravallation. 


3€ 


H 


% 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  "VI.     Siege  of  A.dtiattica.     B.G.,  Bk.  II.  Chap.  29-33. 


116 


Oppidum 
Venetorum. 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  VII.     Campaign  against  the  Veneti.    E.G.,  Bk.  III.  Chap.  7-16. 

The  dotted  line  shows  the  course  of  the  two  fleets  from  the  Loire  and  the  Auray 

respectively. 


III 


J    J    »    f 


0      12     3     4     5 
'       '       '       '      '      ' 


15 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  VIII.     Siege  of  Avaricum.     E.G.,  Bk.  VII.  Chap.  23-28. 

!•  ^gger,  pushed  towards  the  town  from  the  Roman  camp. 

2.  First  position  of  Vercingetorix. 

3.  Second  position  of  Vercingetorix. 

4.  Section  of  the  agger,  according  to  RUstow. 


118 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  IX.     Siege  of  Gergovia.     E.G.,  Bk.  VII.  Chap.  36-53. 
Caesar's  large  camp.       2.  The  double  trench  connecting  the  camps.       3.  The  small  camp. 
4.  Gallic  fortifications.       5.  Gallic  wall.       6.  Detached  legion.      7.  Gallic  camp. 

119 


Iib.Tir.c.59.sq«i 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  X.    March  of  Labienus  against  ZiUtetia.      E.G.,  Bk.  VII„  Chap.  59-62. 


120 


Scale  of  Miles. 
Plan  XI.     Defeat  of  Vercingetoriic  on  the  Vingeanne.    E.G.,  Bk.  "VII.  Chap.  66-67. 


X2I 


Plan  XII.     Siege  of  Alesia.     E.G.,  Bk.  VII.  Chap.  68-89. 

123 


Plan  XIII.     Campaign  against  tJie  Bellovaci.     E.G.,  Bk.  VIII.  Ch.  7-16, 
C,  Rom  =  Roman  camp. 

b  =  Camp  of  the  Bellovaci. 

C  =  Roman  army. 

d  =  Army  of  the  Bellovaci. 


I2S 


A    / 


INDEX    OF   LATIN    MILITARY   TERMS. 


Numbers  refer  to  Sections. 


acie  instructa,  80,  82,  loi,  135. 
aciem  dirigere,  55. 

instruere,  55. 
acies,  78. 
acies  duplex,  63,  64,  65,  95. 

media,  65,  99. 

prima,  64. 

quadruplex,  95. 

secunda,  64. 

simplex,  65,  67,  68. 

tertia,  64. 

triplex,  63,  64,  65,  94. 
agger,  151,  196,  199,  201  seq.,22Z- 
agmen,  72,  78. 
agmen  extremum,  129. 

legionum,  129. 

novissimum,  129,  137. 

pilatum,  80,  81. 

quadratum,  136,  138. 
ala,  18,  86,  177. 
alarii,  17. 
Alauda,  40. 

antesignani,  37,  90,  137,  138. 
apparitores,  33. 
aquila,  13. 
aquilifer,  13. 
arbores,  202. 
aries,  212,  213. 
arma  expediuntur,  134. 
arma  in  contubernio  deposita,  180. 


auriga,  226. 

auxilia,  i. 

auxiliares,  17. 

ballista,  23,  24,  28. 

balteus,  45  a. 

beneficiarii,  178. 

braccae,  43. 

brachia,  191. 

buccina,  14. 

buccinator,  14,  183. 

calcei,  43. 

calo,  16,  180. 

carroballista,  28. 

cassis,-  44  a. 

castella,  149,  150,  191,  193. 

castra  aestiva,  145. 

hiberna,  188. 

ponuntur  (muniuntur),  180. 
catapulta,  23,  24,  28. 
centuria,  6. 
centuriatim,  74. 
centurion,  8. 
cervi,  Fig.  41. 
cippi,  41. 

circumvallatio,  191, 
claudunt  agmen,  134. 
cohors,  6. 

cohors  in  statione  ad  portam,  182. 
cohors  praetoria,  32,  "^Z- 
cohortatus,  loi. 


126 


INDEX. 


cohortes  disponere,  55. 

concursus,  no. 

consistere,  55. 

contvrbernales,  32. 

contubernium,  16,  37. 

cornu,  14. 

cornu  dextrum  (sinistrum),  65, 99. 

crista,  44  a. 

cruralia,  43. 

cursus,  107. 

decuria,  18. 

decurio,  18. 

emissio  pilorum,  no. 

eques,  18. 

equites  in  statione,  i8l. 

esseda,  226. 

essedarii,  226. 

evocati,  34,  35. 

excubitores,  193. 

exercitus,  129. 

ex  itinera,  123. 

ex  loco  superiore,  147.     [137, 199. 

expediti  (-tae,  etc.),  37>  ^33  ^,  ^34, 

exploratores,  1^0 1>,  181,  184. 

fabri,  19,  29,  36. 

falx,  Fig.  32. 

feminalia,  43. 

fossa,  151. 

directis  lateribus,  153. 

fastigata,  153,  154,  162. 

punica,  153. 
funditores,  17. 
furca,  49. 
galea,  44  a. 
galeae  induuntur,  134. 
galeantur,  134. 
gladius,  45  a. 
gradu  certo,  107. 

militari,  124. 
gradus,  125,  133. 
hastati,  9,  73,  74,  79. 
immunes,  178. 


impedimenta,  15. 

impeditos  in  agmine  adoriri,  134, 

impetus  gladiorum,  1 10. 

in  agmine,  134. 

in  itinere,  134. 

in  loco  necessario,  148. 

insignia,  134. 

accommodantur,  134. 
iter  cognoscere,  130^. 
jumenta,  14. 
latera  praetorii,  167. 
latus  apertum,  79,  117. 

exterius,  153. 

interius,  153. 
laxate  manipulos,  61. 
legatus,  4,  30,  65,  171. 

legionis,  4,  30. 
legio,  2. 

armatur,  134. 
legiones  armatae  et  instructae,  135. 

explicare,  55. 

invicem  ad  extremum  agmen 
evocabat,  137. 
lictor,  33. 
lilium,  Fig.  42. 
lituus,  14. 

loci  naturam  perspicere,  130  /? 
locus  iniquus,  106. 
lorica,  loricula,  43,  163. 
manipulatim,  y^. 
manipulus,  6,  13,  58. 
materia,  202. 
mercator,  15,  170. 
mills  levis  armaturae,  17. 
more  barbaro,  148. 
muli  Mariani,  49. 
munitiones,  191. 
musculus,  194,  210,  214. 
naves  longae,  217. 
obsidio,  190. 
ocreae,  44  d. 


INDEX. 


127 


omnes  copiae,  129. 

onager,  28. 

opere  dimenso,  180. 

oppugnatio  repentina,  19O- 

optio,  8,  12. 

orbis,  67,  70. 

ordinatim,  74. 

ordo,  6. 

parma,  17. 

passus,  125. 

pelles,  16,  189. 

phalanx,  224. 

pilani,  9,  73,  74,  79. 

pilis  infestis,  107. 

pilum,  36,  45  b,  61,  112. 

pilus,  9. 

pinnae,  163. 

pluteus,  199,  204,  205,  215. 

porta  decumana,  167,  170. 

praetoria,  167,  169. 

principalis  dextra,  167. 

principalis  sinistra,  167. 
praefectus  equitum,  18. 

fabrum,  36. 
praesidia,  144,  193. 
praetentura,  167,  171. 
praetorium,  169,  172,  182,  183. 
primipilus,  9,  12,  13. 
primum  agmen,  129. 
princeps,  9,  73,  74,  79. 
pugio,  45  a. 
quaestor,  31. 

quaestorium,  170,  172,  182. 
retentura,  167,  170. 
rostrum,  218. 
sagittarii,  17. 
sagum,  43. 
sarcina,  15,  49,  134,  135. 

conferuntur,  134. 

in  acervum  comportantur,  1 34. 
Scorpio,  25  a. 


scutum,  17,  44  ^. 
signa  inferre,  1 10. 
signifer,  13. 
signum,  13,  loi. 

profectionis,  187  3. 
speculator,  33,  I30<5,  181,  183. 
stationes,  184,  193. 
stimulus,  Fig.  41. 
subcenturion,  8. 
sub  linea,  152. 

sarcinis,  134. 

sarcinis  adoriri,  134. 
superior  locus,  106. 
tabernacula  constituere,  180. 
tabernaculum,  16,  189. 
tegimenta  scutis  detrahuntur,  134. 
tentorium,  16. 
testudo,  212,  213. 
tituluni,  150,  183. 
tormentum,  21,  24,  36. 
torquere  agmen,  55. 
tribuni  militum,  4,  12^,  171. 
tuba,  14. 
tubicen,  14. 
tunica,  43. 
turma,  18,  85,  177. 
turmatim,  88. 

turres  ambulatoriae,  201,  214. 
umbo,  44^. 
valli,  163. 
vallum,  157. 

vasa  conclamantur,  189  3. 
vexillum,  13. 
via  praetoria,  169. 

principalis,  167,  169, 1 71, 172. 

quintana,  167,  172. 
vigiles,  183. 
vigiliae,  183. 
vineae,  199,  200,  211. 
vitis,  8. 
voluntarii,  35. 


t'  mi 


BOSTON  COLLEGE 


3  9031   01772087  1 


U35,J93 


599^1 


Author 


JnrJ.qorij    Harry  Ftatt 


Title 


Caesar ^5  army 


035 
'3  93 


J  UDsojvj 


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UNIVERSITY    HEIGHTS 
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